



REMITTANCES AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

A policy research with a
focus on the South Sudanese
community in Australia

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Cover photo: The conflict in South Sudan since 15 December 2013 has arguably produced yet another type of IDP settlement to add to the humanitarian lexicon: protection of civilians (PoC) sites. These settlements have hosted more than 100,000 internally displaced persons for several months, and look set to continue for the foreseeable future. © IOM 2018/Ashley MCLAUGHLIN

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focus on the South Sudanese
community in Australia

Prepared for IOM by

Anna Ferro

FOREWORD



The Ministry of Finance and Planning has the pleasure of presenting *Remittances and Diaspora Engagement in South Sudan – A Policy Research with a Focus on the South Sudanese Community in Australia*. This report has been comprehensively conducted within the purview of the Technical Advisory Working Group's objectives, with the Ministry of Finance and Planning serving as lead co-chair. This report supports the aims and objectives of the Ministry of Finance and Planning in its effort to enact fiscal policies that recognize the contribution of diasporas to the development of South Sudan and its people. This report provides an in-depth analysis of the current state of play in South Sudan concerning remittances and diasporas engagement, the challenges that the Government of South Sudan face and the current operating systems of money transfers. Remittances is one of the greatest contributors to the growth of our national GDP. This research is paramount to avail us with data from migrants' remittances to the Bank of South Sudan, the Ministry of Finance and Planning will benefit from the accurate data for policymaking and the policy recommendations outlined in the report will enable the Government of South Sudan to develop a policy on documenting the flow of remittance in and out of South Sudan and how it can benefit for the development of the country.

This report was a collective endeavour by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Bank of South Sudan, South Sudan Investment Authority, Association of Banking Institutions and other relevant member agencies whose contribution are well appreciated. The Government has been generously supported by IOM with its provision of technical expertise.

Moving forward, we will seek to work closely with our sisterly countries of the East African Community block to learn more about their experiences in successfully managing remittances from diaspora communities across the world.

The Ministry of Finance and Planning expresses its gratitude to the South Sudanese diaspora community in Australia who have participated in this study, the IOM Development Fund and other agencies who have immensely and tirelessly supported this important research for the Government of South Sudan.

Ocum Genes Karlo
Undersecretary for Planning
Ministry of Finance and Planning, South Sudan

FOREWORD



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, as co-chair to the Technical Advisory Working Group on Remittances and Diasporas Engagement, welcomes the *Remittances and Diaspora Engagement in South Sudan – A Policy Research with a Focus on the South Sudanese Community in Australia*. As the ministry responsible for diaspora engagement, this report provides valuable knowledge to inform policymaking.

Following its independence in 2011, South Sudan has been struggling with addressing conflicts, natural disasters resulting in displacement and economic hardships, which have significantly impacted the well-being of the South Sudanese people. The Government has many conflicting priorities that require urgent attention. The situation has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced the Government to juggle even more pressing priorities. Consequently, the Government has yet to develop relevant policies related to favourable remittances and diaspora engagement; drafting such policies can ensure the diaspora's safe investment for families and communities and the sustainable development of South Sudanese people.

As an impact of displacement, many South Sudanese citizens have sought refuge in nearby countries or have been resettled further afield in countries, such as Australia and the United States of America. South Sudan has approximately 1 million diaspora who remain very much connected with South Sudan despite moving abroad, such as South Sudanese students who have studied overseas on scholarships and decided to settle in those countries.

After the independence of South Sudan, many citizens who were in the neighbouring countries returned, and many of their families and friends remain in host countries and have become active diaspora members who continue to support their family members in South Sudan through remittance transfers. Unfortunately, the remittance flow data has not been collected to inform policy prioritization of the remittance and diaspora engagement in the country.

This policy research is the first of its kind in South Sudan and was undertaken with the support and technical guidance by IOM, funded through the IOM Development Fund. The findings and recommendations will act as drivers to support the Government and its partners to collectively support diaspora engagement and investment in South Sudan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation supports the recommendations of this study and will expedite actions to ensure that the South Sudan diaspora continue to contribute to the development of the country through remittances, investment and skills transfer.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Mayen Dut Wol', with a large loop at the end.

Mayen Dut Wol
Undersecretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
South Sudan

FOREWORD



There is a wealth of research globally that confirms that when migration is well managed, it will undoubtedly contribute to the development of the countries involved. About 1 in 9 people globally receive financial support through remittances sent by migrants, and these include diasporas. Remittances have helped to move individuals, families and communities back home out of poverty by addressing their daily needs, economic and education investment and/or supporting family members who are facing crises or other economic hardships. Thus, remittances have contributed to enhancing countries' GDP index. Similarly, diasporas in host countries continue to make positive contributions to their host countries through skills application, socioeconomic investment and other benefits.

South Sudan is both a sender and receiver remittance country with domestic, regional and international remittance flows. Data on remittance flows is mostly based on estimates, with the total inflow of remittances to South Sudan estimated to represent 6.7 per cent of the national GDP in 2019. Remittances have been used to support South Sudanese families living in South Sudan and surrounding countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.


While diasporas and remittances have made a positive contribution to South Sudan and beyond, there is limited information and data available due to a lack of government policies.

To that end, through the project titled Enhancing Knowledge on Remittances and Diaspora Engagement in South Sudan, which was funded through the IOM Development Fund, IOM has supported the Government of South Sudan in producing the evidence-based *Remittances and Diaspora Engagement in South Sudan – A Policy Research with a Focus on the South Sudanese Community in Australia*. This policy research was conducted together with South Sudan's Technical Advisory Working Group, co-led by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and aims to build knowledge on remittances and diaspora engagement in South Sudan. The policy research employed qualitative and quantitative analysis and selected Australia as a case study given the sizeable South Sudan diaspora population in the country. The research applied a gender analysis lens to generate feedback on reinforcing gender-sensitive initiatives from the diaspora, with particular attention on leveraging the diaspora's role on women and youth empowerment. As the research was also conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, it also examined the impact of COVID-19 on the remittance flows.

The policy research outlines 12 policy recommendations for South Sudan that were generated from analysing the data collected through surveys and consultation sessions. The 12 recommendations have been used by the Technical Advisory Working Group to draft evidence-based policy proposals, which were also facilitated within this project scope.

The IOM Development Fund is the Organization's funding mechanism that supports its Member States to improve migration governance in order to meet the goals set forth in the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Agenda 10.7 and 10.10. Given the importance of diaspora and remittances roles in development, their contribution can also be generated to achieve relevant SDGs.

We hope you enjoy reading the report, and that the report's findings and recommendations enable the Government of South Sudan and the international community to provide further support to the South Sudanese people.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a series of connected loops and curves, representing the name Peter Van Der Auweraert.

Peter Van Der Auweraert
Chief of Mission, IOM South Sudan

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This publication is the result of extensive desk research and interviews with key stakeholders carried out between February and May 2020.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AML	anti-money laundering
BoP	balance of payments
BSS	Bank of South Sudan
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CMP	Comprehensive Migration Policy
CSO	civil society organization
DAA	Diaspora Action Australia
DMA	Developing Markets Associates
EAC	East African Community
ECB	European Central Bank
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FDI	foreign direct investment
FIU	Financial Investigation Unit
GDP	gross domestic product
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
GSMA	Global System for Mobile Communications Association
ID	identification document
IDP	internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KYC	know your customer
MFI	microfinance institution
MMO	mobile money operator
MNO	mobile network operator
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
MTO	money transfer operator

MoU	memorandum of understanding
NAC	National Aliens Committee
NCA	National Communications Authority
NCM	National Coordination Mechanism
NGO	non-governmental organization
ODA	official development assistance
PoC	protection of civilians
RRR	reserve requirement ratio
SSCAV	South Sudanese Community Association in Victoria
SSP	South Sudanese pound
TACSI	The Australian Centre for Social Innovation
TAWG	Technical Advisory Working Group
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The country context

South Sudan has faced several challenges that hampered its development trajectory. The effects of prolonged conflicts and insecurity has increased the vulnerability of the population, with displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring countries largely in need of humanitarian assistance. Due to forced migration, most people in South Sudan are connected to and deeply rely on internal, regional and global networks that move money and goods. Therefore, remittances represent a vital financial lifeline.

Despite the potential of mobilizing remittances and engaging the diaspora for development, there are also challenges that reduce their positive impact in South Sudan and that are examined in this study:

- (a) Compliance to the legal framework on remittances is weak and difficult to obtain in the country; informal remittance practices and unauthorized operators are predominant.
- (b) The costs of remitting to South Sudan from abroad are among the highest in the world.
- (c) Accurate data on remittance flows is missing.
- (d) Knowledge on the South Sudanese diaspora abroad is modest and not stable, and mutual trust relationship exists between the diaspora in Australia and the government in South Sudan.
- (e) The possibility of maximizing the productive potential of migrant remittances and turning them into local investments is limited.
- (f) Public authorities in South Sudan express a lack of competence and coordination to address diaspora issues and fully implement remittances and diaspora policies.
- (g) The research took place in 2020 and was based on various methodological tools, with extensive consultations and desk review through different sources. The qualitative tools include interviews with stakeholders in South Sudan, particularly the members of the Technical Advisory Working Group (TAWG), international experts and diaspora members in Australia (50 persons), with the support of Diaspora Action Australia. The quantitative instruments include a questionnaire directed to the TAWG members and an online survey directed to the diaspora in Australia. Additionally, the *Toolkit for Understanding Diaspora Investment* developed by Making Finance Work for Africa (African Development Bank (AfDB) and Making Finance Work for Africa, 2019) was used and adapted to the context of South Sudan to provide a diaspora engagement and investment baseline.

The current state of remittances in South Sudan

Remittances refer to small-value personal transactions across countries. South Sudan is a sender and receiver remittance country with domestic, regional and international flows. Remittance recipients are based in South Sudan, and also in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Remittance senders are based both in South Sudan, but mostly in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Gulf countries. The local and transnational financial need to receive and send money to face daily contingencies shows the crucial role played by remittance providers.

Data on remittance flows is mostly based on estimates: the total inflows of remittances to South Sudan represented 6.7 per cent of the national GDP in 2019, while outflows confirm that remittances also generate from South Sudan, accounting for 2.13 per cent of the GDP (World Bank, n.d.a).¹ A decline is expected as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic: global projections from the World Bank (2020) consider a 23 per cent decrease in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey in Australia confirms the majority (75%) is affected by COVID-19 in its capacity to remit.

South Sudan has not yet developed a data collection system of its remittance flows. A high level of informality of money transfer and foreign exchange services represent a challenge for South Sudan authorities: informal operators – without the authorization of the Bank of South Sudan (BSS) and without complying to the existing regulation – are prevalent, especially for domestic transfers in rural areas. The fewer formal operators involve the following: (a) money transfer operators (MTOs) and mobile money operators (MMOs); and (b) mobile network operators (MNOs) and banks, granted with the licence from the BSS. New MMOs are entering the market with remittance services that could potentially reach rural areas and unbanked populations, especially women, while increasing competition and likely reducing remittance costs. Literacy, gender and urban/rural context appear to be the main drivers affecting the possibility to own a phone and access to any financial service (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019).

The diaspora from Australia sends money mainly through formal channels. The research evidences a highly banked diaspora in Australia, but with very limited access to banks in South Sudan, mainly relying on cash transfers with traditional MTOs, and also through the Internet and the phone. In terms of amount remitted yearly, on average migrants transfer between USD 2,800 and USD 3,500. Remittances represent between 9.5 and 13.8 per cent of the yearly migrant income, and they are perceived as a moral obligation to support the family in need. The increased demand of financial support and expectations on diaspora communities are causing growing financial and mental stress. Remittances are mainly used in South Sudan for daily life contingencies, food and everyday necessities (81%), educational fees (70%) and medical expenses (59%).

Transferring money to South Sudan from abroad can be very expensive: in 2017, the average transaction cost was 9.66 per cent. Nevertheless, fees change according to the corridor (from which sending country) and the operator employed (MTOs, MNOs and banks). The commissions from Australia to South Sudan varied from 5 per cent to 12 per cent, with mobile providers offering the cheapest costs.

¹ Annual remittances data (updated as of October 2019).

The remittance demand side in South Sudan requires to expand the supply of operators and increase market competition especially through the following: (a) mobile money providers; (b) targeted services; and (c) financial literacy, especially in rural areas. Obstacles exist in terms of lack of infrastructures (as network coverage), lack of financial services in rural areas, and limited literacy and financial literacy, mostly among women.

Remittances in a gender perspective

South Sudanese women both send and receive remittances. The possible contribution of women from the diaspora is affected by the social and cultural roles they have in the traditional systems in the origin country, the age on migration in the destination country, and the general outcome of their migratory experience (mostly influenced by the access to school). The study shows examples of women from the diaspora (and also men) highly committed and eager to support women in South Sudan – mobilizing social, human and monetary resources to support health, education and employability projects, as well as transferring principles of gender equity. Rare are the examples of diaspora female entrepreneurs in South Sudan. The diaspora role as advocate for women empowerment in South Sudan is fundamental and shall be further valued and supported.

Within the poor population in South Sudan, women represent the group that faces more risks of inequality, poverty and exclusion. Only 19 per cent of women use formal and informal transfer systems compared to 31 per cent of men; a significant gender gap remains in access to phones; literacy level is lower for women compared to man (and mostly for women in rural areas); the lack of access to an identity document is more acute for women and rural residents. Mobile payments and digital money are considered for their significant potential to serve women's financial needs.

The South Sudanese community in Australia

The diaspora in Australia faces various challenges in the labour, economic and social integration at destination that affect their remitting capacity.

The community is estimated between 30,000 and 50,000 South Sudanese – first and second generation; mainly an urban and suburban population. An increasing life settlement and financial inclusion in Australia emerges: 25 per cent South Sudanese-born owned a house with a mortgage in 2016. The survey undertaken for this study shows 43 per cent of respondents owning a house and 28 per cent planning to buy one. Not all diaspora although has high-paying jobs and budget cuts to Australian social welfare affect the diaspora's ability to send remittances. The majority has large families and salaries are in line with prevalent medium to low-skilled occupations, though with some exceptions. The 64 per cent of the South Sudanese born living in Victoria state earn up to USD 20,400; the respondents to the survey – which involved persons with an average medium–high education – declared a prevalent income between USD 25,000 and USD 33,000. Although the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia is not very well-off, trends of increasing education level are observed and achievements, especially of younger generations, in accessing education and employment opportunities are registered. Despite not all the young generation South Sudanese are interested to be involved in South Sudan development, some of them are motivated and equipped with skills and competencies they are keen to mobilize.

The diaspora in Australia is very fragmented along ethnic divisions; diaspora associations are very diversified and not much coordination exists. Nevertheless, collective remittances from formal or informal diaspora groups reaffirm transnational ethnic solidarity and maintain local bonds and sense of belonging. The majority sustains community projects in the areas of origin; among the sectors that receive the largest group contributions are as follows: (a) health (as child and female/maternal health clinics); and (b) education (building schools or setting up scholarship programmes). Support to the education and human capital formation is among the priorities for individual and collective remittances. Different (male and female) diaspora associations are involved in sustaining vulnerable South Sudanese women – especially widows or single mothers. Other initiatives include the following: (a) response to natural disaster; (b) acquisition of vehicles; (c) aid for disabled people; and (d) shipping supplies. Overall, the lack of structured government offices dedicated to the diaspora makes it difficult for the diaspora to coordinate and implement projects in South Sudan, for instance in terms of availability and accessibility to documents and permissions.

The diaspora in Australia and investments in South Sudan

Remittances from Australia are rarely employed to support family or personal job-generating activities. The more prevalent narrative is that after the 2011 independence of South Sudan, many South Sudanese abroad returned. Most people who invested at that time, mainly on small-scale activities, inevitably lost the invested capitals due to subsequent conflicts.

The research underlines that investing in South Sudan assumes, for the diaspora in Australia, the meaning of starting and running a personal business as entrepreneur. This implies a physical presence in the country that cannot always be feasible (for travel costs, work and family obligations in Australia). Despite the common desire and aspiration, the diaspora has no trust in investing in South Sudan today, nor it necessarily disposes the means, the skills or the opportunity (due to personal and family circumstances and life settlement abroad). From the survey, 10 persons declared to be potentially interested in investing in South Sudan in the future, while the majority is doubtful. Moreover, the prevalent plan for the future is to “continue living in Australia” (63%), or to “live in Australia, while increasing visits and relationships with South Sudan” (25%).

At the same time, diaspora investors in South Sudan expressed their difficulties: (a) access to credit (all employed personal resources as starting capital); (b) management of the project from abroad and lack of local skills and work culture from their staff (family members); (c) lack of suitable financial products to easily transfer and manage entrepreneurial remittances from abroad; and (d) lack of investment programmes targeting migrants. Finally, the banking system in South Sudan appears not yet to be equipped or organized to serve the diaspora needs and offer tailor-made products and services.

According to the investigation findings, the conditions that could help migrants to invest in South Sudan are as follows: (a) “raising the public investment in training and education”; and (b) “providing better infrastructures/interconnections between South Sudan and the diaspora”.

Both the willingness and ability of the diaspora in Australia to invest in South Sudan and the country readiness to encourage investments result weak and uncertain; the need to grant stability and security is fundamental.

Recommendations

Based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodology and tools used both in the South Sudanese and Australian contexts, 12 policy recommendations on diaspora remittances and development engagement are outlined, responding to the policy challenges identified at the beginning. Each recommendation may overlap and respond to various policy objectives at the same time.²

The main institutional barriers identified by the diaspora in Australia are as follows: (a) fragile political stability and ongoing insecurity in South Sudan; (b) weakness in the rule of law; and (c) limited transparency and accountability of public institutions. Any attempt of diaspora engagement from the Government of South Sudan was described by informants in Australia as a long-term twofold process of trust building that shall take place in Australia and in South Sudan at the same time.

The recommendations identified through the study are aimed at the following:

Reinforcing the diaspora remittances framework in South Sudan

- (a) Increase the compliance of unlicensed remittance and foreign exchange operators to the existing legal framework by reinforcing policy and administrative measures in South Sudan.
 - (i) Reinforce policy and administrative measures to improve the legal framework of remittances.
 - a. Reinforce implementation, monitoring and sanctioning measures (such as the Financial Investigation Unit).
 - b. Support the development of a national ID system.
 - c. Develop and enforce regulations to protect customer data privacy and users' private information.
 - (ii) Develop a remittance price comparison website and offer visibility to licensed operators.
 - (iii) Establish a permanent remittance task force or remittance commission in South Sudan.
 - (iv) Identify measures targeting domestic local remittance operators (develop a new domestic regulation).
 - (v) Maintain a corridor approach.
 - (vi) Harmonize and align some national remittances supervisory rules and practices with those of the East African Community.

² For each recommendation, an indication is provided of the time needed for implementation, keeping in mind that the definition of "short-medium-long term" all depends on the stability conditions in South Sudan.

- (b) Enable the development of a dynamic and competitive market environment open to more certified operators to foster private sector investments, increase commercial competition, induce reduced remittance costs, and improve the access to financial services in rural areas.
 - (i) Support infrastructural interventions to face structural barriers (such as network coverage and access to electricity).
 - (ii) Identify incentives (as tax breaks) to encourage new formal remittance operators to enter the market in South Sudan and reach rural areas.
 - (iii) Review the legislation on microfinance institutions.
 - (iv) Support the need of reinforcement of the banking system (capitalization, liquidity, internal control).
 - (v) Strengthen digital and financial literacy skills, especially in rural areas.
 - (vi) Create the conditions to link up remittances to directly pay for the children's school fees.
- (c) Establish a data collection system directed to obtain remittance flows' information from official remittance operators.
 - (i) Build a data collection system on remittance flows by mandatory asking for information.
 - (ii) Share data between the South Sudanese and Australian regulatory bodies, and reinforce the technical capacities of the Bank of South Sudan.
 - (iii) Involve private stakeholders in building the data collection system.

Building a diaspora engagement strategy in South Sudan

- (a) Enhance the political will and institutional commitment of the Government of South Sudan to create a diaspora-friendly environment.
 - (i) Open and foster diplomatic channels, embassies/consulates where the diaspora lives.
 - a. The profile of the investment–trade–diaspora attaché shall be introduced/reinforced.
 - (ii) Establish agreements with airlines companies to favour diaspora travel opportunities.
 - (iii) Establish a diaspora institutional public event.
 - (iv) Develop a long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation process in Australia and South Sudan.
- (b) Improve the dialogue with the diaspora in Australia by formally recognizing and involving it as development actor in South Sudan, including the following.
 - (i) Build thematic discussion tables in South Sudan involving the main stakeholders, including diaspora representatives, at the central and local levels.
 - (ii) Create a diaspora commission within the Government in South Sudan to facilitate the dialogue with diaspora at the institutional level.

- (c) Consolidate the knowledge on the diaspora by building a mapping system to reach the Australian diaspora, establishing direct channels and consultation mechanisms, especially employing social media, including the following.
 - (i) System of diaspora data collection: a website, an app, a survey.
 - (ii) Diaspora communication system: email, WhatsApp, social media, social platforms.
 - (iii) “Register” of diaspora philanthropy groups.
 - (iv) “Register” of target groups or specific competencies: highly skilled professionals, academia and health workers.
- (d) Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its engagement by meeting and consulting the diaspora in Australia.
 - (i) Plan a consultation road tour involving different South Sudanese authorities in Australia (in the states where the diaspora lives as in Victoria state and Queensland), following a participatory and bottom-up approach with the support of local facilitators.
 - (ii) Establish a virtual (online) and physical diaspora desk (in Juba).
- (e) Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its engagement by mapping and engaging skilled diasporas in Australia, starting with small pilot projects of knowledge transfer targeting health and academia profiles.
 - (i) Revitalize the past project from IOM South Sudan (2013) called Strengthening South Sudan’s health system by engaging health professionals in the diaspora that created a register of health professionals.³
- (f) Promote diaspora engagement and expertise, reinforcing gender-sensitive initiatives from the diaspora and targeting women in South Sudan.
 - (i) Map and engage diaspora’s female talented and committed individuals and groups.
 - (ii) Sustain and reinforce existing diaspora initiatives that support women’s empowerment in South Sudan (male and female diaspora led-initiatives).
 - (iii) Promote financial literacy, especially in rural areas.
- (g) Promote diaspora engagement and expertise of young diaspora generations with pilot initiatives, as a call for diaspora sustainable development ideas, projects and start-up, only if implementation resources are available.

³ See www.iom.int/news/pilot-project-will-engage-south-sudanese-diaspora-health-professionals.

- (h) Promote diaspora engagement and expertise targeting diaspora investors.
 - (i) Develop tailor-made investment tools and incentives targeting the diaspora.
 - (ii) Facilitate clearance on diaspora land property rights to enable diaspora's investments.
 - (iii) Encourage financial institutions to develop financial products targeting diaspora needs (to remit, save and invest).
 - (iv) Improve the competencies and skill of the local population in South Sudan with public investments in training and education and offering training and technical assistance services.
- (i) Building and reinforcing the capacity of institutions in South Sudan and their coordination to address diaspora issues.
 - (i) Reinforce competencies and capacities of South Sudan authorities (especially BSS) to strengthen the remittance legal framework with technical support and training.
 - (ii) Reinforce competencies and capacities of interested institutions to address migrant-related issues (diaspora focal point/unit).
 - (iii) Reinforce competencies and capacities to build transnational partnerships with international organizations, non-State actors and authorities in Australia (also exploring partnerships that could support diaspora projects offering training in Australia and implementation in South Sudan).
 - (iv) Reinforce the coordination among public institutions in South Sudan interested in dealing with remittances/diaspora (along the existing TAWG).

INTRODUCTION

This research is part of the project titled Enhancing Knowledge on Remittances and Diaspora Engagement in South Sudan, funded by the IOM Development Fund and managed by IOM South Sudan, in partnership with the Government of South Sudan's Ministry of Finance and Planning, BSS and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The objective of the study was to fill the knowledge gap on remittances in and to South Sudan, and address policy recommendations on where the Government of South Sudan could make policy guidance to enhance migrant remittances and diaspora engagement. To this aim, the research analysed the Australia–South Sudan corridor.

Through the transfer of money, goods and knowledge, diasporas – people living out of their homeland, but still being strongly attached to it – participate in the economic, political and cultural support of the origin country. The mobilized resources are fundamental as emergency response and development contribution, especially for fragile countries. South Sudanese remittance recipients are largely dependent on migrants' help to face the consequences of forced migration, displacement and extreme poverty. Enabling the way remittances are sent, received and managed can influence on the possibility to reach vulnerable persons, especially in more remote and isolated areas, improve their life conditions and access financial services, reinforcing the process of financial inclusion in South Sudan. Moreover, the diaspora in Australia – that is very fragmented and faces economic and social difficulties – not only constantly responds to monetary family needs as a moral obligation, but is also crucial in areas of education, health and infrastructures for the communities of origin.

Efforts to improve the remittance environment in South Sudan and engage its diaspora from Australia face critical challenges mostly due to the current uncertain political situation and conflict risks in the country. This hampers the trust from the diaspora and its willingness to further contribute or invest.

The Government of South Sudan started a process of developing a comprehensive migration policy, including the migration and development pillar. An articulated long-term process is needed to make South Sudan a diaspora and remittance-friendly environment, reinforcing the role of the Government and the private sector as environment enablers in maximizing the development potential of remittances and mobilizing migrants' skills and expertise.

Based on an extended qualitative and quantitative analysis of the context of remittances to South Sudan and of the diaspora profile and engagement from Australia, this study aims at helping the Government of South Sudan to take evidence-based decisions.

The first chapter outlines the main features on the South Sudanese context in relation to migrant remittances and diaspora engagement legal frameworks. The second chapter focuses on the state of remittances in/to South Sudan with an extensive analysis of remittance flows and operators, as well as the employment and costs of remittances. The third chapter examines remittances from a gender perspective, while the fourth chapter looks at the South Sudanese community

in Australia: the geographical distribution, and integration and its commitment in transnational organizations. The fifth chapter explores the investment climate in South Sudan with the aim of evaluating possible diaspora investments. The sixth chapter presents the evidence-based policy recommendations on migrant remittances and diaspora engagement between Australia and South Sudan.

Research methodology

The research was carried out between February and May 2020, and was based on various methodological instruments, with extensive consultations and desk review through different secondary sources.⁴ The **qualitative tools** include interviews⁵ with key informants in South Sudan and different stakeholders, particularly the members of the TAWG.⁶ With the support of Diaspora Action Australia (DAA), diaspora members, investors and community leaders were consulted (50 persons) in Australia.⁷ DAA contributed to the fieldwork activities, conducting interviews with South Sudanese community leaders and experienced peacebuilders, ensuring fair tribal and gender representation, and facilitating the survey circulation. International experts from various countries (Australia, Ethiopia, France Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) were also involved.

Quantitative instruments of research were designed and employed: a questionnaire directed to the TAWG members and an online survey to the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia that circulated through different networks and channels (43 questionnaires compiled).⁸

Additionally, the *Toolkit for Understanding Diaspora Investment* developed by Making Finance Work for Africa (AfDB and Making Finance Work for Africa, 2019) was employed and adapted to the context of South Sudan.⁹ To this aim, different tools were used to collect and systematize available information for South Sudan and highlight specific missing data. The templates were not used to produce scores or indexes, but to provide a diaspora engagement and investment baseline that can be updated in the coming years.¹⁰ The attached documents are as follows: (a) Diaspora Investment Readiness Index for South Sudan, which identifies the key aspects that influence the country's readiness to invest ("What investment opportunities are offered to the diaspora?"), as well as the diaspora investment profile (its ability and willingness to invest in the country of origin); (b) Diaspora Investment Assessment Template for South Sudan,¹¹ which collects economic and financial indicators to understand the readiness of the diaspora to invest back home; and (c) "Template of the self-assessment on diaspora engagement" for South Sudan.

⁴ For instance, Australian Bureau of Statistics (www.abs.gov.au/census); World Bank website to compare remittance prices worldwide (<https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org>).

⁵ See Annex 3. Consultations carried out.

⁶ Including the following: (a) Ministry of Finance and Planning; (b) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; (c) Ministry of Trade and Industry; (d) BSS; (e) South Sudan Investment Authority (now Ministry of Investment and Investment Services); and (f) South Sudan Bankers' Association.

⁷ The association DAA has built a close connection to the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia, supporting the organization of the 2011 referendum and facilitating intercommunity dialogue.

⁸ Questionnaire link: <https://ee.humanitarianresponse.info/xj/#C2qkvdoz>.

⁹ An initiative to support the development of African financial sectors. Among its governing members: AfDB Group, European Investment Bank, GIZ and others; and among its partners: the African Union for Housing Finance and the Association of African Central Banks (AfDB and Making Finance Work for Africa, 2019).

¹⁰ Based on the Toolkit methodology, a certain number of key persons are asked to review the templates and provide rates/scores on different pillars and arguments to calculate synthetic indexes. Mr Donglia Donglia from the Bank of South Sudan very generously helped to compile the templates for South Sudan in March 2020.

¹¹ This tool collects the main indicators, but it needs to be part of a broader assessment of diaspora investment and local market conditions.

The study overall faced some challenges and limitations. The qualitative fieldwork in South Sudan and in Australia were affected by COVID-19 restrictions in terms of limited mobility and social distancing: no face-to-face interviews and focus groups or international missions were possible. The mitigation strategy consisted of an extensive use of desk tools, online meetings and consultations from remote that allowed to reach the expected outcomes. To cope with COVID-19 impacts on the fieldwork, it could be useful to plan a follow-up study to update and compare findings in condition of normality.

Despite the quantitative research methodology's initial plan of a higher target number of respondents (a sample between 120 and 200 persons, with indication of age, gender and ethnic representativeness), the survey collected only 43 individual questionnaires. The survey was promoted and shared along diaspora networks in Australia, and more than 150 South Sudanese in Australia were personally invited by DAA to fill the anonymous questionnaire. Unfortunately, the majority denied due to common distrust. The partial result of this survey attempt shall be significantly taken into account, considering the difficult trust relationship between the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia and initiatives from the origin country.

The South Sudanese that participated in the fieldwork (with interviews and the questionnaire filled) correspond to a selected proactive and highly engaged diaspora group that cannot be considered representative of the whole South Sudanese population in Australia. Still, the findings and recommendations collected in the study refer to that possible diaspora target willing to be involved and mobilized for the home country.

1. THE COUNTRY CONTEXT OF SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan became an independent nation on 9 July 2011. In 2005, a peace agreement was signed in Nairobi, ending a long war with the North of the Sudan.¹² In December 2013, a conflict erupted and a civil war broke out until another peace agreement was signed in September 2018.¹³ South Sudan has faced several challenges that hampered its development trajectory. The effects of **prolonged conflicts** and **insecurity** has increased the vulnerability of the population. South Sudanese war-affected communities today need massive humanitarian and reconstruction support: assisting displaced people, providing basic services and food, and improving food security through agriculture and economic development (World Food Programme (WFP), 2018).¹⁴ Different areas in the country are additionally exposed to natural adverse events, particularly due to high rainfall variability.¹⁵

Forced migration due to conflicts and other crises has resulted in 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees that fled to neighbouring countries, and in 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).¹⁶ Under the 2020–2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP),¹⁷ 7.5 million people are considered in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁸ Uganda and the Sudan both host over 800,000 refugees from South Sudan. The majority live in camps¹⁹ and face limited access to livelihood opportunities.²⁰ The protection and humanitarian needs of South Sudanese are evident, representing the largest refugee situation on the African continent.²¹ Conditions are not yet in place to facilitate or promote voluntary returns and repatriation in safety to South Sudan due to ongoing insecurity (United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019–2020).

Since its independence, South Sudan has undergone several economic shocks that reduced the Government's ability to raise revenues and provide the required services to its people. Economic and social infrastructures results are poor, limiting productivity and diversification;²² institutional changes are needed, but the governance challenges are high and the political will and capacity to undertake them is inadequate (African Development Bank Group, 2018). South Sudan largely relies on food commodity imports; recent movement restrictions related to COVID-19 resulted in the closure of border crossings, affecting trade activity especially

¹² The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

¹³ The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

¹⁴ Data revealed high food insecurity levels in South Sudan, especially in Jonglei, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile states and Juba in Central Equatoria. Most of these areas also coincide with high insecurity incidences and natural shocks and risks (WFP, 2018).

¹⁵ From flood risks to drought risks.

¹⁶ See <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan?id=251>.

¹⁷ The HRP is prepared for a protracted or sudden-onset emergency that requires international humanitarian assistance to the affected population (<https://humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan>).

¹⁸ See <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/south-sudan-crisis-response-plan-2020-2021>.

¹⁹ With only 8 per cent living in individual accommodations.

²⁰ See www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/.

²¹ See <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/21611#:~:text=The%202019%2D2020%20South%20Sudan,by%20the%20end%20of%202020.&text=As%20the%20protracted%20emergency%20enters,situation%20on%20the%20African%20continent>.

²² The economy of South Sudan is highly dependent on oil production (accounting for about 90% of government revenue) and therefore dependent on the global oil prices fluctuations; exchange rates and increased inflation are highly affected by the devaluation of the local currency.

between South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and the Sudan. As a consequence, food imports were reduced and prices increased,²³ further worsening the livelihoods of the population. Small signs of economic recovery were reported in 2020, but a collapse of the peace agreement could push the economy back into recession (World Bank, 2020).

Due to its history of mass migration and displacement, most people in South Sudan are connected to and often rely on internal, regional and global networks that move money and goods. Money transferring (to send or receive remittances) represents a crucial financial need for most people in South Sudan. At the same time, **financial literacy** in South Sudan is very limited, and it varies in consideration of the rural and urban area, gender and literacy (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:32).²⁴

As a consequence of local conflicts and forced migrations, **remittance flows** regularly reach family members settled in refugee camps in neighbouring countries and living in South Sudan. The role of South Sudanese diasporas and their monetary support appear decisive in providing direct help and resources, especially to those severely affected by displacement, insecurity and poverty.

The South Sudanese **diaspora** is largely composed by persons previously based in refugee camps (for instance in Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda or North Africa) that afterwards resettled²⁵ in other countries. Australia is among the countries that offered resettlement opportunities to South Sudanese refugees, with increasing flows from the late 1990s—early 2000. The integration process in Western countries for persons who faced forced migration and displacement, trauma and human rights' violations can be a complex experience that leads to different outcomes. Not all diaspora abroad are well-off, and some are socially and economically marginalized.

South Sudan's fragile context expresses an extensive need for stability and support. Given this fragile context, recognizing and reinforcing the contribution of diaspora and its remittances in South Sudan is essential.

1.1. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

When studying migrant remittances and how to engage the diaspora for development in South Sudan, with particular interest to migrants' economic and investment contributions, the arena of stakeholders results large and diversified. Government and institutional actors are the main subject that can institutionally legitimate the process of engagement of the diaspora and include it in a long-term national development perspective. This study has primarily involved the participants of the Technical Advisory Working Group (TAWG) established by IOM, including the most strategic stakeholders in South Sudan in relation to migrant remittances and diaspora engagement.

²³ See www.acaps.org/country/south-sudan/crisis/complex-crisis.

²⁴ Overall, people have limited knowledge of financial services: "half of the population indicate that they have never heard of insurance or loans services and a third report of having never heard of savings services. Financial literacy is equally low across age groups and types of residence (rural, urban, PoC site). However, there are large differences across gender, literacy levels, and counties. Men tend to be more informed of the existence of different financial services. Predictably, literate people also have higher levels of financial literacy" (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:31).

²⁵ Resettlement involves the relocation of refugees from a country of asylum to a country that has agreed to admit them and grant them permanent settlement.

TAWG participants are as follows:

- Ministry of Finance and Planning
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
- Ministry of Trade and Industry
- Bank of South Sudan
- South Sudan Investment Authority (now Ministry of Investment and Investment Services)
- Chamber of Commerce
- Representatives from the private sector financial institutions
- South Sudan Bankers' Association
- Representative of a diaspora association
- IOM technical advisor

Public actors involved in the TAWG are particularly important for their role in improving coordination and coherence between the National Policy on Migration and other development and sectoral public policies. Other additional key institutions in South Sudan that could be involved in remittances and diaspora related issues are as follows: (a) National Aliens Committee/National Coordination Mechanism on Migration (NAC/NCM);²⁶ (b) Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs;²⁷ (c) Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology or the Ministry of General Education and Instruction;²⁸ and (d) Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development.²⁹ A fundamental group is composed by market players that deliver remittance related services. Global money transfer operators (MTOs), mobile money operators (MMOs) and telecommunication providers are crucial for remitting;³⁰ among them, for instance are MoneyGram, Western Union, Dahabshil, Small World, Amal Express, World Remit, MTN, Zain, Nilepay and m-Gurush. Unauthorized domestic money transfers represent a widespread solution to circulate funds internally in South Sudan.

Among financial institutions, retail and commercial banks³¹ normally offer the possibility to remit using MTOs.³² However, their role is significant when considering the possibility to differently save and manage remittances and potentially turn them into investments. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) could play a significant role due to proximity to people, but the legal framework for MFIs in South Sudan is not yet complete, therefore they do not represent a possible remittance player today.³³ Likewise, posts in South Sudan are not financial institutions, and they do not offer money transferring.

²⁶ A governmental inter-agency committee set up to coordinate migration issues.

²⁷ Due to the diaspora engagement in women empowerment in South Sudan.

²⁸ Due to the diaspora interest to transfer the high skills and competencies gained abroad, as from those in academia.

²⁹ Due to the diaspora interest to possibly support job creation in South Sudan, mobilizing human and financial capitals.

³⁰ Especially for international transfers from the diaspora based in Australia.

³¹ There are 29 banks in South Sudan today, among them, Equity Bank Limited, Ecobank and Cooperative Bank of South Sudan.

³² It happens easily that banks make a commercial agreement with an MTO to offer a remittance service, which is quicker and more immediate compared to a bank transfer.

³³ Six MFIs currently operate in the country, but they are not monitored by BSS.

Finally, individual migrants and formal and informal diaspora organizations abroad that support development projects and interventions in South Sudan are fundamental stakeholders. During this study, 40 South Sudanese groups and associations in Australia³⁴ were mapped, and 50 South Sudanese persons in Australia with different ethnic origins were involved in consultations.

1.2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT AND REMITTANCES IN SOUTH SUDAN

1.2.1. Diaspora engagement framework

In 2018, the Government of South Sudan, through NAC/NCM and in collaboration with IOM, started a process of developing the *National Comprehensive Migration Policy* (CMP) (Ministry of Interior and IOM, 2019) in accordance with the National Development Plan 2018–2021 and South Sudan Vision 2040. A migration policy responds to the current nature of South Sudan being a country of destination for many African migrants, a transit country on the route to North Africa, and also the country of origin and/or return for many South Sudanese displaced, resettled or migrated abroad. The objective of the (CMP is to improve or establish a system of policies and institutions to manage migration in South Sudan. Moreover, on September 2019, a national consultation on the Global Compact for Migration took place in Juba, bringing together main stakeholders³⁵ to increase collaboration towards a successful implementation of the migration policy.

The CMP addresses four thematic areas: (a) free movement and border management, (b) labour migration; (c) forced migration; and (d) migration and development. One of the suggested recommendations highlighted in the CMP refers the need of “enhancing information on GoSS diaspora at the individual and collective level, through data collection and research” (Ministry of Interior and IOM, 2019:45). Moreover, it is stated that: “a mapping of remittance corridors shall be conducted ... including an assessment of trends regarding remittances flows from diaspora destination countries and the analysis of remittances channels, behaviours and costs in different corridors” (ibid., p. 46).

The leading institution for migration governance in the Government of South Sudan is the Ministry of Interior,³⁶ while NAC/NCM coordinates the actions of the more than 20 different government institutions with mandates related to aspects of migration.

In the past, the Government established a diaspora desk to facilitate relationships with its community abroad. For a while it was under the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development and then it was under the Office of the President. At the moment in South Sudan, there isn't any diaspora direction or diaspora desk under any ministry.

³⁴ See the list in the annexed documents; these groups were identified through online registers of ethnic associations in Australia and on Facebook.

³⁵ Government, CSOs, human rights organizations, media, NGOs, academia, and agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations.

³⁶ Directorate of Nationality, Passports and Immigration.

1.2.2. Remittances framework

Considering the remittance legal framework in South Sudan, financial institutions interested in offering money transferring and foreign exchange services (including electronic operations) are requested to follow a formal process, accomplishing given requirements³⁷ so to obtain a **certification** granted by the Bank of South Sudan.³⁸ To operate, they have to comply with the following existing regulations³⁹ in South Sudan: (a) Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act (2012); (b) KYC due diligence procedures⁴⁰ (2017); (c) Foreign Exchange Business Act (2012); (d) guidelines for reporting large cash transaction (2017) for those offering foreign exchange services;⁴¹ and (e) Electronic Money Regulation (2017), for those related to electronic money transactions.

The Bank of South Sudan (BSS) is the **authority** that regulates and monitors the remittance market. Any foreign exchange service, traditional MTOs or MMOs⁴² offering and managing remittance transfers needs to be licensed from the Central Bank. Mobile network operators (MNOs) that cannot yet offer direct e-money payments and operations, but provide telecommunication services, also need a letter of no-objection from the National Communications Authority (NCA) (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019; interview with BSS representative).

The remittance legal framework in South Sudan had been drafted to align with global best practices and recommendations.⁴³ For instance, the Electronic Money Regulation (2017) is very valuable as MMOs represent a key actor for future developments in the global and South Sudanese remittance market. Nevertheless, there are different obstacles to a proper implementation of the remittance legal framework.

1.2.3. The persistence of an informal and unauthorized remittance framework in South Sudan

South Sudan is characterized by a limited presence of certified actors delivering remittance services; instead, a widespread **informal remittance market** and informal financial practices exist in South Sudan, especially in rural areas. This market is made up of money transfers and foreign exchange providers that operate without the required licence from the Bank of South Sudan and without complying to the existing regulation on money transferring in South Sudan.⁴⁴ Unauthorized operators tend to offer domestic transfer services within South Sudan or to neighbour countries.

³⁷ The requirements change according to the nature of the market player (whether it is a financial or non-financial institution). Some requirements for a financial institution include the following: (a) proof that it is a registered company operating under the Companies Acts 2012 of South Sudan; (b) MoU with their involved partners; (c) tax clearance certificate; (d) meet capital requirements; (e) maintain a robust information system; (f) safeguard customer funds; and (g) implement KYC and AML procedures. Banks are allowed to conduct money remittances without returns to the BSS since they are licensed for banking operations. Non-financial remittance providers as MNOs need to obtain also a “no-objection letter” issued by NCA.

³⁸ The financial sector is regulated by the BSS, established in July 2011 by the Bank of South Sudan Act.

³⁹ See <https://boss.gov.ss/banking-supervision/regulation/>.

⁴⁰ This refers to rules related to anti-money laundering/combating financial terrorism requirement to carry out procedures in identifying a customer.

⁴¹ Banks and other financial institutions are requested to report any amount over USD 10,000 (or equivalent to SSP).

⁴² With the role of financial intermediary as e-money service provider.

⁴³ Based, in particular, on FATF recommendations. FATF is an independent intergovernmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF Recommendations are recognized as the global AML and counter-terrorist financing standards (GSMA, 2018).

⁴⁴ For instance, these operators are as follows: (a) not properly compliant with AML/KYC regulations; (b) not risk compliant; and (c) do not provide a satisfactory and well established internal legal framework (Source: Interview with BSS representative).

The presence of a large informal remittance market in South Sudan is explained by different reasons:

- (a) Even if regulations were drafted to impede and control money laundering, the **compliance with KYC and AML requirements** remains overall weak.⁴⁵ The ability of the public authorities to properly implement the regulation and to monitor and sanction unauthorized operators is limited and needs reinforcement. On the one hand, there is limited access to formal **identity documents** in South Sudan necessary to correctly verify the identity of remittance senders/receivers. On the other hand, remittance operators do not systematically require customers' identity documents to access financial and telecommunication services.⁴⁶ This suggests a need to support the development of a national identity system (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019).

Additionally, different local remittance agents and traders dispersed in the territory might ignore the current regulation or how to apply it, as they never received proper training from their company (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019; interview with Bank of South Sudan representative).⁴⁷ Moreover, the financial services industry is undergoing transformations due to digital technology. Digital payment services and technologies have enabled the collection of different "alternative data"⁴⁸ on consumer behaviours that can be potentially misused, but also used for credit granting (World Bank and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2018). Financial sector actors are not requested today to follow procedures to keep personal data secure and protect customers' privacy in South Sudan. In the long term, the absence of data protection rules in the country poses risks in terms of potential misuse of personal data for illicit activities (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:81). This suggests a need for a national legal framework for data protection, especially related to mobile money services.

The lack of credit history (due to a lack of identity documents, to a lack of tracked information, and to a recurrent use of informal operators) impedes financial inclusion and access to credit from the formal financial sector (World Bank and CGAP, 2018).

- (b) **The banking system**, in a reconstruction phase, expresses fragilities and its need of reinforcement (capitalization, liquidity, internal control) is essential. Banks have a crucial economic role in the financial inclusion process: people financially excluded, find difficulties to borrow and save money, reducing therefore the possibility to establish or boost their business. Banks in South Sudan show a general lack of the following: (i) technology; (ii) well-equipped manpower; (iii) capacity-building; and (iv) partnerships or interrelations with international banks (banks where the diaspora abroad live). The financial services available in the country are limited (and concentrated in the capital and main urban centres), and many banks are facing difficulties of recapitalization, liquidity and high internal risk control.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ "One of the biggest problems facing legislators in South Sudan is policy implementation. Many policies passed by the NLA and signed by the President remain unimplemented. It is true that legislating a policy is a necessary step, but it is not sufficient condition for ensuring the adequate implementation of the policies" (Edward, 2014:33).

⁴⁶ For instance, the population in South Sudan is not used to provide identity details to buy a SIM card or to open a mobile money account. It is reported that a resistance to KYC procedures from users of mobile money/remittance services could represent an obstacle (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019).

⁴⁷ Training agents on KYC/AML generates costs for money transfer companies that might be reluctant to spend on this.

⁴⁸ Alternative data is "a generic term that designates massive volume of data that is generated by the increasing use of digital tools and information systems", but the definition can change according to the country context and the kind of information that is collected (World Bank and CGAP, 2018:10).

⁴⁹ Source: Interview with BSS representative.

- (c) **Unauthorized operators** are often the only money transfer option in rural, remote or border areas; common is the lack of alternative services and competitors. Moreover, alternative and certified formal services, even when available, tend to cost more compared to informal ones.
- (d) The local economy in South Sudan is highly dependent on the USD currency; the presence of a **black exchange market** offers higher exchange margins compared to official rates, also due to local currency volatility and depreciation.⁵⁰ For instance, the official exchange rate for USD 1 was 163.62 South Sudanese pounds (SSP) (on 24 June 2020), while the exchange rate for USD 1 at the black market on the same day was SSP 330. The difference is self-evident.⁵¹
- (e) The local population in South Sudan has low **literacy and financial literacy rates**, overall limiting more advanced or diversified financial behaviours of remittance recipients. Literacy and proximity to financial/money transfer services are key factors in affecting financial literacy and inclusion.⁵² Only a minority of the population relies on more elaborate financial practices, such as domestic and international transfers, saving and borrowing schemes. These practices remain overall heavily dependent on informal methods (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:33).

1.3. KEY CHALLENGES TO LEVERAGE MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND ENGAGE THE DIASPORA IN SOUTH SUDAN

Despite the potential of mobilizing remittances and engaging the diaspora for development, there are challenges that reduce their positive impact in South Sudan and that are examined in this study. For each challenge here identified, a compendium of corresponding evidence-based policy recommendations is presented in the final section (chapter 6).

A crucial challenge refers to the **general conditions of insecurity** in the country. Political and economic stability and good governance in South Sudan are profoundly needed. The diaspora in Australia asks for formal signals and positive evidence of a changing political climate in South Sudan in order to be engaged and possibly invest in the future.

- (a) **Compliance to the legal framework on remittances** is weak and difficult to obtain in the country. Informal remittance practices and unauthorized operators are predominant and the access to formal remittance services – to send and receive money – is less common, as explained in paragraph 1.2.3. This particularly happens in rural and remote areas that suffer the absence of financial institutions (banks and MFIs) and the poorness of most infrastructures. Improving the access to formal remittance practices and increasing the presence of authorized operators guarantees against the risks of money laundering and illicit activities, and supports the possibility to increase financial inclusion. There is no single way to drive money transfers from informal to formal; it is a long and articulated process requiring considerable attention and effort from policymakers (see chapter 2 for examination, and chapter 6 for corresponding recommendations 1 and 2).

⁵⁰ Due to the 2013/2016 conflict in South Sudan, there has been a steep devaluation of the SSP and a sharp rise in inflation.

⁵¹ Information collected consulting the BSS website on 24 June 2020 (<https://boss.gov.ss/currency-operations/exchange-rates/>).

⁵² This is particularly true when considering rural population, where the percentage of low educated persons and the absence of financial operators is higher.

- (b) **The costs of remitting to South Sudan** from abroad are among the highest in the world, and efforts to diminish the commissions applied and to facilitate a more competitive remittance market are needed (see chapter 2 for analysis and chapter 6 for corresponding recommendation 2).
- (c) **Accurate data on remittance flows is missing.** Without the possibility to analyse the dynamics of the remittance market, it is hard to formulate a complete diaspora strategy aimed at a greater commitment of the financial sector and at reinforcing a solid legal remittance framework.⁵³ The lack of data is linked to the large presence of unauthorized remittance operators and flows that are not traced. The need to establish a data collection system is therefore fundamental for South Sudanese authorities (see chapter 2 for analysis and chapter 6 for corresponding recommendation 3).
- (d) **Knowledge on the South Sudanese diaspora abroad is still limited.** South Sudanese in Australia is a very diversified community, expressing an interest to further contribute to the development of the origin country, but also a limited trust for the Government. South Sudanese living in Australia are a heterogeneous group with first and second generations and internal subcommunity ethnic divisions. Although the integration process shows success stories, not everybody is wealthy, and many are socially and economically marginalized. Moreover, on the one side, the diaspora confirms its fundamental role and constant engagement to support families and communities in the homeland, but on the other side, it is suspicious towards any institutional initiative from South Sudan. It is important for the Government of South Sudan to improve the knowledge on its diaspora abroad, and building a stable and mutual trust relationship is crucial to further mobilize its contribution (see chapter 4 on the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia; chapter 6 for corresponding recommendations 4 and 5 on trust building; recommendations 6 and 7 on improving knowledge on the diaspora; and recommendations 8, 9, 10 and 11 on diaspora engagement).
- (e) The possibility to **maximize the productive potential** of migrant remittances and turn them into local investments is hampered by the following: (i) economic and political fragility of the South Sudan context; (ii) weakness of the banking system expressing profound needs of reinforcement (recapitalization, liquidity and internal control); and (iii) lack of trust and interest of the diaspora abroad (see chapter 5 on investments in South Sudan from the Australian diaspora and chapter 6, corresponding recommendations 2 and 11).

⁵³ Built on transparency, consumer protection and efficiency of payment system infrastructure (see paragraph 1.2.3 in this chapter).

- (f) Public authorities and other stakeholders (market players, development actors and diaspora groups) have not yet proficiently addressed **diaspora-related discussions**, nor designed any relevant initiative. For instance, while diaspora issues cross the activity and agency of different ministries, competence on diaspora engagement and remittances are limited within these institutions. Moreover, the interministerial dialogue and collaboration among public actors is weak (as evidenced in the case of the investment–trade–diaspora attaché). Furthermore, different diaspora and remittance issues shall be discussed between public and private stakeholders.⁵⁴ Different members of the TAWG expressed a request to reinforce their capacities and competencies in relationship to diaspora and remittance issues.⁵⁵ Coordination among stakeholders shall be reinforced and capacities to deal with diaspora issues shall be strengthened (chapter 6, recommendation 12).

1.4. REINFORCING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN SOUTH SUDAN FOR THE DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

The fieldwork in South Sudan particularly involved the members of the TAWG. Leveraging the diaspora for development (including remittances and knowledge transfer) has been widely recognized by the TAWG as an effective tool for socioeconomic development, requiring a coordinated approach, especially between ministries, departments and agencies. There is a need to enhance the technical capacity to pursue diaspora engagement in South Sudan. More specifically, not all actors are currently organized with the creation and appointment of internal units (focal points) dedicated to diaspora issues. Additionally, specific competencies and skills are necessary to start the dialogue and further engage the diaspora, and to improve the remittance environment and its legal framework in South Sudan. The lack of embassies and consulates in countries where the diaspora lives are identified as an element of weakness, limiting the possibility to directly connect to the diaspora and collect data. Finally, diaspora issues can be transversal to different ministries (as it emerged for the profile of the “investment–trade–diaspora attaché”), highlighting the need for stronger coordination, as well as leadership.

A need for guidance emerged to carefully build a long-term process of diaspora knowledge, exchange and involvement reinforcing data collection systems, channels of communication, and diaspora policy frameworks. This process opens up to the possibility of establishing transnational partnerships or collaborations with organizations and institutions in the migrants’ country of residence (such as including diaspora groups and also civic society, universities, health clinics, local and central government authorities), as emerged from consultations with migrants in Australia and the TAWG members.

⁵⁴ As to design and implement a remittance data collection system; or link remittances to directly pay for school fees from abroad and ensure more money control and ownership from the migrants.

⁵⁵ Source: Interviews with TAWG members and internal questionnaire results.



The conflict in South Sudan since 15 December 2013 has arguably produced yet another type of IDP settlement to add to the humanitarian lexicon: protection of civilians (PoC) sites. These settlements have hosted more than 100,000 IDPs for several months, and look set to continue for the foreseeable future. © IOM 2018/Ashley MCLAUGHLIN



PART I

MIGRANT REMITTANCES TO SOUTH SUDAN

2. THE CURRENT STATE OF REMITTANCES IN SOUTH SUDAN

Remittances are personal small value transfers, within or mostly across countries, from an individual (the migrant) to family members or friends in the homeland. To be sent and received, remittances need retail payment intermediaries: operators that along country corridors (as between Australia and South Sudan) offer the possibility to quickly transfer money (as cash and mobile electronic money), applying a cost to this service.

The individual transfer size is normally small (in terms of amount remitted), but the aggregate remittance volumes can become a substantial share of the country GDP, often exceeding other sources of official development assistance (ODA).

Literature distinguishes among different types of remittances, namely: (a) **individual remittances**, or money sent from the migrant abroad to friends and relatives in the homeland, normally covering consumption or family welfare needs; (b) **collective remittances** from migrant formal or informal groups (as hometown or ethnic associations) that normally collect and mobilize their resources for solidarity interventions to favour the community of origin (for instance to build schools, wells or hospitals); and (c) **entrepreneurial or productive remittances**, which refer to resources sent from the migrant to start, reinforce or manage economic activities of the family, of the migrant, or of both of them.

Moreover, the remittance can refer to financial and monetary transfers or money sent and received across countries. Additionally, it can also be in-kind nature (for instance sending goods as food, clothes, technical or medical equipment and ambulances). Increasingly, the term social remittance is used to refer to the transfer of knowledge, know-how, networking and skills. Political remittances represent a subcategory, referring to the role of diasporas' political mobilization through their human, relational and financial resources from abroad (this includes for instance transferring political ideas or visions, supporting political parties, voting practices, sending money to sustain armed groups and conflicts and mobilizing public opinion in their residency country).

Remittances are received by persons still residing in South Sudan, and also by the South Sudanese refugees in other countries (such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda or elsewhere). Remittances are sent by migrants abroad (such as from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America), and also by people in South Sudan to reach relatives or friends displaced in South Sudan or in neighbour countries. Therefore, South Sudan shows at the same time incoming and outgoing remittance flows.

In this chapter, different features related to remittances in and to South Sudan are explored including information on the following: (a) financial flows; (b) significance of remittances in terms of allocation of the migrant's income and moral obligation towards the family; (c) employment from recipients; (d) remittance market operators in South Sudan; and (e) costs of remitting and the impact of COVID-19 on remittances.

2.1. REMITTANCE FLOWS

Data available on the South Sudanese population abroad is overall scarce, with estimates varying between 830,000 and 1.2 million individuals abroad,⁵⁶ little detailed information exists on diaspora communities, their geographical distribution and their characteristics.⁵⁷ Emigration before the civil war had top destinations in the region and a few Western nations (like Australia and the United States) (World Bank, 2016b). Evidence today suggests that South Sudanese people are found in larger numbers in nearby communities in African States (Egypt, Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda), and also in Western countries (Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States), where many refugees were resettled in the last 20 years.

A large proportion of the South Sudanese **economy** is being supported by migrants' remittances to their country of origin. Although poor data is available on the overall volume, remittances play a role in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty for receivers. The qualitative fieldwork in Australia highlights that prior to 2013, the volume of remittances from the diaspora was lower, and cash was used by recipients for multiple purposes.⁵⁸ After 2013, remittances have become the lifeline support for South Sudanese families.

Table 1. World development indicators^a – South Sudan (2018)

Personal remittances, ^b received (current USD) ^c	211 000 000 (2019)
Foreign direct investment (FDI), net inflows (balance of payments (BoP), current USD)	60 140 000
Diaspora population	Between 830 000 and 1.2 million
Diaspora in Australia	Between 30 000 and 50 000
Population in South Sudan, total	10 975 920
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	33.5
Urban population growth (annual %)	2.0
Population growth (annual %)	0.6

Source: World Bank, Data bank: World Development Indicators – South Sudan. Available at <https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=SSD> (accessed 28 January 2020).

- Notes:
- ^a World development indicators is the primary World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data available, and includes national, regional and global estimates.
 - ^b Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees.
 - ^c World Bank staff estimates based on BoP data of IMF.


⁵⁶ Some sources report of 4 million South Sudanese abroad, with at least 2.5 million living as refugees. Many regional refugees returned to South Sudan in 2005 and after independence in 2011, but renewed conflict from December 2013 forced many residents to flee once more (Rift Valley Institute, 2018:5).

⁵⁷ Some South Sudanese migration flows have been less investigated, for instance labour migration or the presence or circulation in/from Egypt or other Arab countries (mixing up refugee flows with labour migrations).

⁵⁸ Such as helping the family to build a house, starting a small business or providing resources during harvest.

Based on available estimates, the total inflows of remittances to South Sudan represented 6.7 per cent of the national GDP in 2019 (World Bank, n.d.a). The trend (see Table 2) shows important inflows⁵⁹ in 2015 and 2016 (when the internal crisis and life conditions for the local population were very severe). The increase of remittances in times of crisis confirms their capacity to be counter-cyclical, playing an important resilient role in enabling people (remittance receivers) to survive during emergencies, and recover after them (Savage and Harvey, 2007). Remittances from South Sudanese in Australia to the country of origin in 2012 were estimated in USD 24.6 million.⁶⁰

Figure 1. Remittance inflows and outflows to/from South Sudan, 2015–2019 (USD million)



Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data from IMF's BoP statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies and World Bank country desks. GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2019). Author's representation on World Bank data.

Data on outflows show that remittances also generate from South Sudan, accounting for 2.13 per cent of the GDP. This is particularly true for some corridors explained to help South Sudanese displaced persons receive from the family in the origin country.⁶¹ Table 2 shows Egypt, the Sudan, Nigeria, and mostly Uganda as main remittance receiving countries from South Sudan.

Table 2. Remittance outflows from South Sudan

Remittance-receiving country (→)	Egypt	Ethiopia	India	Kenya	Nigeria	Sudan	Uganda	World
Remittance-sending country: South Sudan (%)	5.1	0.9	1.1	5.0	11.6	8.1	68.1	100.0

Source: World Bank, n.d.a.

At the same time, it is underlined that not all areas of South Sudan obtain similar diaspora contribution and support, creating unequal impacts of migrant remittances among territories.⁶² As reported from different qualitative sources, “[M]ore stable regions of South Sudan, such as – until recently – greater Bahr el-Ghazal and western-central Equatoria, have seen more opportunities for long-term developmental work, rather than emergency aid remittances. (Moreover) these

⁵⁹ As anticipated, a limit of these data exists as most available statistical and quantitative information on remittances to South Sudan is mainly an estimate (mainly reporting guesstimate or proxy data).

⁶⁰ See <http://rightnow.org.au/opinion-3/remittances-to-south-sudan-an-unrecognised-source-of-aid/>.

⁶¹ The main remittance corridors with South Sudan identified by the World Bank are as follows: Saudi Arabia, Kenya, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (see World Bank, n.d.b).

⁶² Not all remittance recipients, communities and territories receive transfers from South Sudanese that entered the international resettlement systems. Those who were able to move to countries such as Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom and found jobs there presumably send larger amounts of remittances. This aspect recalls the debate on the possible relationship between remittances and inequalities (Abuchi Agwu et al., 2017) or on their role in increasing the migratory pressure (Dimova and Wolff, 2009).

diaspora injections have had an uneven and unequal impact across the country, reflecting the ethno-regional disparities of the diaspora network itself” (Rift Valley Institute, 2018; interview with Nicki Kindersley from the University of Cambridge).

2.1.1. South Sudan has not yet developed a data collection system of its remittance flows

Most information on remittance flows in South Sudan today basically refers to estimates from the World Bank. When data on remittance flows is not easily available, building a data collection system is recommended.⁶³ Disposing of this information is fundamental to take grounded decisions to adopt initiatives addressing the diaspora, both from the Government and the private sector.

Official flows and information obviously exclude funds that are transferred through informal remittance channels as unauthorized operators or cash hand delivery. In the case of South Sudan, this segment is particularly significant for domestic remittances.⁶⁴

Formal remittance providers operating today in South Sudan do not provide their remittance data to the Bank of South Sudan.⁶⁵ The possibility of inviting operators to voluntarily share their data is rarely successful. As discussed with the Bank of South Sudan, a solution could be to mandatorily ask operators to provide data. Another option is to link up the authorization for MTOs/MNOs to operate in the country with the compulsory request to share the data with the Bank of South Sudan.⁶⁶ Even if partial in its outreach, obtaining this information would help to partially fill the knowledge gap and start establishing a remittance data collection system (see chapter 6, recommendation 3).

Some supplementary aspects need to be considered in the data system collection. The data requested shall include only the remittance volumes and the number of operations. Requiring more information to operators can augment the risk to add costs to the remittance sender. Moreover, issues of privacy of data and consumer protection need to be considered in relationship to anti-trust regulation.⁶⁷

2.2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REMITTANCES: A PART OF THE MIGRANT INCOME AND A MORAL OBLIGATION

The global knowledge on migrant income distribution and remittances (International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2017) highlights that the **largest part of the migrant income stays abroad**, with remittances accounting for around 15 per cent (with variations among countries). Remittances tend to represent a complement to the recipient’s income, used in large part (50–75%) for daily life expenses (including food, school fees and health). In terms of investments, remittances globally result more likely in house reparations and only in smaller

⁶³ The process to collect remittance data is not internationally harmonized. See in particular, Cirasino, 2006.

⁶⁴ It is difficult to estimate the volumes of unrecorded flows. Unofficial remittances could add 50 per cent or more to a country’s total, according to household surveys and other estimates from the World Bank (World Bank, 2005).


⁶⁵ In order to build up a remittance data collection system in South Sudan, it is firstly important to exclude migrant remittance flows from BoP. Moreover, personal bank transfers (via SWIFT) are not a common instrument to remit, while remittance flows refer to transfers mostly through MTOs and MMOs. This is particularly true for countries with low financial inclusion levels and low accessibility and distribution of financial institutions (see www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/bpm6.pdf).

⁶⁶ Source: Information on the possibility to link the licence to operate the remittance market with the request to mandatorily provide data was explained by Leon Isaacs, DMGlobal, with reference to the case of the Gambia.

⁶⁷ This is particularly true for accessing information on quotas of market share for the different operators.

part to sustain job-generating activities or savings.⁶⁸ Additionally, migrants abroad are not always well-off, and they can meet economic difficulties in the destination country.

Figure 2. Migrant income distribution between origin and destination/residence country



Source: Author's elaboration based on online survey's results among South Sudanese migrants in Australia.

Information on South Sudan is overall in line with global trends and findings. The survey undertaken in Australia reveals in fact that remittances sent represent **between 9.5 and 13.8 per cent of the yearly migrant income**,⁶⁹ with variations (from 100% of the income remitted, to 1–2%). Even if the sample is small (43 persons), the analysis highlights that those earning less than others actually remit more.⁷⁰ It can be argued that the amount remitted is influenced by the expenses due in Australia, such as the presence of an extended family to support, children at school, and a mortgage to repay.

The majority of the survey respondents declare to remit with a certain regularity: once every one to two months (51%) and every three to six months (33%), from a minimum of USD 80 to a maximum of USD 1,200. In terms of amount remitted, on average, respondents remit yearly between USD 2,800 and USD 3,500 with very high variations in the sample.

Moreover, a study on the South Sudanese community in Australia reports that “remittances are seen as necessary for family economies, they cement relationships and they also acknowledge as a source of influence” (Cauchi, 2018:5). As reported by an Australian–South Sudanese interviewed for this research, sending money represents a moral and cultural obligation. “It is an obligation; you do not have a choice. Otherwise you are neglected by the family. It means taking care of all the extended family. If I can send my nephew to school, if there is a marriage, if there is an urgency, Dad calls and you do it. If you can (if you have the means), you have to make sure everyone is looked after. It is in our culture, all the Dinka people do this, but I think it is the same for the Nuer people.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Based on a recent survey on Commonwealth diaspora communities in the United Kingdom.

⁶⁹ Excluding the two opposite respondents that remit 100 per cent and 0.6 per cent, the percentage of remittances account for 9.5 per cent of the yearly income.

⁷⁰ In terms of percentage and not in terms of amount remitted.

⁷¹ Interview with an Australian–South Sudanese.

Additionally, a study on South Sudanese refugees in Canada reported how the remittance obligation to send money to the family produced a considerable financial and emotional strain on migrants (Johnson and Stoll, 2008). The fieldwork in Australia confirms that the increased demand of financial support and the expectation put on diaspora communities is growing, causing financial and mental stress. Overall, interviewees would welcome the possibility of thinking of alternative ways to support the development of South Sudan.

2.3. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MONETARY REMITTANCES IN SOUTH SUDAN

Remittances are mainly used in South Sudan for **daily life contingencies**, food or everyday necessities (81%), planned education fees (70%) and medical expenses (59%). Health remittances represent recurrent emergency and last-minute contributions. Secondly, remittances are sent for occasional requests (such as marriage, funerals and other ceremonies) or donations to groups. These findings confirm the results of the Rift Valley Institute survey (2018) (see Figure A5.1 on Annex 5). It is interesting to note that remittances today are not largely employed for real estate or house reparation; in addition, the majority of the survey respondents in Australia declares not owning a house in South Sudan (only 2 persons out of 43), while 26 per cent is considering to possibly buy one in the future.

The study's findings – in line with other studies (Rift Valley Institute, 2018; World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:33) – highlight that quite rarely remittances are employed for **investment** or to run business (for an extensive analysis of remittances as a possible means of boosting investment in South Sudan (see chapter 5 and chapter 6 recommendation 11).

2.4. REMITTANCE OPERATORS IN SOUTH SUDAN

The operators offering remittance services in South Sudan⁷² include traditional MTOs, MMOs and banks. Formal remittance operators are those:

- (a) Granted with the authorization from the Bank of South Sudan and provide direct remittance services. Among them:
 - (i) Banks, for instance, Equity Bank Limited (Kenya's Equity Bank Group), Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Opportunity Bank;
 - (ii) MMOs/e-payment service providers (with the role of third-party/intermediator) as Trinity Technologies⁷³ and Nilepay (Lukiza)⁷⁴

⁷² This section lists the remittance operators identified through web search, interviews with key informants in South Sudan and Australia, and indications from the survey in Australia. Some mentioned remittance operators operate in South Sudan with no licence or whose agreement with the correspondent agent was not approved by BSS (Source: interview with the Bank of South Sudan). This proves the difficulty in South Sudan to have the regulation correctly implemented and to control over a plethora of small/medium agents in the territory.

⁷³ Trinity Technologies is a subsidiary of Trinity Holdings and Trinity Energy Limited, an oil marketing company specializing in import and distribution of petroleum product (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019).

⁷⁴ Nilepay is a product of Lokiza holding company; this is different from Niletel telecommunications company.

- (b) Operating without direct authorization, but relying on other licensed third-party operators. Among them:
 - (i) Traditional MTOs, such as MoneyGram, Western Union,⁷⁵ Amal Express and Dahabshiil;
 - (ii) MNOs and telecommunication companies, such as M-Pesa, Zain and MTN76 that rely on mobile money service providers (licensed third party/intermediators).

Informal remittance operators (such as MTOs and MNOs) provide direct or indirect remittance services without the authorization from the Bank of South Sudan (as explained in chapter 1, paragraph 1). In this group, other informal modes of remitting can be included as through friends or couriers that hand carry money (domestically or internationally).⁷⁷

2.4.1. Money transfer operators in South Sudan for domestic and international remittances

Many in South Sudan (73%) are familiar with money transfers, more than with any other financial operator. Among those that transfer money, 53 per cent use operators to send money domestically, and 60 per cent to send internationally. For both their international and domestic transfers, people in South Sudan tend to choose money transfers because these are considered cheaper and because of the lack of alternative options (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:44).

Domestic remittances are mostly covered by unauthorized money transfer agents and services, followed by hand delivery, airtime recharge and mobile money. The informal transfer systems are based on moving funds through a third-party agent network, mainly located in major cities. When transferring, people are provided of a transfer code that needs to be reported to the cash-out agent to prove the operation. People send and receive money domestically on a regular basis, and transactions are normally in the local currency (SSP). In the World Bank and Altai Consulting study (2019), informal agents were traced in the following: Bor, Juba, Kuajok, Malakal, Nadapal, Pibor, Tonj, Torit and Wau with branches in other cities, such as Ayond, Nimule, Rumbek and Yambio. In areas where branches are not available, people rely on purely informal couriers and friends.

International transfers (to send and receive money) mostly employ formal channels and operators.⁷⁸ It is estimated that 19 per cent of the population in South Sudan sent or received money from abroad in 2018 (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:34). Transactions in South Sudan are normally conducted in USD, while the fees can be paid in local currency (SSP).

As reported in a Rift Valley study (2018), the intermediary services used to send international remittances from Australia to South Sudan show a predominant use of formal channels (almost 90%), particularly the MTO Dahabshiil. The survey undertaken in Australia for this research confirms that formal channels (MTOs,

⁷⁵ Western Union services are available in Juba through a licensed forex bureau called Mig Exchange and also through KCB (Source: interview with the Bank of South Sudan).


⁷⁶ Its headquarters are not in South Sudan.

⁷⁷ Another channel employed by some (mostly in urban areas) is airtime transfer as an alternative to the transfer of hard local currency or cash. Agents/traders send airtime to a recipient's phone in exchange for cash or directly from one's mobile account. This can happen only between persons that share the same operator and need its network coverage (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:48).

⁷⁸ Transfers from/to countries abroad.

MNOs and bank transfers⁷⁹) are the most used channel to remit to South Sudan (see Figure 3).⁸⁰ Additionally, the most frequent operators mentioned are Dahabshiil, Amal Express, World Remit, Juba Express, followed by MoneyGram, Western Union, Taaj Service, ZAAT Money, Nilepay, MTN and Equity Bank Limited.

Figure 3. Channels to transfer money from Australia to South Sudan



Note: Elaboration of the online survey's results among the diaspora in Australia.

The migrant's choice of the remittance operator to employ from abroad is not only influenced by the cost, but also by the familiarity, proximity and accessibility.⁸¹ The survey in Australia confirms that main reasons why respondents use a remittance operator are as follows: (a) easy access for remittance receivers (52%); (b) easy access for the sender (44%); (b) rapidity (44%); and (c) security (30%). The cheaper cost of remitting is less important (26%) when compared to the other reasons.


2.4.2. Mobile money and the telecommunication sector in South Sudan

Following the trend registered in other neighbouring countries, the diffusion of mobile payments and transactions is beginning in South Sudan. Overall, mobile money services in South Sudan are still at a very early stage. As deeply analysed in a recent study (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019), the telecommunication sector in South Sudan started to expand before 2011, with a growing presence of several new national and international players (such as Gemtel, Vivacell, Zain Sudan and MTN Sudan). During and after the 2013 conflict, the situation changed with a decreased market dynamism, decreased commercial investments, problems in network coverage and the shrinking of the companies' client base. The telecommunication sector in South Sudan today is among the weakest in the world (ibid., p. 18).

⁷⁹ Bank transfers are employed mainly to remit to relatives in Juba, as in rural areas there are no branches.
⁸⁰ The fieldwork in Australia highlighted that when the demand of support is coming from multiple people in South Sudan or elsewhere, some migrants chose to send money to a trusted individual who will distribute the money to designated individuals.
⁸¹ A study from the ECB (Kosse and Vermeulen, 2014) on the role played by general payment habits highlighted that migrants who regularly use Internet banking for other purposes are more likely to use bank services for remittances as well. However, other important drivers exist in determining the choice of payment channels, such as personal characteristics and country-specific factors, (perceived) costs, ease of use and the availability of remittance options. Based on the study findings, it is suggested that financial education of the migrant, cost reduction and new (mobile) remittance solutions may serve valuable roles.

In the long run, mobile technology could represent a way to push the informal, cash-based economy and trade towards a more formal economy, and additionally support women’s financial inclusion (chapter 6, recommendations 2 and 9).⁸² The diffusion of phone ownership and mobile services access meets nevertheless important challenges in the country, the first is related to **phone ownership**. The 45 per cent of the population in South Sudan owns a phone, concentrated among urban residents (64%), compared to rural residents (38%) (estimates, World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019). Phones are not easily affordable to all population due to their high prices; phone sharing seems to be a common practice, particularly within a household.

Figure 4. Barriers to phone ownership among those who do not own one



Source: World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019; total survey on 770 persons on Figure 1 (p. 22).

The **literacy level** and **gender** affect the possibility to own a phone, more than income and rural/urban living context (see Figure A5.4. on Annex 5). Equally, economic–demographic factors explain financial behaviours more than structural and social ones:⁸³ domestic and international transfers, and saving and borrowing money increase according to the literacy level and gender (with men transferring more likely than women).⁸⁴

Among the **obstacles** that largely affect the sector’s development are the following: (a) network coverage is overall poor, especially in rural areas, bringing connectivity problems;⁸⁵ (b) the presence and diversity of mobile operators is reduced after conflicts with a consequent limited competition, investment and innovation in the sector; (c) the penetration of mobile phones is low, and phone ownership is unbalanced against main socioeconomic characteristics; and (d) financial literacy is very limited, especially in rural areas. Infrastructural interventions are crucial today to support the diffusion of mobile connections and payments.

⁸² For instance, in the long term, integrating informal sector users into business networks, formal banking and insurance, linking to the Government through social security, tax and secure wages payment.

⁸³ The main drivers of the probability to transfer domestically, transfer internationally, save and borrow money are living context (urban, rural or PoC sites), literacy level, age, income and gender.

⁸⁴ “Literacy appears to be a main driver of all financial practices, having a positive impact on the probability of transferring money domestically and internationally, saving and borrowing. Gender also has an impact, as being a woman decreases the probability of saving. Finally, the type of residence can also influence such practices” (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:36).

⁸⁵ It is reported that 91 per cent of the population live in rural areas (although large displacement occurred after 2013) (South Sudan Centre for Census, 2010).

Technically, the mobile money business model in South Sudan is defined as a mixed model where MNOs, banks and non-bank institutions (mobile money providers as third-party companies) can be issuers of e-money and circulate mobile money (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:41; interview with Bank of South Sudan).⁸⁶

A recent service launched in South Sudan is m-Gurush (July 2019), a new mobile phone-based money transfer service in collaboration between Trinity Technologies (intermediary financial service that offers mobile payments and transactions) and Zain (telecommunication operator).⁸⁷ Licensed by the BSS and NCA, it allows to domestically and internationally use a mobile electronic wallet/platform. The system relies on a network of agents in Juba and around the country to pay, transfer and cash withdraw.⁸⁸ People can buy goods in affiliated shops (using the phone credit to pay for it), transfer money from one phone/wallet to another, and withdraw cash from agents.⁸⁹

With a commercial partnership with MTN and m-Pesa, m-Gurush recently opened (May 2020) to international corridors with Kenya and Uganda to promote cross-border transactions by directly receiving money in the e-wallet.⁹⁰ The service is only outbound at the moment, sending funds in USD or SSP.⁹¹ As the Trinity Technologies representative states: “We see many future applications that can be of interest also for the diaspora, using e-money to pay for health, education or agriculture. Technology is a tool, and we have to train young people to love technology and also promote it where the diaspora lives.”

Other mobile money services are accessible through foreign operators, although they are not granted a licence from the BSS nor from the NCA, confirming what previously explained (chapter 1, paragraph 3) in terms of widespread informality in the remittance sector due to unauthorized operators and limited knowledge and compliance to the existing regulation among agents.⁹² Although conducted informally, mobile money transactions take place in South Sudan.

It is reported that mobile money (through foreign operators) represents a quite common practice in South Sudan (for one sixth of the surveyed population), mainly used to send and receive money domestically and internationally (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:50). Evidence suggests that there is significant interest for mobile money services among the South Sudanese population. Nevertheless, to spread mobile money services and payments, all players in the market must learn how to use these new technologies and their opportunities, both in the destination and origin country, and supportive infrastructural interventions are fundamental in rural areas (chapter 6, recommendations 2 and 9).

⁸⁶ In other Western and Eastern African countries, licences are often issued to MNOs or banks, and not to third-party companies (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019).

⁸⁷ In terms of data, 100,000 clients in South Sudan registered to the platform services since its launch and, on average, the total transactions registered by the Juba agents accounted for SSP 14 million per day (Source: Interview with Trinity Technologies).

⁸⁸ There are 25 agents in Juba (in Bilpham Road, Customs, Konyokonyo, Gumbo, Shirkhat, Gurei located at Trinity Energy Petrol Stations, Hai Malakia and Hai Nim) and 2,000 agents that offer the service around the country (mgurush.com).

⁸⁹ The aspect of liquidity can be a problem as the agent could possibly not ensure, in the right time, the money to withdraw. In this case, affiliated banks can play a role of sub/agent to ensure cash withdrawal. This happens only in urban areas where banks are located (partnerships have been signed with Equity Bank Limited, KCB and others).

⁹⁰ Offering in particular: cross-border remittances and merchant-to-merchant payments, m-Gurush multipurpose Smartcards and Biometric KYC Capture. Other banks have been approved to work in this business (for instance KCB Bank, Equity Bank Limited, Stanbic Bank Limited, Co-operative bank and Nilepay).

⁹¹ June 2020.

⁹² As MTN Uganda and Safaricom (World Bank and Altai Consulting 2019:48; interview with the Bank of South Sudan).

Text box 1. Are South Sudanese in Australia Internet users?

Of the population in South Sudan, 45 per cent owns a phone, with a limited but still-growing diffusion, especially in urban areas. It can be expected that a large part of South Sudanese in Australia has a mobile phone today. In order to access digital transfers or e-remittances, it is necessary that at least the money sender (the migrant abroad) has Internet access. Data from the Australian Bureau of Census (2016) reports that 70 per cent of South Sudanese born living in Victoria State (Australia) has home Internet access, while 20 per cent has no home access to the Internet. Significant differences emerge in home Internet access considering the local areas of residence of South Sudanese (information for Melbourne suburbs).^a

Note: ^a The percentage of South-Sudanese accessing Internet from home varies a lot among those living in Maribyrnong (39.3%), Yarra (52.6%) and Latrobe (78%).

2.4.3. The banking system in South Sudan

A slow recovery of the financial sector was recently highlighted in South Sudan (World Bank, 2019).⁹³ Today, there are 29 commercial banks that scaled down during the recent conflicts.⁹⁴ The majority are located in the capital Juba, highlighting the absence of financial institutions in rural areas; the banking system comprises commercial and regional banks, private and public/government banks.⁹⁵ Some of them provide banking services as deposit accounts, loans, currency exchange, wire transfers and mobile money services. An element of strength in the system is identified in its regulation framework (Banking Act, 2012), but elements of weakness exist due to the general lack of technology, well-equipped manpower, capacity-building, partnership or interrelations with international banks. The financial services available in the country are limited, and many banks are still facing difficulties of capitalization, liquidity, internal risk control.⁹⁶ The need for reinforcement (recapitalization, liquidity and internal control) in South Sudan's banking system is essential, especially through some options indicated and offered by the Bank of South Sudan (for instance, banks' merging, search for strategic investors or voluntary liquidation). Retail banks in origin countries rarely develop specific products addressing migrants (mostly they offer remittance services partnering with MTOs);⁹⁷ and they rarely target low-income population that receives remittances.

Considering the financial inclusion in South Sudan: in 2012, less than 1 per cent of the population was banked (Ferullo, 2018). In 2018, 8 per cent of adult population (older than 15 years)⁹⁸ had an account at a financial institution (the percentage for women was 4.6%)⁹⁹ (see Figure A5.5 on Annex 5). Cash is the predominant means of conducting financial transactions, with only a minority of the population saving money (39%), mainly to cover basic expenses and through informal methods.¹⁰⁰

⁹³ With deposits and lending activities picking up in the second half of the 2018 fiscal year (World Bank, April 2019).

⁹⁴ For instance: KCB South Sudan Limited, Equity Bank Limited, Cooperative Bank of South Sudan, Nile Commercial Bank and Charter One Bank. The complete list of banks in South Sudan is accessible here: <https://boss.gov.ss/banking-supervision/>.

⁹⁵ Such as agricultural banks, cooperative banks, Ivory Bank and Nile Commercial Bank.

⁹⁶ Statement from the Bank of South Sudan.

⁹⁷ Compared to transferring money with an MTO, bank transfers do not offer the same possibility to quickly send/receive money.

⁹⁸ See <https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/sites/globalfindex/files/countrybook/South%20Sudan.pdf>.

⁹⁹ This percentage was considered reasonable by key informants consulted during the study. Other sources consider 13 per cent of the population owning a bank account, mainly literate men from urban areas (based on a household survey involving 1,648 persons in South Sudan (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019)).

¹⁰⁰ As keeping cash in a safe place or by buying livestock.

This applies also to those who receive remittances and/or use them to invest in a small business (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:35).

Mobile banking remains limited, with 24 per cent of bank account owners using it, making up only 3 per cent of the population in South Sudan (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:51). Still some banks started offering this service, such as Equity Bank Limited, Cooperative Bank of Kenya¹⁰¹ and Ecobank.¹⁰² Interviews confirm that especially regional banks in South Sudan are looking at Internet and mobile banking as promising scenarios. This is confirmed by a key informant underlying that: “Mobile banking and digital payments are the direction that most banks are taking in South Sudan, and this is especially true today with COVID-19 when people are afraid to physically touch money”.¹⁰³

Considering migrants abroad and their financial needs in South Sudan, prior to the recent conflicts, some regional banks in South Sudan used to encourage their diaspora clients to deposit little amounts in their accounts. For example, taking up from a Kenyan local language, Equity Bank Limited named a product “*jijenge* account” (meaning saving little money, little by little). This was not a commercial product line targeting migrants, but a savings account/accumulation plan offered also to diaspora clients. Migrants were transferring money through bank transfers¹⁰⁴ or MTOs¹⁰⁵ from abroad. This represents an example of a bank in South Sudan addressing diaspora clients with products corresponding to their financial needs. This case refers also to advanced financial diaspora profiles: persons with two bank accounts, in the origin and destination country, with saving plans and a presumably occasional circular mobility between countries.

The **banking system** in South Sudan today appears **not yet equipped or organized to serve diaspora clients** due to its fragilities, and also to a lack of information and interest on South Sudanese living abroad as potential customers. There is no matching between the diaspora demand side (composed of potential remitters, bank account owners or ultimately investors) and tailor-made products and services offered by banks in South Sudan (such as saving products, loans, competitive and functional operation accounts and costs for businesspeople that work between countries) (see also chapter 5 on diaspora investors).¹⁰⁶ The fragilities of the banking system in South Sudan and the lack of products responding to diaspora financial needs negatively impact the following: (a) banks that do not intercept new diaspora clients; (b) Government, which does not intercept financial flows from diaspora investors; and (c) diaspora, missing the opportunity to securely manage funds and payments (chapter 6, recommendations 1 and 2).

¹⁰¹ With its mobile application and limited support agents' network to withdraw money and make deposits.

¹⁰² With its mobile banking services to transfer funds, pay bills or top up airtime (www.ecobank.com/sd/personal-banking/countries; <https://co-opbankss.com/>).

¹⁰³ Interview with a bank association representative.

¹⁰⁴ From their private bank account in the resident country, to their bank account in South Sudan, with SWIFT, especially possible through interbank transfers from abroad.

¹⁰⁵ Cash-to-account, transferring money from an MTO abroad to the bank account in South Sudan.

¹⁰⁶ Note that each bank is free to set its own interest rate (as well as the foreign exchange rate applied), without any central restriction or interference from the Bank of South Sudan, therefore interest rates may differ from one bank to the other.

Text box 2. What is the relationship between the diaspora from Australia and the South Sudanese banking system?

This question was addressed to different key informants: the relationship appears limited and weak.^a The results of the survey conducted in Australia for this research highlight that 100 per cent of respondents (43 persons, including men and women) have a bank account in Australia, while only two persons have a bank account in South Sudan. Key informants stated that the percentage of diaspora accounts on the total bank accounts in South Sudan is very small.^b

Different diaspora investors living out of South Sudan mentioned the following difficulties with local banks: (a) Internet banking is not always offered as an option or presents connectivity problems; (b) fees applied for bank transfers are not always transparent; and (c) the absence of interbanks relationships (between the migrant's bank in Australia and the one in South Sudan) affect the costs and the time needed for bank transfers, resulting therefore in uncompetitive to immediate and easy transfers with MTOs/MNOs.

A diaspora investor stated: "When I need to send money from Australia for my business, I use Amal Express (MTO)".^c Moreover, another one adds: "If it could be possible, I would prefer to use the bank instead of driving 40 minutes carrying with me cash to the MTO agency".^d

Another aspect that limits the possibility for diaspora investors to employ bank transfers refers to the absence of banks in rural areas: "In South Sudan, people do not have a bank account, only NGOs and government have. For instance, for people who produce shea butter and hibiscus like me who don't have a bank account, I have to go there and pay cash".^e

Notes: ^a Information based on key informant interviews; data or estimates were unsuccessfully requested to the Bank Association and its network of banks.

^b Interview with South Sudan Bankers' Association; Bank of South Sudan.

^c Statement from an Australian diaspora investor.

^d Statement from an Australian diaspora investor.

^e Statement from an Australian diaspora investor.

2.4.4. The microfinance sector in South Sudan

The National Legislative Assembly has not finally discussed and approved the regulatory framework for MFIs¹⁰⁷ that ultimately miss the licence from the Bank of South Sudan to operate in South Sudan. MFIs are alternative financial institutions that demonstrated a key role in banking the traditionally unbanked and transformed remittance clients into clients of other financial services (Orozco, 2007). Although South Sudan did not yet develop the microfinance legal framework, six MFIs registered at the Ministry of Justice are currently operating (as non-deposit). Reviewing the legislation that allows MFIs to establish, operate and pay remittances could help reduce informality and increase competition, especially in rural areas and among women in rural areas (chapter 6, recommendation 2).

¹⁰⁷ At the moment, eight are registered at the Ministry of Justice.

Text box 3. How is credit accessed in rural areas?

This question discussed with different informants refers to how people in rural areas can afford loans (for instance to buy a cow), if/when they do not have enough resources to do it. The absence of formal financing bodies leaves room to the following common informal practices: (a) *tontine* (collective loans and fundraising within small groups);^a (b) local shops or persons that informally give credit with interest rate around 20 per cent for a maximum period of three to five months, depending on the agreement and the agricultural season (that can influence the capacity/rapidity to repay the loan);^b and (c) remittances, in which migrants and their donations can be considered as a form of “benevolent credit institution”.

Linking remittances to financial institutions in South Sudan to give and repay microcredit for residents in rural areas shall be of interest for all stakeholders: the Government, the banking sector, MTOs/MNOs and MFIs (when operative in South Sudan) and migrants abroad.

Notes: ^a The *tontine* scheme is a financial practice especially employed among women groups in rural and border areas. The scope is to informally raise and lend funds for private small business activities in agriculture or cover unplanned expenses, mostly relying on local resources, instead of migrant remittances. This financial need and practice could be reinforced with the presence and involvement of local microfinancial institutions.

^b Local shops seem to play a role in providing loans and developing social networks that act as informal safety nets (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:35).

2.5. COSTS OF REMITTING

2.5.1. The making of the remittance cost


The cost of sending remittances with a formal remittance operator includes a visible and an invisible component.

- (a) The **commission**: the fee applied by the intermediary and paid by the migrant/sender. It is normally a fixed sum that varies according to money ranges. Sometimes, the commission is expressed in percentage of the amount remitted.
- (b) The **exchange rate** applied by the operator and different from the official exchange rate. This contributes to make up the non-visible exchange rate margin. Central banks that regulate and monitor banks and remittance providers do not obviously regulate the foreign exchange conversion rates applied to customers.

The remittance costs vary in consideration of the **channel**: transfers via cash and bank accounts tend to cost more than mobile money (Ratha et al., 2019). Mobile operators are currently considered among the cheapest solutions, due to their low technical and operational costs. Increasing the remittance market competition among operators, expanding mobile technology and displacing financial operators especially in remote/rural areas can help reduce remittance costs (chapter 6, recommendation 2).¹⁰⁸ Corridors with more migrants and more competition show in fact lower remittance costs (Beck and Pería, 2009).

¹⁰⁸ Mobile payments in South Sudan is not yet widespread due to a mix of socioeconomic and structural barriers including the following: (a) continued instability and insecurity; (b) severe underdevelopment; (c) infrastructures' constraints as poor network coverage and poor network quality; (d) lack of access to electricity; and (e) low penetration of mobile phones and high costs.

Figure 5. Cost of sending USD 200 worldwide (Sustainable Development Goals)



Source: Ratha et al., 2019.

Note: EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

In global terms, the remittance (Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target is to lower remittance costs to 3 per cent in order to allow migrants to save or send more net money to families. The costs of remittances are more expensive for sub-Saharan African countries.

2.5.2. The costs for domestic and international transfers to South Sudan

The average transaction cost of sending remittances from abroad to South Sudan in 2017 was 9.6 per cent. The costs applied by informal domestic transfer systems vary among operators, with fees ranging from 2 per cent to 5 per cent of the total transaction, normally charged to the sender (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:44).

Considering the practice of transferring airtime in exchange for cash, information on the costs indicates that agents do not charge fees to send airtime on behalf of a customer, while cashing out is highly charged (in Juba, it is reported a commission around 10–20%). This method of transferring money is very quick, but highly costly (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:46). The commissions applied to electronic transfers from m-Gurush are between 1 and 1.5 per cent for domestic transfers, and 2 per cent for international ones (Kenya and Uganda). Using the mobile wallet to buy goods has no charge.¹⁰⁹

The costs applied to send international remittances from abroad to South Sudan vary a lot (see Annex 6). During the research, the main MTOs in South Sudan were invited to share information and participate in the consultation process, but without success. Online simulation tools were therefore employed, accessing the operators' websites and the World Bank website for remittance price comparison (accessed twice). Additionally, information was collected thanks to key informants (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale); Developing Markets Associates (DMA) Global in Europe and DMA for Asia and the Pacific)¹¹⁰ and South Sudanese in Australia. Based on this analysis,¹¹¹ the costs of remitting from Australia to South Sudan show variations from **5 per cent** (sending USD 100 through online transfer via Bakaal operator)¹¹² to **12 per cent** (via Amal Express agent).¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ The maximum amount remitted or hold in a wallet is SSP 200,000 (Sources: mgurush.com; interview with Trinity Technologies representative).

¹¹⁰ DMA covers the collection of costs for different remittance corridors for Australia, excluding South Sudan.

¹¹¹ This information has not been corroborated by mystery shopping activities.

¹¹² See <http://test.bakaal.net:8081/forms/guest/tandc>.

¹¹³ See <https://loginy.co.uk/a-logins/amal-express-login.html>.

Interview with a South Sudanese in Australia:

“Dahabshell is common, so is Western Union. Now more commonly, I use World Remit. Today [25 March 2020], I sent money to Bor Town in South Sudan. I paid AUD 185 to Amal Money Transfer, including the commission, and my mum received USD 100.”

Remittance of AUD 185 from Australia → At destination in South Sudan USD 100 (USD 14 fee) = 12% commission

The evidence collected confirms that **sending money to South Sudan is very expensive** compared to other countries, but costs change in relation to the remittance corridor (which sending country) and to the nature of the operator and channel.

2.5.3. Simulation of remittance costs from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to South Sudan

Based on the available information (World Bank – remittance prices website, see table attached) for four sending countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) to South Sudan, the remittance fees from the United States are lower compared to the costs applied from the United Kingdom. The highest commission for remitting to South Sudan is 19.81 per cent to send 120 British pounds (GBP) from the United Kingdom, and the lowest is 1 per cent to send USD 200 from the United States.

Table 3. Comparison of average costs to remit to South Sudan with existing operators in the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in third and fourth quarter 2019 and first quarter 2020

		Total average, first quarter 2020	Total average, fourth quarter 2019	Total average, third quarter 2019	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (currency)	Data collection from the World Bank
Saudi Arabia	USD 200	7.52	7.29	8.40	14.00	0.52	7.52	15.04	7 February 2020
					14.00	0.29	7.29	14.58	28 October 2019
United Kingdom	GBP 120	10.79	8.66	9.26	7.57	2.35	8.66	10.39	1 November 2019
					8.50	3.71	10.79	12.95	3 February 2020
United States	USD 200	3.73	4.01	3.58	7.14	0.16	3.73	7.47	6 February 2020
					7.14	0.43	4.01	8.01	2 November 2019
United Arab Emirates	USD 200	5.01	7.58	8.15	5.21	2.40	5.01	10.01	9 February 2020
					5.21	4.97	7.58	15.15	3 November 2019

Source: World Bank, Remittance prices worldwide, available at <https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en>. Site accessed by author on 7 February 2020 and 17 April 2020; data reported were collected by the World Bank on dates indicated (2019/2020).

The main affecting factor in the remittance cost is the possibility **to send money via Internet/mobile or through a regular agent**. When the remittance is sent via bank transfer, the recipients may incur additional and unclear costs (banks' commissions) when converting in the local currency.

Considering remittances from Kenya to South Sudan, the monitored formal channels refer to bank transfers whose average costs were around 11 per cent.¹¹⁴ Transfers from neighbouring countries, and more specifically from areas with large presence of South Sudanese population, tend to employ informal operators that make formal methods a too expensive option.

This comparison exercise shows the importance to have more operators within each corridor to increase competition and particularly open up to mobile/Internet remittance providers that can induce others to reduce commissions (chapter 6, recommendation 2).

Text box 4. Possible impacts of COVID-19 on remittances

In addition to the impacts on health, the COVID-19 pandemic has also dramatically impacted the transnational economic activities of migrant communities and their families back home, affecting all the remittance value chain (UNHCR and IOM, 2020). In destination countries, migrants can find themselves among vulnerable groups in the following living and labour conditions: (a) often employed in the black-market economy as undocumented, with concerns to access health structures; (b) being dependent on their working conditions for their legal status; (c) often sharing apartments or dorms; and (d) not understanding well the local language).^a The limitations on international mobility also affect the possibility for migrants to move back or go somewhere else along their network. This means that migrants are in a condition of potential fragility in destination countries.

Economic impacts of COVID-19 in relation to remittances are identified in the following: (a) decreased earnings of migrants abroad (affecting their short- and long-term capacity to remit); (b) diminished working capacity of MTOs agents, affected by the closure of cash transfer activities/shops, generally determining diminished remittance flows; (c) increased risks that remittance companies change their service standards (in terms of delivery times, costs and accessibility); and (d) diminished possibility to informally carry cash money due to mobility restrictions. Additionally, the current fall in oil prices will likely affect remittance outflows from Gulf countries.^b

The current global recession as a consequence of COVID-19 will likely affect African economies, especially those more dependent on migrant remittances and on oil/petrol and natural resources production and export, such as South Sudan. African countries will be affected by a decrease in the following: (a) FDIs; (b) ODA; (c) remittances from the diaspora; (d) import/export and tourism; and (e) people's saving capacity. Risks for small and medium enterprises are expected, unless supported by financial measures to face liquidity problems (Tyson, 2020). The Bank of South Sudan is still conducting major evaluation for the banking sector; the following quick measurements were undertaken: (a) reduction of the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from 15 per cent to 10 per cent, Central Bank Rate (CBR) and reserve requirement ratio (RRR);^c (b) suspension of the Minimum Paid-Up Capital Regulation (Amended 2020);^d (c) the South Sudanese pound as legal tender;^e and restructuring of loans.^f

Given that remittances are normally counter-cyclical, a decrease can be expected, but also a likely mobilization of personal savings from the diaspora. At the same time, due to the reduced remitted amount, remittances could be differently allocated, such as subtracted to school fees and employed to daily contingencies.

¹¹⁴ From a minimum of 10.71 per cent with Equatorial Commercial Bank to a maximum of 17.04 per cent with Ecobank (<https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en/corridor/Kenya/South%20Sudan>, accessed 17 April 2020).

Based on global projections from the World Bank (2020),^g the impact of COVID-19 on migrant remittances will produce a 20 per cent decrease worldwide, and 23 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa. Remittances are nevertheless expected to grow in 2021, with a rise of 5.6 per cent in low- and middle-income countries. The fieldwork undertaken in Australia confirms that COVID-19 is affecting the diaspora's capacity to remit (75% of respondents confirm it). Some also reported job loss or general income reduction. Additionally, the fieldwork highlighted the effect of the ban on assembly of any fundraising activity, normally related to community events to collect cash donations.

This situation suggests that the diminished possibilities for cash-based remittances (due to lockdown and to MTOs agents being reluctant to physically handle coins/cash)^h could induce an increased search for alternatives (such as digital payments, cards, contactless payments and apps).ⁱ To cope with the drop of remittance volumes, remittance operators are likely expected to focus on the **digital channel**. It is probable also that once remittance consumers will adapt to digital methods, they will probably keep using them in the future (when the pandemic will be over). For South Sudan, this implies the further and urgent need to open up to more mobile payments operators (chapter 6, recommendation 2).

It can be assumed that not just individual migrants will struggle to support their relatives by employing private resources and savings, but also group/collective remittances will actively collect funds (possibly involving other donors and mobilizing all kinds of resources). In the fieldwork in Australia, different groups mentioned their current support in sending material resources for the unequipped health system in South Sudan and additional means to cover food necessities. A female group reported to be raising funds to support the local population, especially women by through the following: (a) sending sanitary soap; (b) suggesting to make protective masks ("We sent pictures of how to make face masks"); and (c) raising awareness on the risks on this virus ("We [as a female diaspora group] are trying to create awareness through local radios and spread the right information").^j

Notes: ^a See <https://crest.iom.int/news/covid-19-places-migrant-workers-highly-vulnerable-situations%C2%A0>.

^b See www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-history?cid=EXT_WBEmailShare_EXT.

^c The measure is intended to release additional liquidity to commercial banks to support economic activities and especially the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic (such as micro and small business enterprises). The CBR was cut from 15 per cent to 13 per cent to give commercial banks the chance to reduce the cost of borrowing while access liquidity is at lower rate from the Central Bank at the time of distress; RRR was also reduced from 20 per cent to 18 per cent, thereby freeing extra cash for commercial banks (Source: Interview with Bank of South Sudan).

^d Bank of South Sudan deemed it necessary to suspend with immediate effect the enforcement of the implementation of Circular No. SDR/S/4/2020, which directs all banks to raise their paid-up capital to minimum of SSP 5 billion for a period of six months to prevent potential risk of banking crisis.

^e Article 46 of the Bank of South Sudan Act, 2011 stipulates that the South Sudanese pound is the only legal tender that shall be accepted in payment of all public and private debts in South Sudan. Pursuant to this, the bank issued a number of circulars, including Banking Circular No. BSS/3/2015 dated 14 December 2015, instructing all government agencies, financial institutions, NGOs, CSOs and the general public to use the South Sudanese pound in all their financial transactions. Conduct of all business transactions in SSP will strengthen its value and reduce the high demand for the United States dollar.

^f The Bank of South Sudan encourages banks to consider circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and make it possible for MSMEs and corporate borrowers to contact them in order to assess and restructure their loans based on special arrangements that shall be agreed upon. Restructuring these loans will mean making lower repayment each month, provision of relief or grace period and freeing up cash for operating capital, thereby avoiding business closure.

^g See https://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/covid-19-through-migration-lens-policy-responses-should-be-inclusive-migrants?CID=WBW_AL_BlogNotification_EN_EXT.

^h See www.cbsnews.com/news/cash-paper-money-coronavirus-covid-19/.

ⁱ See www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/06/COVID19-pandemic-impact-on-remittance-flows-sayeh.htm.

^j Statement from a female diaspora key informant.

3. REMITTANCES FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE: FROM AUSTRALIA TO SOUTH SUDAN

Considering the relationship between women and remittances, it is important to distinguish between women receiving and sending remittances, and diaspora women as investors in the homeland (involved with the so called entrepreneurial remittances).

3.1. WOMEN RECEIVING REMITTANCES

The survey conducted in Australia shows that female relatives are among remittance receivers as well as men, and they often benefit of diaspora-led solidarity projects (see chapter 4).¹¹⁵

Mobile money and payments, as examined in chapter 2, are particularly considered for the positive impacts they could generate for women in developing countries, in terms of increased access to financial inclusion, including the possibility to directly receive and autonomously manage remittances (Pénicaud Scharwatt and Minischetti, 2014). On the one side, technology needs to be available; on the other side, people need to learn how to use technology. The penetration of mobile money services among women in South Sudan remains low and barriers exist, preventing women from using these services.¹¹⁶ Additionally, until today, large-scale initiatives of financial literacy were not undertaken in South Sudan nor commercial campaigns from MMOs or telecommunication companies were launched, specifically targeting women.

As reported by the World Bank and Altai Consulting study: “A significant gender gap remains in access to phones. ... Moreover, women share phones more often than men ...” (2019:25). The study reports that “[O]nly 19% of women use formal and informal transfer systems, compared to 31% of men. ... 1% of women use mobile banking (against 5% of men), and 9% of women have subscribed to mobile money services (against 18% of men)”.

In addition, “Women’s limited familiarity with proxy services, compared to men, could suggest that they will likely be less familiar and at ease with formal mobile money services, once launched. However, examples of countries where the mobile money gender gap is inverted, such as Kenya, suggest that women could be a population in high needs of these services, and therefore that the potential for

¹¹⁵ Respondents mentioned “the aunt; the uncle; the nephew; the niece, the brother or the sister”.

¹¹⁶ The literacy level is overall lower for women in South Sudan, compared to men (and mostly for women in rural areas); the lack of access to an identity document is more acute for women and rural residents in South Sudan (compared to men and urban residents); women have a lower average monthly income in South Sudan (USD 14 versus USD 11) (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:74).

women's uptake is high.¹¹⁷ Efforts will therefore have to be made to target women and tailor services to their specific needs and constraints" (ibid., p. 52).

These significant gender gaps are preventing women from obtaining the benefits of mobile technology and accessing consequent socioeconomic benefits. This analysis suggests the importance of increasing efforts to the following: (a) expand the presence of MMOs and payments in South Sudan; (b) support the development of infrastructures for Internet/mobile technology in rural areas; (c) encourage the development of small/microcredit products and services; and (d) augment initiatives of financial education especially targeting women (chapter 6, recommendation 2).

3.2. WOMEN SENDING REMITTANCES

Looking at the other side of the remittance chain, women who are able to send money are those participating in the (formal or informal) labour market in the destination country.¹¹⁸ Different global trajectories outlined the growing importance of female labour migrations (Sassen, 2000; Hennebry and Petrozziello, 2019), especially related to a demand for domestic work or elderly care in Western countries.¹¹⁹ Although earning less than migrant men, migrant women tend to remit a larger portion of their earnings (Le Goff and Salomone, 2015). In global terms, in Africa, the majority of remitters are males, while two thirds of recipients are women (IFAD, 2017; Orozco, 2007).

In the South Sudan–Australia case, South Sudanese (first-generation) women less likely work and gain earnings compared to men due to their childcare and housekeeping duties, limiting therefore their possibility to autonomously dispose and decide on the money to send. Nevertheless, during the research, encouraging examples of female migrant remittances were found. Women's education, health and work empowerment in South Sudan are the main areas of intervention of the diaspora from Australia, including not only female, but also male groups.

Women from the diaspora (although with their own difficulties) appear very committed and eager to support women in South Sudan: "We came from an oppressive country; women have no voice. But abroad, women understood they deserve to be treated differently; as a consequence, the rate of divorce increased. The concept of helping girls to school is a new thing in South Sudan; the family law is missing in South Sudan. Women asked us: why do we need a family law? But girls get married at 12. We are taking back what we learned as a diaspora, but these ideas on women's rights were not easily accepted because of the patriarchal culture. But we do a lot, with our women's centres, schools for girls, advocacy and raising awareness."¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ In Kenya, women outnumber men by about 22 per cent points. The same holds true in Malawi and Zambia: women's use of mobile banking services is outpacing that of men. In those countries, the case of use for mobile money, which rests heavily on personal transfers and payments, is very relevant for women, who are involved in managing their household's finances (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017).

¹¹⁸ Although more frequently excluded or disadvantaged by the local labour market conditions (Cortes, 2011).

¹¹⁹ See <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/gender-and-migration>.

¹²⁰ Statement from a female diaspora informant.

The research discovered different relevant examples of talented South Sudanese diaspora individuals that came back, contributing to school programmes especially dedicated to girls.¹²¹ In Australia, a female diaspora NGO called Mamaland Hope for Future Foundation,¹²² a group of South Sudanese women, was identified: its fundraising activities and contributions supported, for instance, the maternity ward in Juba Teaching Hospital, an orphanage, the women's prison and a few schools. Despite early scepticism from male South Sudanese elders, Mamaland gained respect from co-nationals, while challenging traditional gender roles in the South Sudanese community (Diaspora Action Australia (DAA), 2014). Another valuable project is the South Sudan Women Empowerment Network (SSWEN), an NGO founded in 2005 by diaspora women in the United States; it started from online conversations on women's roles in South Sudan and in the diaspora. It finally flourished into an organization in South Sudan that promotes gender equity measures, empowerment programmes and human rights advocacy. It gathers women from marginalized areas in South Sudan, local CSOs and a solid global diaspora network and female movement.

The engagement of female diasporas raises attention on the challenges and opportunities they faced (during their migration and resettlement experience) and still face today (in their changed relationship with the country of origin around issues of ethnicity, religion, class and the contested diasporic identity) (Erickson and Faria, 2011:634).¹²³

3.2.1. Women sending entrepreneurial remittances

Female diaspora investors, involved in managing their entrepreneurial remittances seem to be rare, either participating to their husband/family business or with their own one (see chapter 5 exploring the relationship between the diaspora in Australia and investments in South Sudan).

One interviewee explained the way she contributes to female support in South Sudan, channeling female-to-female entrepreneurial remittances: "It's not easy to find South Sudanese women in business; women face more challenges like men controlling them or men not wanting them to work. But I encourage other women to have their business. ... The way I support women in South Sudan is to buy my products only from women and pay the women directly. (Also) they need guidance and inspiration. I want to create a business network with women in South Sudan and women in the diaspora."¹²⁴

Monetary, social and cultural contributions from diaspora female groups and individuals represent an essential way to leverage diaspora remittances towards development and improve women's condition in South Sudan. Initiatives to support and reinforce the cultural, social and collective remittances and transnational engagement of South Sudanese diaspora women shall be envisaged as an important way to support gender equity and women empowerment in South Sudan (chapter 6, recommendation 9).¹²⁵

¹²¹ As the team leader Akuja de Garang and the Girl's Education South Sudan project (<http://girlseducationsouthsudan.org>).

¹²² See www.facebook.com/mamalandforfuture/.

¹²³ In terms of education, employment and also cultural adaptation from kinship-based networks to family, marriage and divorce norms. Literature tells that experiences of migration and resettlement can be both oppressive and liberatory for migrant South Sudanese women (DeLuca and Eppich, 2007; DeLuca, 2008; Abusharaf, 2002).

¹²⁴ Statement from a female diaspora investor.

¹²⁵ Being South Sudanese diaspora women, at the same time providers/supporters of female empowerment initiatives in the origin and destination country, but also possible beneficiaries of capacity-building, training programmes or direct funding.





PART II

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT: THE CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDANESE IN AUSTRALIA

4. THE SOUTH SUDANESE COMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA


Refugees from South Sudan represent the largest African community and the fastest-growing migrant group in Australia (Milner and Khawaja, 2010). The majority arrived after spending part of their lives in refugee camps or conflict-affected areas. The lasting causes of their departure generally impeded refugees to return home (Abur and Mphande, 2019).

The very first South Sudanese presence in Australia dates back to the 1980s, who were educated and wealthy people living in Canberra with study experiences in India.¹²⁶ Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, South Sudanese arrived in Australia mainly through humanitarian programmes (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2007), resettled from refugee camps in East Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia and occasionally Uganda) and from North Africa, primarily Egypt,¹²⁷ increasing from 3,000 to 6,000 a year during the period 2003–2006 (see Figure 6).¹²⁸ These first arrivals often sponsored relatives to follow, creating a migration chain and leading to a further increase of South Sudan humanitarian migrants (Schweitzer et al., 2007).

The female South Sudanese (first-generation) population in Australia refers to women migrating as refugees or for family reunification.

Today, humanitarian migrants from South Sudan cannot apply to Australia's refugee resettlement programmes as other countries and nationalities were prioritized.

Figure 6. South Sudanese migrant flows to Australia, 1991–2010



Source: Lucas et al., 2013.

¹²⁶ Interview with Ibolya Losoncz from the Australian National University.

¹²⁷ It is reported that a certain number of South Sudanese, during the 1980s and 1990s, attended higher education schools in camps in North Sudan and Egypt, experiencing also a certain political activism (through student associations or university groups). This community mobilization, with the support from the Catholic Church in Cairo, was helped to advocate for refugee status for resettlement, especially to Australia (Atem, 2015).

¹²⁸ This increase is explained (Losoncz, 2015) by Australia's response to the international pressure from UNHCR to resettle some of the 6 million refugees in Africa (UNHCR, 2006).

4.1. ESTIMATING THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH SUDANESE IN AUSTRALIA

The community is estimated between 30,000 up to 50,000 South Sudanese (Lucas et al., 2013). According to some experts,¹²⁹ the first generation from South Sudan in Australia is esteemed between 20,000 and 30,000 persons,¹³⁰ and second generation shall approximately account for the same.

Collecting clear and precise information on the presence of South Sudanese in Australia is complex. Today, a large part of the South Sudanese community in Australia is mostly Australian citizens (naturalization of first migrant generations and second generations born in Australia). Before 2011, when the Republic of South Sudan was established, resettled people defined themselves as “Sudanese”. Therefore, it is not possible to track data on South Sudanese in the Australian Census prior to 2011.¹³¹ Moreover, many were born in refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, North Africa and Uganda.¹³² This is confirmed considering the data on refugees registered in Ethiopia until 2016, reported as Sudanese before 2011, and South Sudanese after 2011 (see Figure A9.2 on Annex 9).

The information from the Australian Census used in this study include indications of the country of birth, the ancestry (self-ascription, with the possibility to mention more than one) and the spoken language at home. By combining these sources, it is possible to gain an approximation of the South Sudanese presence in Australia.

On the basis of the Australian 2006 Census, almost 19,000 persons that entered Australia under resettlement programmes were born in Sudan. A relevant part of them could belong to today’s South Sudan. The Australian 2011 Census accounted for 19,133 Sudanese permanent migrants. In the latest *Australian 2016 Census*, 8,000 declared to be born in South Sudan, entering for family reunification and humanitarian reasons. Although, it might be argued that a part of those born in Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda (total 36,000) and resettled in Australia could be South Sudanese people from refugee camps. Experts and key informants considered plausible that at least one third of them could be of South Sudanese origin.¹³³

Table 4. Country of birth by visa stream, permanent migrants at place of usual residence on Census night, 2016

	Skill	Family	Humanitarian	Other permanent	Total (summing family + humanitarian for ^a countries)
South Sudan	3	1 033	6 960	–	7 993
Sudan ^a	194	1 739	12 848	–	14 587
Egypt ^a	5 835	3 651	3 430	11	7 081
Kenya ^a	4 883	2 137	2 785	–	4 922
Ethiopia ^a	317	4 158	4 266	4	8 424
Uganda ^a	349	510	1 246	–	1 756

Source: Table 4, 34170DO001_2016, released at 11:30 a.m. (Canberra time), Wednesday, 18 July 2018 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Understanding Migrant Outcomes – Insights from the Australian Census and Migrants Integrated Dataset, Australia, 2016).

Note: ^a Refugees being born in other countries but South Sudan.

¹²⁹ Interview with Ibolya Losoncz from the Australian National University and Freddie Carver from the Rift Valley Institute.

¹³⁰ “Between 2003 and 2008, approximately 20,000 South Sudanese refugees were accepted for resettlement, and Australia is now a home to 30,000 South Sudanese-born people” (Losoncz and Marlow, 2019:2).

¹³¹ The Australian Bureau of Statistics notes that “South Sudan-born were previously included in the Census count of the Sudan-born, and this is highly likely with a large number in the 2011 Census (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudanese_Australians).

¹³² The survey in Australia confirms it: 79 per cent of persons were born in South Sudan and the rest in Egypt, Ethiopia Kenya and Uganda.

¹³³ There is no scientific evidence of it, but it resulted in a plausible hypothesis.

The hypothesis that at least one third are of South Sudanese origin is corroborated by the data from the Victoria State (Census 2011 and 2016) on the country of birth of people with South Sudanese ancestry (see Table A7.1 on Annex 7). The main countries of birth for people with South Sudanese ancestry are in fact Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. It is also worth underlying that 34.6 per cent of people with South Sudanese ancestry were born in Australia, referring to second generations.

4.2. THE LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME

In 2011, more than 7,000 persons declared to speaking Dinka at home. Unfortunately, no other South Sudanese language was registered in the census. In the 2016 Census, South Sudanese languages were indicated by 18,180 persons.¹³⁴ Based on the previous estimate, it can be possible that part of those speaking Amharic and Kiswahili could be also of South Sudanese origin.

Table 5. Language spoken at home by State and territory of usual residence, count of persons, 2016

South Sudanese languages	New South Wales	Victoria	Queensland	South Australia	Western Australia	Tasmania	Northern Territory	Australian capital territory	Total
Acholi	72	111	420	143	253	55	28	0	1 082
Anuak	34	22	106	16	57	3	0	0	238
Bari	79	169	93	147	319	19	19	12	857
Dinka	2 010	4 869	1 781	1 780	1 600	11	104	537	12 692
Nuer	19	1 601	136	69	289	10	34	0	2 158
Madi	185	42	286	148	172	73	14	13	933
Shilluk	12	200	0	0	4	0	0	4	220
Total	2 411	7 014	2 822	2 303	2 694	171	199	566	18 180
Amharic	769	3 724	685	498	890	151	9	87	6 812
Swahili	1 773	2 447	2 262	2 004	2 364	143	232	238	11 460
Total	2 542	6 171	2 947	2 502	3 254	294	241	325	18 272

Source: Cultural diversity, released at 11:30 a.m. (Canberra time), 20 July 2017 (Table 12) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017.0 Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016).

For the Victoria State (see Table A12.1 on Annex 12), data on South Sudan-born people (Census 2016) shows that the majority speaks Dinka (49%) at home, followed by Arabic (21%) and Nuer (14%). Additionally, only for the Victoria State (Census 2016), the majority of the South Sudanese born people (79%) speaks well/very well English, while 21 per cent does not (see Table A.12.2 on Annex 12). Speaking the language of the destination country is a prerequisite to support the integration process. Speaking rough English can preclude the chances to find a job; if accompanied by low professional skills and education attainment, it can be a predictor of unemployment in Australia (Losoncz, 2019:79).

¹³⁴ A key South Sudanese informant in Australia gently helped to review the languages spoken.

An interviewee confirmed: “After Ethiopia, Uganda and Kakuma refugee camp (Kenya), in 2004, my mum and I moved to Australia. My mum is first generation; she didn’t speak any English. Now she can’t speak, but she has some comprehension. She never worked in Australia. To work, you have to at least understand English. I also struggled with English until high school; I speak, but with this strong African accent.”¹³⁵

4.3. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

The geographical distribution of South Sudanese in Australia (table below, Census 2011; 2016) shows that **Victoria State** accounts for the highest presence, followed by Queensland, Western Australia, New South Wales State and South Australia. Metropolitan/greater city areas present an increase from 2011 to 2016.

Table 6. Distribution within Australia of South Sudan-born: 2016 and 2011 Census

State or territory/ Greater Capital city Statistical Area/ Rest of State or Territory ^a	South Sudan-born					Overseas-born ^e				
	2016		2011		2011–2016	2016		2011		2011–2016
	Persons	% of total ^d	Persons	% of total ^d	% change	Persons	% of total ^d	Persons	% of total ^d	% change
New South Wales	977	12.7	561	16.1	74.2	2 072 566	33.6	1 778 545	33.6	16.5
Greater Sydney	804	10.4	420	12.0	91.4	1 773 543	28.8	1 503 620	28.4	18.0
Rest of State	170	2.2	141	4.0	20.6	299 027	4.9	274 922	5.2	8.8
Victoria	2 750	35.7	1 118	32.1	146.0	1 680 274	27.3	1 405 337	26.5	19.6
Greater Melbourne	2 487	32.3	1 011	29.0	146.0	1 520 265	24.7	1 259 966	23.8	20.7
Rest of State	260	3.4	107	3.1	143.0	160 012	2.6	145 374	2.7	10.1
Queensland	1 430	18.6	715	20.5	100.0	1 016 035	16.5	888 634	16.8	14.3
Greater Brisbane	1 123	14.6	577	16.6	94.6	592 693	9.6	509 159	9.6	16.4
Rest of State	306	4.0	130	3.7	135.4	423 341	6.9	379 473	7.2	11.6
South Australia	898	11.7	390	11.2	130.3	384 096	6.2	352 998	6.7	8.8
Greater Adelaide	870	11.3	358	10.3	143.0	341 059	5.5	310 940	5.9	9.7
Rest of State	27	0.4	28	0.8	-3.6	43 039	0.7	42 059	0.8	2.3
Western Australia	1 201	15.6	488	14.0	146.1	797 714	12.9	688 220	13.0	15.9
Greater Perth	1 173	15.2	483	13.9	142.9	702 554	11.4	597 927	11.3	17.5
Rest of State	28	0.4	7	0.2	300.0	95 153	1.5	90 291	1.7	5.4
Tasmania	89	1.2	70	2.0	27.1	61 241	1.0	57 653	1.1	6.2
Greater Hobart	61	0.8	38	1.1	60.5	30 670	0.5	27 953	0.5	9.7
Rest of State	30	0.4	33	0.9	-9.1	30 573	0.5	29 697	0.6	2.9
Northern Territory	131	1.7	62	1.8	111.3	45 407	0.7	35 177	0.7	29.1
Greater Darwin	93	1.2	52	1.5	78.8	34 979	0.6	26 132	0.5	33.9
Rest of Territory	39	0.5	11	0.3	254.5	10 426	0.2	9 041	0.2	15.3
ACT	219	2.8	79	2.3	177.2	105 170	1.7	86 324	1.6	21.8
Australia^b	7 699	100.0	3 486	100.0	120.9	6 164 361	100.0	5 294 150	100.0	16.4
All capital cities^c	6 616	85.9	2 944	84.5	124.7	4 995 765	81.0	4 235 703	80.0	17.9
Rest of country	1 084	14.1	543	15.6	99.6	1 168 601	19.0	1 058 448	20.0	10.4

Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018:9.

- Notes:
- ^a Rest of State or Territory categories include “No usual address” and “Migratory-Offshore-Shipping”.
 - ^b Australia total includes “Other territories”.
 - ^c Comprises Greater Sydney, Greater Melbourne, Greater Brisbane, Greater Adelaide, Greater Perth, Greater Hobart and Greater Darwin.
 - ^d Percent in italics adds up to total for Australia.
 - ^e Includes “Inadequately described”, “At sea”, “Australia (includes external territories), nfd”, “Norfolk Island” and “Australian External Territories, nec”.

¹³⁵ Statement from a female diaspora investor.

South Sudanese in Australia are mainly an urban and suburban population, with highest concentration in cities as Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. Most part of the South Sudanese community that settled in Victoria in the 1990s/2000s faced an interstate migration due to a search for affordable housing (South Sudanese Community Association in Victoria (SSCAV), 2017). Nevertheless, South Sudanese people were also resettled in rural areas to meet the local demand for low-skilled labour; these areas are described as “typically low in infrastructure and services required to support the development of human capital, such as language and skill development, of resettled refugees” (Losoncz, 2015:6).

An interviewee adds: “In 2001, we arrived in Sydney; I grew up there. But then my family moved to Melbourne because my father found a job and the majority of the South Sudanese community lived there; we felt more comfortable.”¹³⁶

Annex 8 (Number of South Sudan-born in major suburbs, Victoria) is the list of the Victoria suburbs where South Sudanese born residents mainly live (2016), with Wyndham largely surpassing Brimbank and Greater Dandenong, followed by Casey and Melton.

Text box 5. Demographic and economic traits of South-Sudanese born living in Victoria State

The community of South Sudanese born in Victoria State more than doubled (from 1,123 in the 2011 census to 2,753 in the 2016 census). Most South Sudanese live in Melbourne (metropolitan area), and the community is equally composed by men and women. The population presents a quite young age structure.¹³⁷ Almost half of South Sudanese-born consists of families with children (47.5%), and a significant part (32.2%) is one-parent family.

The general education level improved from 2011 to 2016. The South Sudanese born in Victoria State with no educational attainment are almost one tenth of the total.¹³⁸ Those that reported only school education¹³⁹ represent still the majority.¹⁴⁰ Those with tertiary education (advanced diploma, bachelor’s degree or post-graduate) increased from 18 per cent (2011) to 24 per cent (2016). A gender gap exists for education (Losoncz, 2019).

Considering the income level, the 64 per cent of the South Sudanese born living in Victoria earn up to USD 20,400 (with 23% earning up to USD 6,800,¹⁴¹ 16 per cent earning up to USD 10,200,¹⁴² and 25 per cent earning up to USD 20,400¹⁴³). Those few earning from USD 34,000 to USD 68,000 increased¹⁴⁴ from 2011.

¹³⁶ Statement from a diaspora investor.

¹³⁷ In 2016: 17 per cent was up to 18 years, 38 per cent between 19 and 34 years; 25 per cent between 34 and 44 years and 20 per cent up to 64 years.

¹³⁸ 11 per cent in 2011, 8 per cent in 2016.

¹³⁹ School education means the highest educational attainment is between year 8 or below and year 12 level.

¹⁴⁰ 50 per cent in 2011, 34 per cent in 2016.

¹⁴¹ The census accounts for weekly income between AUD 1 and AUD 199. There are 52 working weeks in Australia. Those earning up to USD 6,800 were 25 per cent in 2011.

¹⁴² Those earning between AUD 200 and AUD 299 a week were 22 per cent in 2011.

¹⁴³ Those earning between AUD 300 and AUD 600 were 19 per cent in 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Those earning up to USD 34,000 (AUD 600–AUD 1,000 a week) increased from 9 per cent in 2011 to 13 per cent in 2016. Those earning up to USD 68,000 (between AUD 1,000 and AUD 2,000) increased from 4.8 per cent in 2011 to 8.4 per cent in 2016.

In the survey undertaken for this study (involving South Sudanese in Australia), most respondents declared to earn between AUD 40,000 and AUD 50,000 (USD 25,000–AUD 33,000) yearly, considering the sample is medium–highly educated with prevalence of tertiary and superior education. Only few respondents declared a yearly income up to AUD 10,000 (USD 6,500). An outlier respondent declared an income of AUD 120,000 (USD 77,000), while only some reported an income in the cohort AUD 80,000–AUD 100,000 (USD 50,000–USD 65,000).

Interviewees confirmed that not all diaspora have high-paying jobs and that budget cuts to Australian social welfare are affecting the diaspora's ability to send remittances.

House ownership in Australia

The majority of South Sudanese-born living in Victoria rents a house (78% in the 2011 census; 61% in the 2016 census). Interestingly, in 2011, only 10 per cent owned a house with a mortgage, while in 2016, the percentage increased to 25 per cent as a signal of life settlement (property of a house) and financial inclusion (access to credit).

The survey conducted in Australia confirms this growing trend, with 43 per cent of respondents owning a house in Australia, and 28 per cent of them planning to buy one in the next three or five years.

4.4. WORK OCCUPATION

Focusing on the South Sudanese-born in Victoria State (in 2011), almost one fourth of the population was employed, while half of the population was not in labour force.¹⁴⁵ In 2016, the percentage of the employed ones increased (37%), while the percentage of those not in the labour force diminished, still being considerable (39%). In New South Wales, the unemployment rate for South Sudanese was 14.1 per cent in 2016.¹⁴⁶

South Sudanese female participation to the labour market in Australia (especially first generation) is conditioned by the responsibilities in family childcare and housekeeping (Milos, 2011).¹⁴⁷

Meat processing and farming (especially in rural areas) became an important employment sector for first generations (Atem, 2015:4), as well as construction, especially in urban zones.¹⁴⁸

Considering the industry of employment, a large part of South Sudanese in Victoria State was hired in manufacturing, health care and social assistance. Among the main occupations, two main groups emerged: (a) unskilled workers and machinery operators (2011 – 40%; 2016 – 35%); and (b) community and personal service workers (2011 – 27%; 2016 – 35%).¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Considering people in working age (more than 15 years).

¹⁴⁶ For data on the Western Australia State, see <https://omi.wa.gov.au/resources-and-statistics/publications/publication/new-and-emerging-communities-in-western-australia>.

¹⁴⁷ The traditional South Sudanese family structure attains to large families with many kids. This is also confirmed in the destination country, where the survey in Australia highlighted an average of four children per family.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Ibolya Losoncz from the Australian National University.

¹⁴⁹ The occupations included are as follows: aged; child and disabled caregivers; waiters and bar attendants; and education aides.

4.4.1. Barriers in the labour market

Different variables influence on the possibility to find a job and upgrade the career for South Sudanese in Australia, showing outcomes of economic and social exclusion and discrimination (Abdelkerim and Grace, 2012; Correa-Velez and Onsando, 2009; Dhanji, 2009; Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2006). Literature, interviews with experts and diaspora representatives confirmed that South Sudanese in Australia find more barriers than others (both refugees and Australians) to fully integrate and easily access work occupations and opportunities.¹⁵⁰ As stated by SSCAV (2017), “racial hostility and discrimination in sections of the Australian community ... made it more difficult for people of South Sudanese in areas such as getting jobs and housing”.

The language impediments and the lack of professional skills more likely affected first generations, representing an entry barrier to access the local labour market. This resulted on higher rates of unemployment compared to other migrant groups. The lack of social capital and network (Putnam, 2000) limited integration outcomes and achievements in education and employment. Nevertheless, there are South Sudanese people in Australia that succeeded, despite the discrimination challenges in the workplace and in the surrounding society: “Many young South Sudanese broke the ceiling: they are doctors, lawyers and [information technology] IT specialists.”¹⁵¹

An interviewee speaks of the complexities faced in Australia: “Settlement was an issue; the lack of mentors was an issue. We had support from my mum in terms of cooking, but she has no education. I had nobody who could advise me on what to do, who could explain things to me. ... I struggled for me and had my own challenges. People discriminated me; they were using offensive words. But I was climbing the ladder.”¹⁵²

4.5. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN AUSTRALIA AND COEXISTING GENERATIONS OF SOUTH SUDANESE–AUSTRALIANS

The South Sudanese Australian community faced challenges and obstacles that most refugee and migrant groups meet in terms of language, cultural diversity and possible cultural clashes between the origin and the destination country. Systemic barriers had a negative impact on resettled refugees and their children to develop a positive identity in Australia (Losoncz and Marlow, 2019). Issues and appeals related to the lack of public support and respect for refugees were raised from community leaders and human right groups.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ The reasons were analysed in a recent publication (chapter 7 of Losoncz, 2019) pointing at the following: (a) failure of the Australian multicultural model of integration; (b) lack of cultural awareness within public institutions and programmes to support South Sudanese migrants; and (c) contradictions between Government of Australia’s domestic and international politics on resettlement.

¹⁵¹ Statement from an informant living between Juba and Melbourne.

¹⁵² Statement from a female diaspora investor.

¹⁵³ As reported in a qualitative study on the mental well-being of 20 South Sudanese–Australians in Melbourne, findings show that South Sudanese refugees “face a range of settlement-related challenges, and a host of post-resettlement adaptation experiences such as limited change of gender roles, language proficiency, unemployment, host society unacceptance or intolerance, constrained recreational opportunities, lack of community connectedness and overall mental health and general wellbeing issues” (Abur and Mphande, 2019:2).

4.5.1. Intergenerational change

Not only South Sudanese people experienced a cultural distance from the Australian environment, but also within the community itself (Migrant Information Centre, 2012); generational and cultural gaps between younger and older generations occurred.

A recent community work in Melbourne examines the challenges that South Sudanese of all ages face in navigating the Australian system and honouring the South Sudanese values (TACSI, 2018:37).¹⁵⁴ Not only cultural divergences in family and parenting practices and sociality exist (Atem Deng, 2015), but also an internal generational cleavage between elders and young people has been evidenced. The two groups differently experienced situations: war and displacement, refugee and resettlement, exposure to African traditions as well as to mainstream Australia society. “Not only those exposed to war have been traumatized. We all come from stories of displacement and loss. There are also many problems with second generations in Australia, from discrimination at school, to prison and detention.”¹⁵⁵

Some studies show evidence that resettlement experiences negatively affected and disempowered South Sudanese in their roles as elders within the families and respective communities (Atwell et al., 2005). Moreover, “for parents and elders, the lack of language skills can create intergenerational gaps and tensions. ... Many parents and community elders express concern that their children are learning different values and concepts of rights and responsibilities that distance and disrupt more traditional ways of disciplining and guiding young people” (SSCAV, 2017:4).

4.5.2. Negative stereotyping

A negative public narrative¹⁵⁶ on South Sudanese in Australia overstated the problem and the presence of young gangs, further affecting a negative stereotype and self-perception of all South Sudanese¹⁵⁷ – disregarding the positive and successful outcomes of many second generations.¹⁵⁸ The organization SSCAV took a step into the complexities of the South Sudanese group in Australia, addressing a response letter – Parliamentary Inquiry into Migrant Settlement Outcomes (SSCAV, 2017) – to explain the reasons behind the “young gang” problem. Different suggestions were advanced, including the engagement of the communities in working with Australian authorities to help young people at risk, focusing on preventative and rehabilitative services.

The South Sudanese community in Australia faces important exogenous and endogenous challenges that can sometimes bring to problematic outcomes. On the one side, many are committed in the integration process, struggling to remove barriers and access to local opportunities. On the other side, obstacles to the integration process in Australia could represent a motivation to look back at South Sudan. This depends on what extent migrants and their families are settled abroad (such as presence of children at school, a mortgage, the employment conditions and welfare benefits). Additionally, the (positive or negative) integration outcome also impacts on the possibility for migrants abroad to mobilize additional social, human and monetary

¹⁵⁴ The project was organized by TACSI, with the South Sudanese Australian community, the Department of Health and Human Services and health providers.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a diaspora informant.

¹⁵⁶ For instance, when referring to a “real concern about Sudanese gangs” in Melbourne, July 2018 (see www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jul/25/its-not-safe-for-us-south-sudanese-australians-weather-african-gangs-storm).

¹⁵⁷ The South Sudanese community, as an unintended result and reaction to this negative stereotyping, demonstrated to have safety and strength together, and also missed useful connections with the broader community (underlying the lack social capital and network) (TACSI, 2018).

¹⁵⁸ As university students in law, medicine and engineering or leaders in sport activities (Interview with Ibolya Losoncz from the Australian National University).

capitals linked to the Australian civic society (for instance by involving NGOs, donors, individuals or philanthropists to possibly contribute to development or investment projects in South Sudan).

Overall, the data collected and the fieldwork undertaken evidenced a community that is still struggling along a **complex integration process abroad**, and also offers positive and successful stories: first and second generations that achieved high education and employment positions (such as lawyers, university researchers, health professionals, social workers and entrepreneurs) (chapter 6, recommendations 6 and 8). Particularly, second generations show divergent profiles: they are interested to accomplish their lives in Australia, without further contributing to South Sudan besides family remittances, and also deeply linked to their family history, identity and origin in South Sudan and prone to mobilize their own resources (chapter 6, recommendation 10).

4.6. TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES AND SOUTH SUDANESE GROUPS IN AUSTRALIA

Communities across South Sudan are often part of regional or global networks primarily grounded in ethnic or family kinship that provide reinforced solidarity and support (Rift Valley Institute, 2018:5; Carver and Ruach Guok, 2020). This is due to both the absence of a “collective South Sudanese sense of community” (Rift Valley Institute, 2018:8), and the lack of stronger State-based social contract, welfare system or reliable security.

Individual transnational trajectories of South Sudanese from Australia include also an international elite, made up by persons with double citizenship and passport comprising for instance of workers from international organizations, students and traders.¹⁵⁹ The widespread network of the South Sudanese diaspora and its local transnational connections were analysed by the Rift Valley Institute and represented here below (2018).

Figure 7. Global and regional connectivity of the research respondents



Source: Rift Valley Institute, 2018:7.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Nicki Kindersley from the University of Cambridge.

4.6.1. The establishment of South Sudanese organizations in Australia

The cities of **Sydney** and **Melbourne** host the oldest South Sudanese communities in Australia. Migrant formal or informal organizations are normally distinguished according to their scope: either support the needs of co-nationals in the destination country (especially new arrivals in their integration process), and (alternatively or simultaneously) operate to support the origin country with donations aimed at sponsoring community projects.

In Australia, since the establishment of a first umbrella or pan-South Sudanese association to provide help and represent the community's needs with the local and government authorities, smaller subgroups emerged. With the increasing arrivals of South Sudanese refugees,¹⁶⁰ dispersed associations were established based on ethnicity and language, emphasizing local identities rather than a national identity. This had an ultimate impact in migrant associations: the sense of community did not extend beyond immediate tribal or subtribal affiliations (Atem, 2015).

In Sydney, 50 organizations were listed (ibid.). Once arrived in Sydney, South Sudanese formed the first ethnic association named Community of Southern Sudan and Other Marginalised Areas Association and afterwards the Equatoria Community Welfare Association emerged. The two larger associations kept their role of intermediation with the Australian society, but smaller groups appeared to mediate family conflicts or collect money/remittances to help specific communities back home.

In Victoria, SSCAV was similarly created in the 1990s, animated by different voluntary teams to be a representative body, support the community and organize initiatives and events.

The changes within migrant organizations can be explained by considering ethnic lines and generations turnover (from "older" first migrants to "newer" younger ones). The same ethnic conflicts in South Sudan can be found among ethnic organizations in Australia.

The result of the mapping exercise¹⁶¹ of South Sudanese groups in Australia offers a dynamic scenario (see the list on Annex 2) with almost 50 groups recorded)). The nature of the associations largely includes ethnic related groups (for instance Acholi, Equatorians, Nuer, Lou-Nuer, Dinka, Bari and Kakwa); some hometown/village associations are linked to specific areas of origin (Bor, Panniok and Liech). The second-level associations (as federations) are few. Additionally, there are solidarity/peace-related groups, female groups, groups supporting political parties in South Sudan, and some sport/cultural groups (wrestling). The large variety of ethnic groups suggests that in order to start a dialogue with the diaspora in Australia, an inclusive and unbiased approach is needed to deal with and engage the diversity expressed by migrant organizations (chapter 6, recommendation 5).

¹⁶⁰ Experiencing war and life in refugee camps, with harsh tribal violence and competition.

¹⁶¹ Employing different sources as online lists of migrant associations, Facebook pages, Twitter, interviews and the survey results (March–April 2020).

4.7. COLLECTIVE REMITTANCES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SOLIDARITY PURPOSES

Rather than focusing only on individual monetary remittances, it is important to consider also the wide range of **migrant capitals** (human, social, economic and financial) involving individuals and groups in their commitment towards the communities of origin (chapter 6, recommendation 6).

During the fieldwork in Australia, with the support of DAA, 50 male and female representatives of communities or organizations belonging to different ethnic groups – mostly aged between 20 and 50 years and with an average medium–high education level – were interviewed.¹⁶² Their associations represent a minimum of 8 up to 300 members. Projects run by such organizations directly impact a minimum of 20 people up to 400 people (often with scholarship programmes); indirectly, they can reach up to between 8,000 and 10,000 people (with large schools and education projects or clinics).

The fieldwork shows evidence that the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia has been actively **fundraising** to deliver aid and development. Fundraising can be restricted to small groups pulling together their resources. Community fundraising can raise as much as USD 65,000.¹⁶³ Funding raised are unlikely to be given to potential beneficiaries in South Sudan as a monetary contribution; they are usually employed to support diaspora-led initiatives. Beneficiaries are either living in South Sudan or in refugee camps.

Despite diaspora groups in Australia being highly diversified, the majority sustains community projects in the areas of origin, albeit there is not much coordination between diaspora communities. Collective remittances seem to reaffirm transnational ethnic solidarity and maintain local bonds and sense of belonging. Strong ties with the hometown–village–region represent a crucial asset for community projects, providing support in dispersed and rural areas. Overall, the lack of structured government offices dedicated to the diaspora makes it difficult to coordinate and implement projects in South Sudan (chapter 6, recommendations 5 and 7).

Diaspora-led initiatives funded by Australian-based diaspora are most commonly the following:

- Education initiatives, including building schools and scholarship programmes (predominately directed at orphan children) from 22 up to 400 children beneficiaries. The diaspora engagement in this sector shows the importance of building partnerships with the diaspora to help reconstructing the education system in South Sudan, and also engaging the diaspora and its talents to capitalize the diaspora knowledge to specific local education needs and capacities (chapter 6, recommendations 5 and 8). Moreover, interviewees often reported of looting and disruption to their projects caused by local militia, reinforcing the need for local stability not to vanish the migrants' contributions.
- Healthcare initiatives, including building clinics (particularly in rural areas) and refurbishing hospital wards (mostly in Juba), especially to assist women and children's health.
- Women independence and empowerment, male and female diaspora groups support women, particularly widows and single women, with empowerment projects focused on developing women's financial independence. This more likely happens by providing initial funding and equipment instead of training.

¹⁶² Acholi, Dinka, Equatorians, Jonglei State, Luo and Nuer.

¹⁶³ For instance, to deliver medical programmes.

- Response to natural disaster, more common among interviewees from the Jonglei region is to support projects to build dikes to help containing recurrent floods.
- Aid to disable people; these initiatives seem to be limited to acquiring wheelchairs.
- Acquisition of vehicles and transport for remote areas, where there was none.
- Burials; after the Bor massacre in the 1990s, Australian diaspora raised funds to bury people and afterwards donated funds to families. This was the only case mentioned where money were sent directly to people in South Sudan.

Other initiatives include sending supplies, such as clothing, schooling resources, sewing machines, reusable sanitary items for girls, medical supplies, food and other essentials for people in camps.

4.8. THE REQUESTS OF THE DIASPORA IN AUSTRALIA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH SUDAN

The diaspora in Australia has no single voice; therefore, it is essential to understand and equally engage diaspora diversities and heterogeneity. “The diaspora in Australia is not neutral: there is a need of reconciliation, social cohesion and trust building. What happens in South Sudan happens also in Australia. The tribe affinity is stronger than the nation-patriotism. Diaspora needs help in area of trust building.”¹⁶⁴ In order to start a dialogue with the diaspora: “Representativeness needs to be carefully considered; there is a need for productive discussion, but the local interlocutor has to be very cautiously chosen. ... The risks to get wrong are high” (chapter 6, recommendations 4 and 5).¹⁶⁵

All interviewees strongly affirm that **safety, stability and transparency** are the fundamental conditions for any diaspora engagement or investment. The recent conflicts produced a prudent and sceptical attitude, mining trust in the Government and its initiatives.¹⁶⁶ Based on the fieldwork in Australia (interviews and survey), the **principal requests** from the diaspora to the Government of South Sudan are directed to “improve the dialogue of the Government of South Sudan with the diaspora” and “involve the diaspora in local projects of development”. Dialogue and direct involvement are the most prominent requests.

Secondly, the diaspora asks to: “foster greater knowledge of South Sudanese diaspora and South Sudan within the Australian government”; “involve educated/skilled South Sudanese abroad”; “establish Consular services”; “create partnerships with organizations in your country of residence”; “reinforce the cultural linkages with the diaspora abroad”, “reinforce the capacity of the organizations in South Sudan” (chapter 6, recommendations 4, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12).

Thirdly, other aspects mentioned are as follows: “incentives and benefits for diaspora investors” and “products and services to help migrants send money or reduce costs of remittances” (chapter 6, recommendations 2 and 10).

¹⁶⁴ Statement from a diaspora informant.

¹⁶⁵ Statement from Freddie Carver of the Rift Valley Institute.

¹⁶⁶ Zeelen and van der Linden (2009) refer to the social learning and interactive knowledge production needed for any partnership involving diasporas.

5. THE SOUTH SUDANESE DIASPORA IN AUSTRALIA AND INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH SUDAN

5.1. THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN SOUTH SUDAN

The investment and business climate in South Sudan suffers from the post-conflict situation of political insecurity and instability; a country rich in natural resources (oil, iron, diamonds, copper, nickel, marble and gold), but poor in (human, institutional and infrastructural) development. It ranks 185th (out of 190) in the Doing Business 2019 classification.¹⁶⁷ The main authority is the South Sudan Investment Authority upgraded to the Ministry of Investment and Investment Services by the current Revitalized Peace Agreement and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. A South Sudan Business Forum (2012) was created to facilitate dialogue between the public and private sectors, as well as a one-stop shop (May 2012) to ease investment registration. The local regulatory framework consists of the following: (a) Investment Promotion Act (2009); (b) Investment Promotion Regulations (2012); (c) Investment Policy Framework (July 2012); and (d) the three-year Strategic Policy Framework from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (2020–2022).

The main players in terms of FDIs are global companies or large-scale investors (in the oil and mining sectors, energy and coffee plantation). Oil is the driving factor of the economy, while subsistence agriculture is the primary economic activity for most of the South Sudanese population (approximately 80%).¹⁶⁸ South Sudan has a weak private sector, and entrepreneurship by the local population is likely found in the informal sector.¹⁶⁹ Northern Sudanese dominate most businesses and trade in the country, while Kenyans and Ugandans and East African Community (EAC) countries mainly provide most of the imports.¹⁷⁰

Access to capital is extremely limited, considering that after the recent conflict, the financial institutions are in a process of re-establishing their capacity and role; moreover, their presence is concentrated in Juba City.

Investment incentives and facilities are available¹⁷¹ in terms of tax exemptions and concessions,¹⁷² fiscal incentives¹⁷³ and access to land for investment.

¹⁶⁷ See www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings, list issued by the World Bank.

¹⁶⁸ See https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/East%20Africa%20Landscape%20Study/11SouthSudan_GIIN_eastafrica_DIGITAL.pdf.

¹⁶⁹ Typically in areas, such as retail, livestock, vehicle repair, transportation and equipment maintenance.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

¹⁷¹ As specified in the Investment Promotion Act, 2009, chapter VIII, Investment incentives; Second schedule Benefits and incentives, Article 32.

¹⁷² For priority investment areas in machinery and equipment, capital and net profits for a determined period, and especially all agriculture imports.

¹⁷³ As for instance granted allowances based on different conditions.

The local vacuum in entrepreneurship, industry and innovation, and the sense of uncertainty in the private sector (small- and medium-sized enterprises) can nevertheless represent a potential opportunity for investors and entrepreneurs.

Among the different **investment priority areas**¹⁷⁴ listed in the Investment Promotion Act of South Sudan (2011), South Sudan's National Development Strategy (2011–2013; 2019–2021)¹⁷⁵ prioritized infrastructure, agriculture, power and ICT/technology.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, two other priority sectors demonstrated a special vitality:¹⁷⁷ mining and tourism.¹⁷⁸

Estimates from informants reveal that diaspora companies registered in South Sudan could represent up to 15 per cent of all companies (accounting up to maximum 100 companies), mainly medium-sized companies with up to 30 employees and dealing with import. "Businesspeople are more from Canada, United Kingdom and United States; they bring clothes in containers, import food items from abroad, Europe and United States; cars from Japan or other machineries."¹⁷⁹ No data is collected from the Ministry of Trade and Industry: diaspora companies are registered as South Sudanese companies, and they receive the same treatment as all others: "The businessperson can be a resident abroad; it depends if people who register the company want to fully come back to South Sudan or just to invest."¹⁸⁰

5.2. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DIASPORA TO INVEST IN SOUTH SUDAN

Given this scenario, a crucial question within this study was addressed to understand the interest of the diaspora as potential investor in the home country. Literature and development actors recognize in the diaspora a mix of key factors that can affect the role of active investor, even in fragile and post-conflict States (Benson and Odundo Owuor, 2018). In fact:

- (a) Migrants already remit, and by transferring money to their relatives, they maintain regular financial behaviours and practices with the origin country;
- (b) Their motivation towards an investment in the country of origin can combine the financial risk, with the commitment to social good (Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Terrazas, 2010).

Family networks are undoubtedly recognized as the most common channel to investments due to the need to locally manage funds and activities from trusted persons (McGregor, 2014).

Nevertheless, voices of criticism shall be included, pointing at the misleading assumption of a diasporic will to invest in the homeland, and converging interests with the transnational family (McGregor, 2014; Lubkemann, 2008). Additionally, the narrative of migrant investments is grounded on the common stereotype

¹⁷⁴ These are 11 areas including also pharmaceutical, forestry, natural resources mapping and banking.

¹⁷⁵ The 2011–2013 strategy is available at http://mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS_SSDP.pdf. The 2019–2021 South Sudan National Development Strategy provides a comprehensive socioeconomic development plan for South Sudan and is available at www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NDS-4-Print-Sept-5-2018.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ See www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/fragility-resilience/promoting-private-investment-in-transition-countries/the-horn-of-africa-opportunity/country-profiles/south-sudan.

¹⁷⁷ Source: South Sudan Investment Authority.

¹⁷⁸ Especially with a growing presence of hotels in Juba. The COVID situation although is affecting many sectors today.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

(among families and governments in the origin country) on the presumed diasporas' wealth and capacity to generate cash and savings.

Finally, cautious confidence is expressed in the findings of a recent project from *Making Finance Work for Africa, 2020*¹⁸¹ assessing initiatives to leverage migrant remittances into investments:¹⁸²

- (a) Diaspora capitals are hardly harnessed for productive investment and usually kept in host countries;
- (b) Not many examples of successful diaspora investment initiatives exist globally. Most of them have involved considerable time in planning, product design and significant resources;
- (c) Actions and tools to help understand the potential of diaspora investment and guide governments to design and implement effective diaspora investment mechanisms are still relatively underdeveloped.

Given this premise, it is important to understand how to move on from the investment interest of migrants to the actual investment (Nielsen and Riddle, 2007; The Commonwealth, 2018). There is no unique and single explanation, but a multiset of variables enters into play:

- (a) Economic and political context in the origin country, that in the case of South Sudan shows how the lack of stability and security, investment facilities or capital resources is discouraging diasporas.
- (b) Socioeconomic life conditions of the diaspora abroad, according to which, the more integrated migrants are with their lives and families in the destination country (children at school, house mortgage), the less likely investments can be expected in the origin country. The integration process of South Sudanese in Australia is fragmented and multifaceted, with complex challenges and outcomes for a community with medium–low income and with differences between first and second generations (see also chapter 4 on the South Sudanese community in Australia).
- (c) The relationship between the diaspora abroad and the public institutions in the origin country implies a bidirectional process of trust building, dialogue and engagement.¹⁸³ Trust on the credibility of the political authorities is crucial, but the diaspora from Australia has major concerns on transparency, country safety and stability.

¹⁸¹ See *Making Finance Work for Africa, 2020*.

¹⁸² Diaspora investment is distinguished between direct investment, as international entrepreneurship in the country of origin, and portfolio investment as sovereign bonds, equity or stock purchases (AfDB and *Making Finance Work for Africa, 2019:68*).

¹⁸³ Different aspects exist, among others: (a) instruments or platforms for virtual diaspora mapping; (b) consular/embassies services abroad; (c) political vote from the diaspora abroad; and (d) a history of positive exchanges and forms of mutual recognition between the Government and the diaspora.

5.3. THE EXPERIENCE OF SOME SOUTH SUDANESE INVESTORS FROM AUSTRALIA

5.3.1. Remittances and investments

All key informants in Australia confirm that: “Money sent home from Australia is not for investment; remittances are sent to sustain the family in South Sudan or in a refugee camp in Uganda, Kenya or Sudan. We support our relatives.”¹⁸⁴ Additionally, “Many who invested in the past still have a small shop in the village or something in real estate. But this is just a way to live an average life; this is not real investment.”¹⁸⁵

A member of the TAWG confirms that: “Families in South Sudan receive support from migrants: there are women that open a small shop (for tea or coffee) with this money, but these are not investments.”¹⁸⁶

In general, given the main use of remittances for emergency and daily life, different informants agreed to focus on and explore opportunities to transform subsistence agriculture of remittance recipients into small-scale commercial farming (MFIs could potentially play a significant role; see chapter 6, recommendation 2).

5.3.2. Negative stories of return and personal investment

Direct experiences of investors from the diaspora are not easy to find. The more prevalent narrative is that after the 2011 independence of South Sudan, many returned from Australia for the enthusiasm and general dynamism of the new country building. It is largely reported that most returnees who invested¹⁸⁷ inevitably lost their capitals due to subsequent conflicts (2013/2016). “The challenges to invest in South Sudan are tremendous. I know people from the United States who invested in the city of Bor after 2011, but they lost everything during the war. They will never try again.”¹⁸⁸

These recent and negative experiences of failure produced a prudent and sceptical attitude among migrants who consider South Sudan too risky and too unstable for possible investments. All interviewees strongly affirm that **political stability, credibility and security** are the fundamental conditions for any diaspora engagement or investment. The trust in the Government’s strength and capacity is very low, and doubts for risks of corruption are often mentioned.

“Today a very limited number of South Sudanese diaspora from Australia invests. If you have lost your business, like me after 2013, you may not be even able to work. Those able went back to Australia to recover from their loss and for the family pressure.”¹⁸⁹ And another one, referring to her own experience: “The diaspora today is very discouraged. Nobody is thinking to invest. I went back to South Sudan in 2011 to be part of the history. I gave up my job and my education to be there, but I left definitively in 2016 and started from zero again. Until you have the same system, you will have the same outcome.”¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁴ Statement from a key informant from Australia.

¹⁸⁵ Statement from an Australian diaspora investor.

¹⁸⁶ Based on the internal survey (February 2020) among the members of the TAWG (Source: South Sudan Investment Authority).

¹⁸⁷ Among the examples of investments, informants mention small-scale activities as opening a shop, a pharmacy and making and selling shoes.

¹⁸⁸ Statement from a key informant in Australia.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with a diaspora investor.

¹⁹⁰ Statement from a diaspora informant.

Some stated that diaspora investors prefer neighbouring countries instead (as Uganda or Kenya) for the better security conditions. An interviewee confirms it: “I came to Kenya with my four kids. Here in Kenya, I found a group; I got inspiration, all women are businesswomen in the group. I decided to start my own business getting shea butter and hibiscus from South Sudan, and selling it in Kenya. When they will make the permanent peace, maybe I will go to South Sudan.”¹⁹¹

The research underlines that investing in South Sudan mainly assumes for the diaspora in Australia the meaning of directly starting and running a personal business as entrepreneur (see paragraph 5.4.2 in this chapter). Forms of financial investments were not evidenced (also due to the lack of available financial products targeting the diaspora). Considering real estate investments, 85 per cent of the survey respondents declare not currently owning a house in South Sudan. When asked about the intentions for the future, the responses manifest different ideas: some are interested to buy one in the future, others not, and others are hesitant on this decision. Only one interviewee mentioned that there are “individuals who want to establish in South Sudan that have been buying land around Juba and other urban areas in Jonglei state and Upper Nile to build houses, starting by building a shanty house and with time they add on to it”. Still, informants also report of difficulties to access documents to proof land property right in South Sudan reasonably due to conflicts, evacuations and displacements.

5.3.3. Young generations and future engagement

A positive note comes from the strong motivation of a young South Sudanese–Australian investor, addressing the possible contribution from new/second generations. Not all his peers in Australia share this point of view actually, but it tells of a subgroup that can represent a potential investor target in the future:

My father always said:

We are here [in Australia] because we do not have a country. You guys have to go back when you graduate. When I graduated in IT, I could not find a job; Australia is not a diverse country. In 2018, I went to South Sudan for the first time; I was 27. In South Sudan, they are not educated to be investors. But South Sudan is not for everybody. It takes a lot of courage to work in South Sudan. Who will do it? Only us: we come with laws and policies from Australia. We come from the Western world. We speak English and maybe Arabic. We do not speak the tribe language. I'm doing my best to change things; I do not want a war. You have to believe in your country before you invest in it. How do you go and ask to invest if I don't have trust?

¹⁹¹ Statement from a female diaspora investor.

5.4. ENABLING FACTORS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE DIASPORA TO INVEST IN SOUTH SUDAN

5.4.1. Access to credit

Access to credit and the starting capital to invest in South Sudan can be an obstacle for diaspora investors and entrepreneurs from Australia, considering the community living there is low–medium income. In most cases, those who did invest resorted to personal or family savings. Informants mentioned how some in the past raised money by working a few years in Western Australia in the mining sector: “It is a hard job, but if you have a plan. ... These guys were able to buy a house in Western Australia and invest in South Sudan prior to the war, saving up to AUD 130,000.”¹⁹² Other examples refer to family savings accumulated for years thanks to employment salaries or through a business in Australia with the scope to collect funds to employ for future activities in South Sudan.

Access to bank loans in Australia normally applies to a real estate mortgage and rarely to entrepreneurship: “I was thinking of having a business, but with all the challenges we face as refugees, there is no way to get capital to start a business in Australia.”¹⁹³

Access to bank loans in South Sudan is considered very unlikely: “Banking institutions do not support entrepreneurs in South Sudan; you have to have your own savings to start. The problem in South Sudan is the environment that is not stable and secure. The only opportunity for me was to find NGOs or international donors and programmes interested in my business. In this case, you can have chances to get funding.”¹⁹⁴

Another diaspora investor further adds on the financial institutions in South Sudan: “Getting loans from banks in South Sudan is very difficult. The interest rate is about 22 to 23 per cent and if you sum up the other costs, you reach 27 to 28 per cent interest rate. I never had a loan from a bank in South Sudan for my business.” ... Moreover, banking institutions are dominated by regional banks in South Sudan. If you are a new client in South Sudan, it is difficult to get access to loans.” As observed by the Bank of South Sudan, local banks in South Sudan are not well prepared to compete with regional banks, and this could not facilitate South Sudanese diaspora investors (see also chapter 2, paragraph 2.4.3 analysing the banking sector in South Sudan).

5.4.2. Investing and returning to South Sudan

A general question that emerged during the discussions with South Sudanese in Australia is how starting an investment/enterprise in South Sudan could go along with distances. The result highlights that any personal investment or business in South Sudan would necessarily require a personal and preferably physical engagement of the migrant to manage and monitor the activity on site. But travelling costs, work or family obligations or life plans in Australia might not allow this decision for all. Moreover, no return schemes or incentives exist in South Sudan.

¹⁹² Interview with a diaspora investor.

¹⁹³ Statement from a female diaspora investor.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with a diaspora investor 1.

*At the beginning, I was going up and down between Australia and South Sudan every three months. But you can't bring children from the diaspora in South Sudan: you don't have the same education and health services you had in Australia. My plan was to bring my family from Australia and live in Nairobi or Kampala to stay nearby. The long-term strategy to ensure that your business in South Sudan succeeds is that the family has to relocate. But my wife had a job and a salary of AUD 80,000 per year that she didn't want to lose. Entrepreneurs are willing to take risks that their families don't want to take as well. These are challenges that we face.*¹⁹⁵

The implementation of an investment in South Sudan from the diaspora shows the importance of involving and relying on local trusted staff and intermediaries, mainly family members. “This is a mistake we all made: how can you (as diaspora abroad) have a business idea and make the mistake to delegate it to your brother who doesn't have your same ideas and experience. You send the money for your business, but at the end, the money is gone and you have a conflict with your relatives.”¹⁹⁶

However, there are also rare examples of diaspora investors from Australia able to combine their intermittent presence with a local management architecture inspired by the Australian working culture and habits. “We selected the right family members working hard. We trained and tested them, like they do in Australia. You have to be very selective: it took years; it was hard. You don't have to consider them as family members. Money can change the way people react. They got paid every 14 days as in Australia, and this made them work more. If you don't work, you do not get paid. And we have our lawyer in Juba that controls everything; he is our very trusted person.”¹⁹⁷

Overall, business investments from South Sudanese in Australia require an individual return plan, but this option can't always be feasible with migrants' personal and family life circumstances. At the same time, the importance of involving (and training) trusted and skilled local staff is essential for any diaspora project as well as relating to a healthy banking system to access credit (chapter 6, recommendations 4, 7 and 11). These two conditions impede migrants abroad to turn their wishful investment ideas into concrete projects.

The results of the survey in Australia confirm these findings: the main **plan for the future** indicated by respondents is to “continue living in Australia” (63%), followed by those interested to “live in Australia, but increase visits and relationships with South Sudan” (25%). The option to go back to South Sudan is contemplated only by three persons. Moreover, when asked on the frequency of their return to South Sudan, the 44 per cent of the respondents didn't visit South Sudan for a very long time, with some never been in South Sudan.

A study on the South Sudanese in the Netherlands further validates this finding: “In 2011, the two major issues for South Sudanese living in the Netherlands were their involvement in the development of their home country and their personal decision to return to their country or not. Education plays an important role

¹⁹⁵ Interview with a diaspora investor 2.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with a diaspora investor 3.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with a diaspora investor 4.

in both these issues: the state of education in South Sudan is a challenge for interventions, but securing a good education for their own children is a reason not to return to South Sudan” (van der Linden, 2016:109).

Text box 6. Investment ideas from the diaspora in Australia

The survey included some questions on the interest and plan to invest in South Sudan. Considering the nature of the business investment, the respondents mentioned different ideas (reported below, Ideas for investment projects).

The (10) persons stated to be **potentially interested to invest** in South Sudan in the future while the rest of them (33) is doubtful about it. Nevertheless, only 1 person (out of 43) confirmed to be actually saving money for an investment project. When asked on the estimated budget to realize the planned investment in South Sudan, the range varies between USD 3,000 and USD 1 million, with few projects accounting for around USD 100,000.

The main **enabling conditions** that could help migrants to invest in South Sudan are identified in the following: (a) more public investment in training and education (52%); better infrastructures/interconnections (48%); and (c) reduced instability and increased transparency from the Government (37%). Secondary are the following: (a) profitability of the investment; (b) receiving of technical or legal support; (c) creation of free trade zones; (d) stronger banking sector; and (e) presence of tax incentives or other benefits.

Ideas for investment projects mentioned are as follows:

- Filming industry, interpretation and IT services
- Manufacturing machinery, transportation, construction
- Modern farming, agriculture and fishery
- Education (building a university, school for the poor or a private school)
- Company to train people in development activities
- Law practice business
- Pharmaceuticals/pharmacy
- Women’s enterprise for small business
- Building a hotel in Aweil

One interviewee spoke about a real estate business initiative run by the diaspora. The group is still collecting funds and have yet to start developing the business.

5.5. IS SOUTH SUDAN READY TO ENGAGE ITS DIASPORA AS INVESTOR?

Finally, in order to analyse to what extent South Sudan can attract diaspora investments, a set of instruments developed in the *Toolkit for Understanding Diaspora Investment* (African Development Bank and Making Finance Work for Africa, 2019) was employed in this research.¹⁹⁸ Based on the assessment exercise of many diaspora investment initiatives, the toolkit suggests that to facilitate diaspora investments, two dimensions should match: the financial robustness and attractiveness of South Sudan and the diaspora's ability and willingness to invest.¹⁹⁹

The analysis confirms that “it is a prerequisite that governments and private sector continue their work to create appropriate conditions for positive investment climate in their country of origin. Any effort to promote investment will not succeed if the business climate is not investor friendly” (Orozco, 2007:7) (chapter 6, recommendation 2).

As a result of this exercise of data collection and analysis, the following can be observed:

- Firstly, the **absence of most information**, suggesting the need to improve and implement the capacity to monitor, produce and collect data from the South Sudanese Authorities → **Data collection** shall turn into a policy recommendation (chapter 6, recommendation 3).
- Secondly, the **financial readiness** of South Sudan to open up to diaspora investors is too limited and fragile; the capacity to sustain small/medium-size investments is weak, and the diaspora as potential investor is not the object of any target programme or incentive → Coherent **tailor-made measures** to facilitate diaspora's existing and potential entrepreneurs/investors shall become object of policy recommendation together with the improvement of the local investment environment, private sector growth programmes and a reinforced role of the financial/banking sector (chapter 6, recommendations 2 and 11).
- Thirdly, the Government of South Sudan has not yet assumed a solid **dialogue, understanding and strategy** to interact with its diaspora → Engaging the diaspora and its investors is very hard for any government. It is recommended to follow gradual steps, starting from **trust building**, to diaspora **dialogue, recognition, outreach and engagement**, assessing the needs of potential/existing entrepreneurs and finally designing mechanisms to mobilize migrant investors (chapter 6, recommendations 4 to 11).

¹⁹⁸ Toolkit realized by DMA Global with funding provided by the Government of France, IFAD and USAID, through the AfDB's Migration and Development Fund.

¹⁹⁹ The government tools to facilitate diaspora financial investments can include sovereign/government bonds and public pension schemes for diaspora. The private investment channels can include the following: (a) diaspora corporate bonds; (b) online collective investment portals; (c) diaspora savings accounts; (d) diaspora loans and mortgages and diaspora managed funds.

6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

By using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodology and tools both in the South Sudanese and Australian contexts, the study explored to what extent the Government of South Sudan is equipped to dialogue with the South Sudanese diaspora and engage it for development, and to what extent the South Sudanese diaspora in Australia is interested or willing to be engaged or invest in the origin country.

Public and private stakeholders in South Sudan highlighted opportunities and obstacles to this aim; at the same time, the South Sudanese diaspora members in Australia (men and women, young generations and older persons, single individuals and community leaders, investors and non-investors) expressed their different points of view.

Based on the outcomes of the research and responding to the specific policy challenges identified at the beginning of this study (chapter 1, paragraph 1), 12 **policy recommendations** on diaspora remittances and development engagement are identified. Each recommendation may overlap and respond to various policy objectives at the same time.²⁰⁰ The recommendations aim at the following:

- (a) Reinforcing the diaspora remittances framework in South Sudan
 - (i) Reinforcing the remittance **legal framework** in South Sudan
 - (ii) Enabling the development of a dynamic and competitive formal **remittance environment** in South Sudan also to induce a remittance **costs' reduction**
 - (iii) Improving the **knowledge** on the remittance flows in/to South Sudan
- (b) Building an outreach diaspora engagement and mobilizing strategy
 - (i) Designing and implementing tools to consolidate the knowledge, promote engagement and mobilize the **expertise** of the diaspora from Australia
 - (ii) Favouring diaspora **investments** and job-generating activities in South Sudan
 - (iii) Reinforcing the **coordination** among stakeholders in South Sudan and building capacities at institutional level in South Sudan.

²⁰⁰ For each recommendation, an indication is provided of the time needed for implementation, keeping in mind that the definition of "short-medium-long term" all depends on the stability conditions in South Sudan.

The main institutional challenges and obstacles identified by the diaspora in Australia are as follows: (a) fragile political stability and ongoing insecurity in South Sudan; (b) weakness in the rule of law; and (c) limited transparency and accountability of public institutions. These elements profoundly affect the trust of the diaspora in the Government and represent a fundamental barrier to any diaspora engagement and mobilization of public initiative.

6.1. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO REINFORCE THE REMITTANCE FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH SUDAN

Challenge (a): Compliance to the legal framework on remittances is weak and difficult to obtain in the country

Recommendation 1

Increase the compliance of unlicensed remittance and foreign exchange operators to the existing legal framework by reinforcing policy and administrative measures in South Sudan.

Literature²⁰¹ shows and the fieldwork for this research confirms that the macroeconomic environment and policy and administrative measures play an important role in encouraging remittance flows towards formal channels.²⁰² **There is no single way to push transfers from informal to formal methods;** it is a long and articulated process requiring considerable attention and effort from policymakers.

To facilitate formal remittances, policy instruments shall:

- (a) Reinforce policy and administrative measures to improve the legal framework of remittances in South Sudan (medium–long-term result).
 - (i) Reinforced policy and administrative measures are needed including stronger implementing, monitoring and sanctioning measures and tools to make remittance operators compliant to existing regulation, especially to KYC/AML.²⁰³ For instance, under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act (2012), the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) was planned to supervise and monitor AML compliance, involving the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Bank of South Sudan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of National Security. A key recommendation is to fully establish and reinforce FIU.
 - (ii) By systematically enforcing KYC/AML requirements, the Bank of South Sudan's role shall be further reinforced with technical assistance and capacity-building.

²⁰¹ Gupta, 2005; Ebadalla and Edriess, 2012; Singh et al., 2009.

²⁰² Different attempts of initiatives had been drafted to encourage the transaction of remittances through banking/legal channels (mainly in terms of tax exemptions or concessions and privileges given to expatriates). In particular, a "subsidy model" had been taken into consideration in India, Pakistan and the Philippines as a way to boost documented remittances by offering a reimbursement of the cost of transfers/sending remittances (see www.pri.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PRI-Brief-Oct-2019-1.pdf).

²⁰³ In this way, MTOs/MNOs shall be further encouraged to provide efficient training to their agents, especially targeting small rural operators.

- (iii) Support the development of a **national ID system**. KYC requirements can be enforced with a larger access and diffusion of government-recognized documents of identity, especially in rural areas. A national identity system could be facilitated once stability is consolidated in the country.²⁰⁴
 - (iv) Develop and enforce **regulations to protect customer data privacy and users' private information**, to mitigate risks of fraud, financial harm and loss of privacy. This can apply to individual consumers, and also to microenterprises and small- or medium-sized firms.²⁰⁵ In order to develop a national legal framework for data protection, an example to follow is the recent Data Protection and Privacy Act in Uganda established in 2019.²⁰⁶ In adopting data protection measures, also to enhance digital financial inclusion, coordination among different authorities and industry stakeholders is needed (such as the Central Bank, financial supervisors and the telecommunications).
- (b) Promote a remittance price comparison website and visibility to licensed operators (short–medium-term result).
- (i) Websites to compare the costs of sending remittances were established in different countries to promote market pressure that lower remittance costs and inform migrants on the different options. In Australia, two initiatives of remittance price comparison exist, but the Australia–South Sudan corridor is not included. A possibility could be to undertake discussions to collect information also on remittance costs from Australia to South Sudan and/or launch a remittance website in South Sudan. Moreover, **disclosure issues** could be addressed in South Sudan, giving visibility to the **list of licensed operators**. The impacts of price comparison websites and market pressure initiatives are evident in the long term.
- (c) Establish a permanent remittance task force or remittance commission (short–medium-term result).
- (i) The role of the Government and the private sector as environment enablers in maximizing the development potential of remittances is crucial. Moreover, the collaboration and commitment of different ministries and public authorities are fundamental to building a national diaspora strategy in connection with existing national policies of socioeconomic development.

It is therefore recommended to establish a permanent **remittances task force or commission** (along the existing TAWG) involving the following: (a) all South Sudanese institutions interested in diaspora related issues; (b) migrant-based groups; (c) remittance operators; (d) financial institutions; and (e) development agencies/donors. It is also suggested to establish a more **technical subgroup** within the task force. Its function shall be directed at monitoring the remittance market and identifying – in the medium and long term – efficient and effective policy measures to be implemented. Similar initiatives

²⁰⁴ Examples of biometric registrations exist conducted by some humanitarian and development actors, such as the SCOPE programme from WFP (<https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp272586.pdf>).

²⁰⁵ Protection shall cover all consumer data collected. In South Sudan, the Credit Reference Bureau had been previously established concerning credit history, but it still needs to be implemented. In other countries, a data protection authority has been established.

²⁰⁶ See www.pwc.com/ug/en/assets/pdf/legal-alert-data-protection-and-privacy-act.pdf.

were positively established in different countries (such as the remittance corridor between the United Kingdom and Somalia)²⁰⁷ and represent the first step to enabling a favourable environment for migrant remittances.

- (d) Identify measures especially targeting small local remittance operators so to induce them to implement and reinforce their internal legal framework (improving their monitoring and screening arrangements) and to better train their agents applying KYC/AML regulations.
- (i) In rural areas, infrastructures are often missing and security is critical; mitigating strategies are necessary to palliate the challenges in rural communities, also considering that small local remittance operators do not have the same internal structures and capacities of global money transfer operators (Orozco, 2007). Although unlicensed, small money transfer operators are still essential in providing transfer services in rural areas, where no banking system or alternative exist (European Union – Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2014:57). Today, a **specific regulation addressing domestic money transferring** is missing in South Sudan and shall be developed,²⁰⁸ taking into consideration the important presence of small operators in rural areas and their limited internal legal frameworks and capacities.²⁰⁹
- (e) **Harmonize and align** some national remittances supervisory rules and practices with those of EAC.²¹⁰
- (f) **Maintain a corridor approach** focused on the countries with largest diaspora presence, and remittance flows will help to develop coherent strategies. The Australian–South Sudan corridor is the pilot case study, but new corridors can be further explored in Canada, Egypt, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Mapping diasporas, involving key stakeholders and establishing partnerships along corridors, is recommended.

Challenges (a) and (b): The remittance market is not very competitive, and the costs of remitting to South Sudan from abroad are extremely high.

²⁰⁷ For instance, between the United Kingdom and Somalia, a multi-stakeholder action group on safe cross-border remittances had been created (2014) to develop a pilot scheme in testing and establishing audit mechanisms to track payments at the sending, clearing and receiving stages of the remittance process and train money transfer operators in Somalia (European Union – Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 2014:56–57).

²⁰⁸ For a certain time after the South Sudan Independence (2011), small money transfer in rural areas were initially allowed to operate by obtaining a temporary letter of no objection (lasting maximum three months and being possibly renewed), while being asked to formally register.

²⁰⁹ For instance, in Nigeria, a three-tier-level flexible and gradual approach (for KYC/AML requirements) has been adopted. The requirements increase progressively for low, medium to high-value accounts.

²¹⁰ EAC is a regional intergovernmental organization of six partner States that South Sudan joined in 2016. Currently, South Sudan participates in monitoring, harmonizing and implementing committees related to the banks, MFIs and insurance companies. With neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Uganda, an MoU was signed between national central banks to share confidential reports on the valid standards of financial operators active in the corridors (for instance: (a) compliance to AML/KYC regulations; (b) valid structure and risk analysis; (c) presence of a valid licence for deputy authorities; and (d) valid deposit at the central bank) (Source: Interview with Bank of South Sudan).

Recommendation 2

Enable the development of a dynamic and competitive market environment open to more certified operators in order to: (a) foster private sector investments; (b) increase commercial competition; (c) induce reduced remittance costs; and (d) improve the access to financial services in rural areas (medium–long-term results)

An increased presence of formal remittance operators in South Sudan can help in augmenting the offer of formal remittance services and diminishing the costs of remitting. The Government's role is fundamental to enable the conditions for an increased presence of market operators. The role of the financial sector in attracting migrant remittances and facilitating financial inclusion is essential; the presence of financial institutions (banks/MFIs) shall be extended in rural and remote areas. This is a long and articulated process requiring considerable attention and effort from policymakers. Looking at other contexts in Africa, the Government of Zimbabwe established an investment incentive framework that includes the diaspora and remittance-focused initiatives (such as incentives for recipients and financial literacy training, through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and management by a diaspora desk).

By facilitating the competition of remittance operators, the presence of **mobile/Internet operators and services** – offering today's cheapest commissions to remit to South Sudan – shall increase. Their presence in remittance corridors can induce others to reduce their costs, with positive consequences for migrants (spending less to remit) and remittance recipients (receiving more money). Moreover, mobile operators are considered for their potential to easily reach unbanked population in rural areas, especially women. Positive examples to follow are reported from Somalia and Kenya.²¹¹

- (a) **Support infrastructural interventions to face structural barriers** (such as network coverage, access to electricity and interconnections) especially in rural and remote areas. This can facilitate new remittance (especially mobile) operators to enter the South Sudanese market, unbanked population to access new financial services and diaspora investment ideas to be implemented in the areas of origin. Stability and security are the preconditions to ensure long-lasting infrastructural interventions in the country.
- (b) **Envisage incentives to encourage new formal remittance operators** (MNOs/MTOs and banks) to enter the market in South Sudan. For instance, by offering tax breaks or other incentives especially to those financial institutions able to bring technological devices or innovation for money transfer and improve money transfer technology/ access in rural and remote areas.

²¹¹ In Somalia, 85 per cent of mobile money users stated that mobile money has fostered their financial inclusion, either because it allowed them to conduct more easily financial transactions, helped them access international remittances or gave them access to other financial services, such as loans or savings. This has been the case in Kenya, where different micro-insurance schemes delivered through mobile money were developed to insure farmers' crops against unpredictable weather conditions (World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:67).

- (c) **Review the legislation that allows MFIs** to establish, operate, offer microfinance services and pay remittances in order to reduce informality and increase competition, especially in rural areas and among women in rural areas.
- (d) **Support the need of reinforcement of the banking system in South Sudan** (recapitalization, liquidity and internal control). The banking sector shall improve its capacity in attracting remittances and offering products to migrants and their families in South Sudan. At the same time, South Sudan needs comprehensive macroeconomic reforms (including measures to unify the exchange markets, reduce inflation, diversify the economy and restructure the banking system, considering that 14 banks have liquidity problems today).²¹² It is recommended to start by organizing a strategic meeting between the South Sudanese authorities and the banks in South Sudan to identify priority measures and reforms to undertake. A fundamental issue to be discussed is how to reinforce the presence of banks in rural areas: some commercial banks opened cash centres (small local branches) in rural areas in the past years, but recent insecurity and financial instability occurred, reducing their presence. Incentives and enabling conditions shall be further discussed.
- (e) **Strengthen digital and financial literacy skills, especially in rural areas** where people have low digital and financial literacy levels (especially targeting women) with the following: (i) communication campaigns; (ii) awareness programmes and trainings; (iii) information on the risks connected to informal remitting and to avoid fraud and money laundering. Moreover, financial literacy, especially in rural areas, could help to employ remittances in transiting from subsistence to commercial agriculture (possibly involving MFIs). Existing initiatives of financial education in South Sudan were more commonly run by NGOs, using for instance forum theatre, radio programmes and public meetings.
- (f) **Creating the conditions to better link up remittances from abroad to directly pay for the children's school fees** would be appreciated by diaspora informants (providing migrant money ownership on the use of remittances and supporting human capital formation). Education largely attains both individual and collective remittances. The option to directly pay for school fees is not always practicable. This shall be the object of discussion within the remittance task force as it involves different public and private players.

Challenge (c): Accurate data on remittance flows is missing.

²¹² Up to now, 14 banks in South Sudan have failed to raise their capital after BSS has issued a new circular to increase their minimum capital since 2013 (Source: BSS).

Recommendation 3

Establish a data collection system directed to obtain remittance flows' information from official remittance operators (short–medium-term result)

- (a) **Mandatory asking of data on remittance flows.** Data on remittances is missing in South Sudan today. Although in the Bank of South Sudan, there is no direct activity or structure devoted to deal with diaspora issues, it can be possible to track remittances from abroad by directing all banks involved to submit reports on migrant remittances.²¹³ It can be also possible to link the licence from the Bank of South Sudan to operate in South Sudan with the mandatory submission of remittance data. Reinforcement of the technical capacities and activity of the Bank of South Sudan to build up this data collection system shall be envisaged (see recommendation 12).
- (b) **Establish data-sharing between the South Sudanese and Australian regulatory bodies** to check for the status of those remittance providers that operate in South Sudan without authorization and involve an authorized correspondent agent in Australia.
- (c) **Involve market stakeholders in a participatory process** in order to gain their positive collaboration to implement the data collection system and negotiate on the frequency/nature of the information requested (volumes of remittance flows and number of operations). This would avoid risks that further costs are charged on the migrant side to cover data collection requests. This recommendation is aligned with recommendation 1 to establish a remittance task force in South Sudan.

²¹³ Interview with BSS representative.

6.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BUILD A DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY IN SOUTH SUDAN

Challenge (d): Knowledge on the South Sudanese diaspora abroad is still limited; the dialogue and trust between the diaspora in Australia and the Government in South Sudan are weak.

Recommendation 4

Enhance the political will and institutional commitment of the Government of South Sudan to create a diaspora-friendly environment

- (a) **Open and foster diplomatic channels.** Embassies/Consulates shall be opened in countries where the diaspora lives, and the “investment–diaspora attaché” shall be established (medium-term result).
 - (i) Embassies and consulates shall be established in countries where relevant diaspora communities live (such as Australia and Canada), and existing embassies and consulates shall be reinforced to connect with the diaspora.²¹⁴ A good practice (previously experienced in the South Sudanese Embassy in Germany) is the **investment–trade attaché**, a dedicated person in the diplomatic staff working as liaison with all potential investors. Additionally, the attaché could become a **diaspora engagement focal point** to collect information on diaspora investors, and also develop diaspora-led projects. A positive interest from the Government was registered, but full consensus is needed from the ministries involved (more specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry and Ministry of Investment and Investment Services) on how to contribute to the profile of the investment–trade–diaspora attaché (see recommendation 12).²¹⁵
- (b) **Establishing agreements with airlines companies** can favour diaspora travel opportunities, demonstrating a **political commitment** to concretely support diaspora needs and facilitate international mobility to the origin country. The fieldwork in Australia collected also the suggestion to revise **visa requirements** for South Sudanese diaspora in terms of cost and duration (short-time result).
- (c) **Establish a diaspora institutional public event** to provide symbolic evidence of a political will and commitment to engage the diaspora. Similar symbolic instruments (such as a diaspora day or public recognition of the development role played by diasporas) were employed by other African countries and can be of help only if part of a wider diaspora dialogue and engagement strategy. For instance, the Government of Rwanda’s political commitment to the diaspora is shown through a high number of diaspora events throughout the year, with specific focus to training, youth and women (short–medium-term result).
- (d) **Develop a long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation process in Australia and South Sudan.** Almost all South Sudanese in Australia consulted expressed the urgency to start a mediation and participatory

²¹⁴ Interview with representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South Sudanese informants in Australia.

²¹⁵ Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry and Ministry of Investment and Investment Services.

bottom-up process of common trust, peacebuilding and reconciliation among the diaspora, and also in the home country. The Australian-based community ought to be strengthened and lead by action. This implies consideration for the heterogeneity of the community in Australia; the involvement of any facilitator should be done with caution. The fieldwork registered the presence of different distinguished and recognized South Sudanese persons in the community that could ensure ethnic neutrality in the process. Other CSOs in Australia could also be involved.

Recommendation 5

Improve the dialogue with the diaspora in Australia by formally recognizing and involving it as a development actor in South Sudan (medium-term result)

Recognizing and including the diaspora as an actor of development (especially for the role in the specific areas/villages of origin) means to formally involve it in a coordinated effort and discussion with the local communities and public administrators to plan current and future initiatives.

Other African examples are as follows:

- In Zimbabwe, diasporans are represented with seats within the Government. The diaspora can interface with policymakers during outreach or diaspora events abroad and on site.
- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the diaspora focal point (Directorate for Congolese Abroad) has been restructured to create commissions to support reception, support and mobilization of the diaspora.
- In Nigeria, the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission Act was passed into law in July 2017 to facilitate the participation of the diaspora in policies and projects focused on the development of Nigeria.

Possible initiatives to undertake in South Sudan are as follows:

- (a) **Build thematic discussion tables in South Sudan** involving the main stakeholders, including diaspora representatives at the central and local level. The contributions of the diaspora (in terms of resources, human capital and social capital mobilized) can be very valuable in particular to help reconstructing the **health and education system** in South Sudan. Projects aimed at developing infrastructures (roads, sewers and water supply) have been indicated by the diaspora in Australia as essentials to start any discussion about developing the country. For these types of projects, interviewees recognized the need for the Government's active participation and dialogue.
- (b) **Create a diaspora commission** within the Government of South Sudan to facilitate the connection and dialogue with the diaspora at the institutional level (see also recommendation 12).

Recommendation 6

Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora by building a mapping scheme to reach the diaspora in Australia (short–medium-term result)

The Government needs to establish **easy channels and consultation mechanisms** to reach the South Sudanese in Australia. This requires a coordinated approach between the ministries, departments and agencies involved (see recommendation 12). The fieldwork in Australia shows that the main means employed by the diaspora to keep informed on what happens in South Sudan are as follows: (a) Internet (such as online newspapers and magazines) and social media; and (b) direct contacts with friends/relatives (via telephone or other apps). This shall be taken into consideration when setting up tools to dialogue with the diaspora.

Other African examples are as follows:

- Rwanda has strong formal channels to communicate with its diaspora, using Internet tools, social media and involving its embassies abroad (a website link exists for the diaspora to register their qualifications and working status).
- In Zimbabwe, there is an active information portal that delivers news about, to and from the diaspora.

Among the possible instruments to be envisaged area as follows:

- System of data collection for mapping the South Sudanese diaspora: a website, an app and a survey.
- Communication system with the diaspora: email, WhatsApp, social media and social platforms to dispatch news and information.
- “Register” of diaspora philanthropy groups (formal and informal) abroad, with information on their activity, the projects sustained in South Sudan and areas of intervention.
- “Register” of diaspora target groups or competencies: for instance, highly skilled professionals, academia, health workers or other profiles of interest.

Recommendation 7

Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its development engagement by meeting and consulting the diaspora in Australia (medium-term result)

In line with the previous recommendation (recommendation 6), interviewees agreed that to facilitate a diaspora coordinated and country-wide participation to South Sudan development, it is necessary to **open formal dialogue channels** between the Government of South Sudan and the Australian diaspora.

In other countries:

- Burundi organizes diplomatic missions in host countries.
 - Kenyan senior officials meet with the diaspora on official visits.
 - In Nigeria, diaspora consultation takes place at Annual Diaspora Day Conferences and at diaspora functions in and outside of Nigeria.
 - In Zimbabwe, a videoconferencing facility is being utilized to interface with the diaspora.
- (a) **Plan a consultation road tour involving different South Sudanese authorities in Australia** (where the diaspora lives, such as Victoria State and Queensland). In countries where consulates/embassies exist, **consultation meetings** with the diaspora shall take place. Direct and face-to-face discussions with the diasporas would help to establish a dialogue, collect information and understand the conditions for engagement/investment. It is important that the consultation follows a participatory and bottom-up approach involving local facilitators.
- (b) **Establish a virtual (online) and physical diaspora desk** (in Juba), collecting and sharing information of interest for the diaspora. This desk could facilitate South Sudanese interested in realizing development projects (to coordinate with other stakeholders) and investing in South Sudan (to access updated information and submit dossiers). The need for a diaspora desk is connected with the opening of embassies/consulates and with the presence of an investment–trade–diaspora attaché. Some informants expressed additionally the need to establish or access diaspora networks to circulate ideas and involve professional skills, matching demands and offers: “There are persons that want to come home and invest, but they do not know how” (see recommendation 10 on diaspora investors).²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Statement from a diaspora investor.

Recommendation 8

Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its engagement by mapping and mobilizing the expertise of skilled South Sudanese in Australia (short–medium-term result)

Given the diversity of migrant profiles in Australia, different diaspora mapping exercises, outreach strategies and initiatives shall be designed in order to **differently target and engage** first/second/third generations, skilled professionals, financial and trade investors, migrant associations and diaspora women.

Mapping the competence of migrants abroad²¹⁷ is a good exercise for the origin country to improve the knowledge and awareness on the diaspora profiles, skills and human capitals²¹⁸ and directly involve and mobilize their expertise and competence. It is important to connect the mapping exercise with a transparent **implementation phase** directed to concretely employ and involve migrant competence; otherwise, it could easily produce false expectations and a sense of frustration in the diaspora.

This recommendation is particularly in line with the National CMP indication to: “Facilitate Diaspora virtual and temporary return, by implementing a pilot programme of temporary and virtual returns targeting the health sector ... with specific measures addressing diaspora youth” (Ministry of Interior and IOM, 2019:11).

Other examples of African countries are as follows:

- Rwanda runs skill transfer programmes for the diaspora to contribute by coming back and sharing competencies from their host country.
- The International Jobs and Diaspora Office of the Government of Kenya has a database of diaspora Curriculum Vitae and resumes, with available jobs in international and private organizations. The diaspora is engaged through the enhancement in the delivery of consular services.

(a) **Map skilled profiles to develop focused interventions on knowledge transfer.** Health and education can be the priority target sectors for diaspora engagement in community projects and knowledge transfer. The research in Australia registered different expressions of interests. The availability was expressed in terms of offering personal knowledge and competencies (from first and second generations), for instance to teach to students in Juba universities, volunteer, work as experts or consultants in public institutions or support women’s empowerment in South Sudan. It is suggested to start with **small pilot projects** targeting specific diaspora professional groups and through short-term assignments.

²¹⁷ A key informant mentioned the presence of approximately 1,000 South Sudanese students in Chinese universities that could be the object of further investigation (Source: Interview with Nicki Kindersley from the University of Cambridge). Also, there are studies on South Sudanese migrants in the Netherlands.

²¹⁸ Some examples of projects to mobilize the skilled diaspora include the following: (a) Return of Qualified Afghans programme; (b) Dominica asked members of its diaspora to help set up the Dominica State College; and (c) a tertiary education institution (IOM and MPI, 2012).

(b) **The health sector is a valuable area of diaspora knowledge transfer.** A good practice to revitalize refers to a past project from IOM South Sudan called Strengthening South Sudan's health system by engaging health professionals in the diaspora (2013).²¹⁹ It started with a survey launched in Canada, Kenya and Uganda to create a pilot health-related diaspora register (with physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and others), targeting individuals and associations. The project included a short-term skills transfer programme to train and build capacities of health professionals in South Sudan through lectures, seminars and on-the-job trainings. Unfortunately, it came to an end due to political instability in the country. The diaspora involvement could also open up to the potentials of telemedicine – remote consultations if/when Internet/mobile connections can cover all areas of the country. Moreover, the role of the diaspora shall be reinforced to transfer health awareness to the community of origin on different topics (such as in relation to COVID-19 and social distancing precautions).

Recommendation 9

Promote diaspora engagement and mobilize its expertise in relationship to gender-sensitive initiatives for women empowerment in South Sudan (medium–long-term result)

There is a recognized commitment among diaspora in Australia, both female and male, to support women in South Sudan (and in Australia). Many migrant interviewees mentioned women's education initiatives as a way to foster independence and employability. Further developing gender-focused initiatives aimed to foster women's empowerment, financial independence and health care is the objective of many diaspora groups that shall be included in larger national initiatives. A valuable past initiative targeting women from the diaspora to consider is IOM's Migrant Women for Development in Africa programme (WMIDA) (and WMIDA Somalia) to mobilize female qualified diasporas.²²⁰

(a) **Map and engage the diaspora's female talented and committed individuals and groups** for their contribution to female empowerment in South Sudan and gender equality (especially in the areas of education, health and in job-generating activities). Being able to mobilize their own skills, but also different human and social capitals, female diasporas shall be identified and involved in knowledge transfer and capacity-building in South Sudan.

²¹⁹ In collaboration with the Government of South Sudan's Ministry of Health, Directorate of Consular Services under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Diaspora Desk under the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development, and some South Sudanese diaspora associations (www.facebook.com/southsudandiasporaforhealth/).

²²⁰ See <https://diaspora.iom.int/sites/diaspora/files/publication/pdf/migrant-women.pdf>.

- (b) **Sustain and reinforce existing initiatives** (such as the female diaspora groups Mamaland Hope for Future Foundation and SSWEN). The transnational leadership role of female diaspora groups and individuals need to be mobilized to transfer knowledge in South Sudan; the diaspora's role as advocate for women empowerment projects shall be targeted also with the support of development actors and possible partners in Australia (see recommendation 12 to establish transnational partnerships with actors in Australia).
- (c) **Promote initiatives promoting financial literacy targeting women** as remittance recipients.

Recommendation 10

Promote diaspora engagement and expertise of younger generations (medium-term result)

The research highlighted the presence of different second-generation profiles in Australia with high education levels and relevant skills. Not all young South Sudanese have the same interest to be involved in the development of the origin country; nevertheless, some express their willingness to further contribute (in addition to family remittances) with ideas and competence. For instance, experiences were evidenced of online mentoring via social media, with diaspora youth having transferred to South Sudan's significant knowledge, work ethic and professional standard setting. Pilot initiatives particularly addressing young diaspora generations are recommended in addition to short-term mobility programmes for skilled professionals. Looking at other contexts, Madagascar have implemented diaspora-oriented programmes, including the Malagasy Diaspora Forum and the Young Diaspora Volunteer programme.

- (a) **A call for diaspora sustainable development ideas, projects and start-up** (open to all diasporas, but particularly to young people) is recommended. This possibility was discussed with some informants and could represent a way to mobilize resources, competencies and innovative approaches towards different needs in South Sudan (for instance linked to climate change, access to food, health, small business, insurances, transport and connectivity). As previously remarked, a call for ideas/projects without implementation programme and resources would create frustration and delusion.

Challenge (e). The possibility to maximize the productive potential of remittances and turn them into local investments is weak.

Recommendation 11

Promote diaspora engagement and expertise targeting diaspora investors (medium–long-term result)

The South Sudanese investment climate does not encourage or facilitate migrants to invest. There are no specific investment programmes or incentives explicitly addressing the diaspora. The road tour to meet the diaspora potential investors can help meet specific investors' requests (recommendation 7). Agriculture is among the priority areas and has been positively identified by key informants as a suitable sector for diaspora investments.

- (a) **Offer tailor-made investment tools and incentives targeting the diaspora**, such as the following: (i) fiscal benefits; (ii) technical assistance; (iii) possibility to manage administrative dossiers online; and (iv) linked to this is the role played by the diaspora–investment attaché abroad and the virtual diaspora desk (recommendation 7).
- (b) Looking at other African countries, Rwanda has specific investment guidelines for the Rwandans living abroad, considering that 60 per cent of FDIs are from the diaspora. Incentives are offered to migrants who invest and become residents, providing reintegration and returnee orientation services. Moreover, Rwandan migrants can easily open national bank accounts from abroad. Additionally, Ghana's current investment incentive framework has provisions for the diaspora.
- (b) **Facilitate clearance on diaspora's land property rights to enable diaspora's investments**, especially in agriculture and real estate. Land property right can be a serious barrier and the process to clear and obtain it can be very long, complex and expensive. Managing these issues from abroad can be difficult for migrants (see the need for a virtual desk, recommendation 7).
- (c) **Enable that financial products and solutions targeting the diaspora are developed** to respond to investment needs and channel remittances into family microbusiness activities (from subsistence agriculture to commercial farming). In order to accomplish this goal, it is important to: (i) increase the presence of local certified financial actors in rural areas (including MFIs); (ii) promote **financial education** programmes; and (iii) sustain the banking system in developing products and services responding to the migrants' needs to remit and invest from abroad (recommendation 2).
- (d) **Improve the competence and skill of the local population in South Sudan** to help migrants find competent staff for their investment projects. The research highlighted the frequent problem that migrant investors face when involving family members with poor technical and managerial skills. The requests from the diaspora go in the direction to improve public investments in **training and education** and offer training and **technical assistance services** (for the returned diaspora and the local population).

Challenge (f). Public authorities and local stakeholders have not yet proficiently addressed diaspora-related discussions, initiatives and policies with a coordinated effort.

Recommendation 12

Build and reinforce the capacity of institutions in South Sudan and their coordination to address diaspora issues (short–medium-term result)

A barrier highlighted by TAWG members and local stakeholders is identified in their limited capacity to design and implement instruments to reach and involve migrants, as well as develop a remittance/diaspora-friendly environment in South Sudan. Elements were collected among TAWG members through interviews and an internal questionnaire. The 70 per cent of TAWG members confirmed that remittances can represent a strategic interest for their institution, and the majority expressed a need to reinforce their internal structure and competence to frame and implement diaspora policy measures and initiatives.

Considering the example of Nigeria, diaspora desks are established at several government ministries, departments and agencies. In the case of Rwanda, the dedicated diaspora focal point – the Rwandan Community Abroad Office – is engaged with diaspora organized groups in host countries and works closely with other government ministries, departments and agencies. Moreover, different African countries that drafted and implemented diaspora engagement policies received support by multi-stakeholder cooperation (through meetings, seminars, capacity-building and technical assistance).

- (a) **Reinforce the competencies and capacities of South Sudan Authorities (especially BSS) to strengthen the remittance legal framework**, with technical support and training to further implement and monitor regulations on money transferring (for instance, to set up monitoring and sanctioning systems for unauthorized operators and technically set up a system to track/collect remittance data).
- (b) **Reinforce the competencies and capacities of interested institutions to address migrant-related issues** in different ways:
 - (i) internally improving knowledge and dialogue with the diaspora; and
 - (ii) setting up mechanisms to map and engage it. In other countries, a **diaspora focal point/unit** was introduced to reinforce institutions to start and maintain a diaspora dialogue and engagement process.
- (c) **Reinforce the capacities to build transnational partnerships** between South Sudan authorities with international organizations, non-State actors and authorities in Australia.
 - A possibility to explore transnational partnerships can consider initiatives aiming at reinforcing entrepreneurial/investment ideas or development projects from the diaspora in Australia. Not all migrants abroad have the required technical skills or gained the business experience to invest in the origin country. Orientation and training services could support start-up companies from the diaspora. Stakeholders in the residency country of migrants and development actors can be involved – from the development project or business idea (with training in Australia) to the implementation (with assistance in South Sudan).

(d) **Reinforce the coordination among public institutions in South Sudan** interested in dealing with remittances/diaspora issues. The existing TAWG shall be further supported to facilitate coordination, exchange and elaboration of ideas. The collaboration between different ministries and public authorities is needed to build a national diaspora strategy in connection with existing national policies on social and economic development. This recommendation is in line with the suggestion to create a remittance task force (see recommendation 1) involving all interested stakeholders. A multi-stakeholder engagement should be made a priority. Looking at other African countries, the Government of Zimbabwe has constituted a multisectoral diaspora task force made up of approximately 20 governmental institutions, while also working with Zimbabwean diaspora communities.

LIST OF TERMINOLOGIES²²¹

Diasporas	Migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity or mutual experiences in the destination country. Diasporas is a term generally used today to describe those who identify with a “homeland”, but live outside of it. Furthermore, this definition corresponds to the growing recognition from governments and international agencies that diaspora communities are important development actors.
Digital payment (or electronic/e-payment)	is made through digital instruments or platforms (not cash). The payer and the payee use digital modes and electronic devices to send and receive money (for instance mobile phones, applications and web interfaces).
Electronic/ E-money	is money stored electronically (as on a computer, plastic card or phone), and can be used to pay for products and services, for example on the Internet or over the phones.
Electronic/ E-wallet	is a digital system to store e-money that can be used online or on a mobile phone and it allows to make and receive electronic payments.
Financial inclusion	being able to access services that meet people’s financial needs. For instance, having a bank account to safely save money; accessing a loan for a project/economic activity/ buy a house.
Internally displaced person (IDP)	is someone who has been forced to flee his/her home, but never crossed an international border. IDPs are legally under the protection of their own government.
Know your customer/client (KYC)/ Anti-money laundering (AML)	these guidelines serve to prevent businesses from being used by criminal elements for money laundering. KYC requires to verify a customer’s identity and credentials, for instance with a formal identity document. The KYC procedures fit within the broader scope of AML. AML refers to measures to prevent and combat financial crimes, especially money laundering and terrorism financing. ²²²

²²¹ Based on IOM, 2019, n.d.a and n.d.b; UNHCR, n.d.; GSMA, 2010; and Glossary of World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019.

²²² For instance, AML measures include the following: (a) KYC procedures; (b) risk-based AML policies; (c) ongoing risk assessment and monitoring; (d) AML compliance training programmes for staff; and (e) internal controls and audits.

Migrant	An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.
Mobile banking	is a service in which a mobile phone is used to access a bank account and banking services. It differs from mobile money, as it requires to own bank account.
Mobile money	A service in which the mobile phone is used to access financial services, for instance: payments, transfers, insurances, savings and credit.
Refugee	is someone who has been forced to flee his/her country because of persecution, war or violence, crossing national borders. Most likely, a refugee cannot return home or is afraid to do so.
Remittances	Private monetary and small-value transfers that migrants from abroad send, individually or collectively, primarily to people in countries of origin with whom they maintain close links. However, not all remittances are financial: they can be in-kind nature (as sending goods); increasingly, the term “social remittance” is used to refer to the transfer of knowledge, know-how, networking and skills.
Remittance operators	refer to different players in the remittance market. Traditional money transfer operators are financial companies that represent the principal player in the global remittance market by offering mainly (but not only) cash-based products and cash-transfers for established country corridors. Mobile money operators are service providers that deploy financial services through mobile phones and mobile telephone networks. In the case of South Sudan, there are examples as financial intermediators for e-money payments. Mobile network operators are telephone and telecommunication companies that manage mobile communications between their subscribed users.
Transfers (domestic, regional and international)	remittances can be sent by migrants across borders (international transfers) or within countries (domestic/ internal transfers). Regional remittances normally refer to transfers between neighbouring countries (as between Kenya and South Sudan) or within regions, for example “sub-Saharan regional remittances”.

ANNEXES



ANNEX 1. COMMENTS FROM THE SURVEY RESPONDENTS

How would you like to contribute to and be engaged to the development of South Sudan?

- Developing South Sudan for those left behind.
- Through my company, Juba Enterprise Holdings.
- Making life better there.
- Giving knowledge and teaching young ones the way of life.
- I plan to return to South Sudan in the near future and work there in the academia.
- Women's rights.
- Building a competitive health-care system.
- Planning, discussion and volunteering.
- One day contribute my skills.
- Looking forward to working in South Sudan.
- Be part of any peacebuilding initiative.
- Emails.
- Support in setting up a charity for education and development in South Sudan.
- Diaspora communities and their friends are already engaged supporting people back home (If we can link diaspora works and have a representative to show our commitment).

You are welcome to leave us any suggestion on how the South Sudanese diaspora wants to be engaged in the development in South Sudan.

- We would appreciate if Australian organizations help us to create community peacekeepers and provide dialogue among our communities back home.
- Be the link between South Sudan and the country of my residence.
- Create more volunteering positions to enable them to go and volunteer back home.
- Diaspora needs to be consulted and involved in decision-making in South Sudan.
- Thank you for this; it means a lot for South Sudan.
- Creates fair and just system that will attract South Sudanese diaspora.
- Support to become one voice in Australia to set an example for the community back home. Support to work together cooperatively.
- I would like the South Sudanese diaspora to be given a voice in the ongoing peacebuilding process in South Sudan, and in continuing political development in the country.

ANNEX 2. LIST OF ASSOCIATIONS AND GROUPS OF SOUTH SUDANESE MAPPED IN AUSTRALIA

These references were collected and reported through different sources, such as online lists from the Victoria State and Queensland State Multicultural Commission,²²³ literature review, interviews with key informants and web search (via Twitter and Facebook). It is important to note that the list is not exhaustive and does not include informal family networks (unregistered). The public self-presentation of the groups was included, but no further verification was undertaken.

Western Australia

- **South Sudan Community Association of Western Australia Inc.** is a pivotal State non-governmental organization representing the South Sudanese West Australian community (Perth).
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/pg/sscawa.org.au/about/?ref=page_internal
 - Facebook private group: www.facebook.com/groups/1312811725418008/ (last update on Facebook, 2017)

Victoria State

- **Australian Southern Sudanese Support Group** assists Southern Sudanese with settlement and migration issues. It provides social, emotional and physical support to those in need and fosters a sense of belonging among Southern Sudanese living in Australia.
 - Contact person: Choul Yat
 - Address: 18A Chester Street, Oakleigh, 3166 VIC, City of Monash
 - Tel.: 0401 598 584
- **Coptic Sudanese Welfare Association of Victoria** is an association that gathers members of the Sudanese community living in Manningham Council to assist in the development of culture and heritage and encourage participation in local community activities.
 - Contact person: Maryam Eisa
 - Address: P.O. Box 4225, Doncaster Heights, 3109 VIC, City of Manningham
 - Tel.: 03 9331 2791
 - Email: cswavi@email.com
- **Federation of South Sudanese Associations in Victoria Inc.** is a community-based organization that distinctively embraces ideals of inclusiveness, social cohesiveness and justice, hence, advocates for policy development, resourceful services delivery and social justice for South Sudanese Australians in Victoria.
 - Email: fssav15@gmail.com
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/federationofsouthsudaneseassociationsinvictoria/

²²³ See www.multiculturalcommission.vic.gov.au/ (Victoria) and www.cyjma.qld.gov.au/multicultural-affairs/multicultural-communities/queensland-multicultural-resource-directory/search-directory (Queensland).

- **Liech Nuer Community Association Inc.** supports migrants through cultural activities, employment assistance, cultural orientation and travel assistance.
 - Contact person: Peter Magock
 - Address: 18 Moodemere Street, Noble Park, 3174 VIC, Greater Dandenong
 - Tel.: 03 9546 4164
 - Email: gmagockgaluak3nuer_adok@yahoo.com
- **Lou Nuer Community Association in Victoria – Australia Inc.** is a non-profit and charitable community.
 - Tel.: +61 423 890 296
 - Email: abrahamdoup@gmail.com
- **Nuer Community in Victoria Inc.** is a group that aims to foster friendship and understanding of its members in Australia by promoting cooperation with other Sudanese communities in Australia and overseas.
 - Contact person: David Tut Kuiy
 - Address: 10 Aintree Avenue, Mulgrave, 3170 VIC, Monash
 - Tel.: 0403 668 820
 - Email: kuiy_tut@optusnet.com.au
- **Relief Association of South Sudan (Victoria) Inc.** is an association that runs a range of relief, welfare and educational programmes and activities.
 - Contact person: James Tharjiath Chigach
 - Address: 27–36 Nicholson Street, Carlton, 3065 VIC, City of Yarra
 - Tel.: 0409 017 958
 - Email: 5788676@student.swin.edu.au
- South Sudanese Community Association in Victoria Inc.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/South-Sudanese-Community-Association-in-Victoria-Inc-269823250316286/
- **South Sudan Development Agency Inc.** is an organization that supports newly arrived people originating from South Sudan to resettle and integrate into Australian society. It runs youth work, training, parenting and general social programmes and supports the needs of Southern Sudanese in the community.
 - President: Gatwech Peter Kulang
 - Address: P.O. Box 5359, Clayton, 3168 VIC, City of Monash
 - Tel.: 03 9543 3692
 - Email: info@ssuda.org.au
- **South Sudan Equatorial Association Inc.** aims to foster unity among the people of Equatoria in Victoria. It assists new arrivals in their settlement needs, as well as providing information and links to services and programmes available to the community.
 - Contact person: Dominic Boti
 - Address: P.O. Box 2264, Dandenong North, 3172 VIC, City of Greater Dandenong
 - Tel.: 4346 434 05
 - Email: sossea.inc@gmail.com
- **South Sudanese Women’s Network** is a group that responds to the needs of recently arrived refugee women from Southern Sudan for social support, education and community capacity-building. It provides social, cultural, educational, emotional support and recreational opportunities for the women.
 - Contact person: Martha Kek
 - Address: C/18A Chester Street, Oakleigh, 3166 VIC, City of Monash
 - Tel.: 03 9563 4130
 - Email: micheller@southcentralmrc.org.au

- **Southern Sudanese Community of Australia** runs educational, social and cultural programmes for the Sudanese.
 - Contact person: Ambrose Mareng
 - Address: 49–53 Bunclie Street, North Melbourne, 3051 VIC, City of Melbourne
 - Tel.: 04 3119 2266
 - Email: marengambrose@yahoo.com
- **Southern Sudan Community of Australia**
 - Contact person: Ambrose Mareng
 - Address: 174 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, 3065 VIC, City of Yarra
 - Tel.: 03 9419 4349
 - Email: marengambrose@yahoo.com
- **Pannyok community in Victoria**

Queensland²²⁴

- **Council of South Sudanese Communities** in Queensland, Goodna
 - Email: info.csscq@gmail.com
 - President: Daniel Lee (Email: dan.jlee@yahoo.com.au)
- **Nuer Community Association in Queensland Inc.** hosts community organizations and associations, festivals, events and artistic organizations
 - Address: Brisbane South, Moorooka
 - President: Maduk Muon Kuony (Email: wilmaduk2006@yahoo.co.uk)
- **Organisation of the Kakwa Community of Australia** hosts community organizations and associations (Meadowbrook)
 - Email: president@okcainc.org.au
- **Global African Migrants Community Association, Queensland** is a migrant and refugee service organization (Brisbane North)
 - Contact person: Ayalew Shebeshi
 - Website: www.gampa.org.nz
 - Email: gamca2018@hotmail.com
- **Dinka Bor Community Association in Queensland Inc.** is a community organization that provides counselling services for migrants and refugees (Ipswich, Springfield Lakes)
 - Website: www.dinkaborcommunity.com
 - President: Philip Thon Ayom
 - Email: ayomphilip21@gmail.com

New South Wales – Sydney

- **Community of Southern Sudan and Other Marginalised Areas Association**
- **Federation of Equatorian Community Associations in Australia**
- **Dinka Literacy Program Association** in Australia (Sydney, New South Wales) started in 2009 in Australia's New South Wales. It is a language that can encourage the Dinka members to understand each other and keep them in their culture, such as reading and writing Dinka.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/1632709856960855/

²²⁴ See www.auscompanies.com/en/83939813806/Dinka-Bor-Community.

Associations with different missions²²⁵

Sports/Wrestling

- **Bor Youth Wrestling Desk in Australia**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/Bor-Youth-Wrestling-Desk-in-Australia-112774546802273/
- **South Sudanese Australian Traditional Wrestling Association**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/South-Sudanese-Australian-Traditional-Wrestling-Association-1143307059087035/
- **Dinka Cultural Media Australia** highlights the South Sudanese traditional wrestling sport organized by the Dinka youth in Australia
 - Email: davidjook03@gmail.com
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/dinkamedia/
- **Sudanese Wrestling Reviews** posts wrestling events and songs just to promote the culture.
 - Tel. + 61 412 500 321
 - Email: sudaneseWrestlingReviews@gmail.com
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/SudaneseWR/

Peace/Solidarity

- **Mamaland Hope for Future Foundation** (seems not active anymore) is a group of mixed female migrants sustaining projects in South Sudan.
- **South Sudan Australia Peace Initiative**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/South-Sudan-Australia-Peace-Initiative-236170629890936/
- **South Sudan Peace Alliance** in Ipswich (Brisbane)
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/changethroughdialogue/
- **South Sudan Voices of Salvation:**
 - Reference person: Apajok Biar
- **Bari Communities of South Sudan in South Australia** is an organization that aims to assist with the resettlement of new migrants by facilitating their integration into Australian society while maintaining their cultural identity. The organization recognizes and promotes the role of women in the community and provides education and familiarization with respect to administrative and community procedures in Australia. In 2009, it received a funding of AUD 2,700.²²⁶
- The objectives of the **Pan Africanist Youth of South Sudan** are as follows: (a) fight for the rights and freedom of young people and youth jobs; (b) involve the youth in national affairs decision-making; and (c) advocate for free education for young people and youth.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/PanAfrican00/
- **South Sudanese Nuer Language School of Australia**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/southsnuerlanguagesschool/
- **Dinka Bor Events in Australia** is a group forum that brings people together to watch videos and views photos or read about upcoming events
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/447572862272309/
- **Acholi Community in Australia Inc.**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/288028147994057/

²²⁵ In this group, mixed associations/groups were included that could not fit in other sections.

²²⁶ See www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/communities-and-vulnerable-people/volunteer-grants-2009-successful-organisations-south-australia.

Fashion

- **Face of South Sudan Beauty Pageant Australia** was founded by Ayor Chout in 2013 with the aim to showcase the future of South Sudanese models and share her industry experience with young South Sudanese models to encourage pride within the community.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/faceofsouthsudanaustralia/
- **Acholi Beauty Pageant Australia** has a cultural significance of preserving the tribal tradition. In 2018, the group launched the first ever Acholi Luo Beauty Pageant in Brisbane. The purpose of this event is to inspire the community to grow and build presence while promoting self-growth community activities and culture. This event not only merges a growing Acholi community but also demonstrates exotic traditions and customs that Acholi has planted in the community.
 - Tel. : 0432592848
 - Website: <https://fs7.formsite.com/DKEz3P/miyok5dvby/index.html>
 - Email: cholibp@yahoo.com
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/acholibp/

Political groups

- **SPLM IO Youth League Australia** is a branch lead by the current chairman Cde Gach Wan to empower the South Sudanese youth.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/splmioyouthau/
- **SPLM-IO Australia Group** is a political organization.
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/1625106794191684/.
- **SPLM-IO Chapter Victoria – Australia** is a community organization that supports the call for good governance and structural reforms in South Sudan.
 - Tel.: +61 451 808 052
 - Email: abrahamdoup@gmail.com
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/splmiovictoria/
- **SPLM-IO Australia** is an association committed to the creation of a united, non-ethnic, democratic, federal and prosperous South Sudan.
 - Tel. +61 434 379 432
 - Website: www.splmio.org
 - Email: oasut@splmio.org
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/splmio/
- **SPLM Chapter Victoria**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/386228528197216/
- **SPLM Queensland chapter**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/SPLM-Queensland-Chapter-369500086486846/
- **SPLM Women in Diaspora (Global)**
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/573691073070969/
- **SPLM-IO Diaspora (Global)** is a mass formation of the SPLM-IO members outside of South Sudan
 - Facebook page: www.facebook.com/groups/631280496976257/

ANNEX 3. CONSULTATIONS CARRIED OUT

Participants to the Technical Advisory Working Group in South Sudan
Abuk Nikanora Manyok Aguer – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
John Pan Paguir – Ministry of Trade and Industry
Donglia Donglia – Bank of South Sudan
Alfred Sokiri – South Sudan Investment Authority
William Akoy Dau – South Sudan Bankers' Association
Market stakeholders
Telecommunications and remittances sector
Mou Ambrose Thiik – Trinity Technologies
Key informants on remittances and South Sudanese diaspora in Australia
Leon Isaacs – Developing Markets Associates (DMA), United Kingdom
Jonathan Capal – DMA's director for Asia and the Pacific, Australia
Daniele Frigeri – Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Italy
Ibolya Losoncz – School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet), Australian National University, Australia
Diaspora Action Australia, Australia
Santino Deng – Monash University, Australia
Nicki Kindersley – University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
Freddie Carver – Rift Valley Institute, Ethiopia
Melissa Phillips – Western Sydney University and board member of Australian Red Cross, Australia
Bernard Suwa – South Sudan Country Coordinator of Mission 21

The identities of the South Sudanese diaspora members in Australia (50 persons) interviewed for this study are kept anonymous.

ANNEX 4. SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy recommendations to reinforce the remittance framework in South Sudan

Challenge (a): Compliance to the legal framework on remittances is weak and difficult to obtain in the country

Recommendation 1	Time
Increase the compliance of unlicensed remittance and foreign exchange operators to the existing legal framework by reinforcing policy and administrative measures in South Sudan	
(a) Reinforce policy and administrative measures to improve the legal framework of remittances in South Sudan	Medium–long term
(i) Reinforce implementing, monitoring and sanctioning measures and tools of the Bank of South Sudan to make remittance operators compliant to existing regulation and know your customer (KYC)/anti-money laundering (AML) (implement Financial Investigation Unit (FIU))	
(ii) Reinforce the role of the Bank of South Sudan to implement the above measures	
(iii) Support the development of a national ID system	
(iv) Develop and enforce regulations to protect consumers' private information to mitigate risks of fraud and money laundering	
(b) Establish a remittance price comparison website and visibility to licensed operators	
(c) Establish a permanent remittance task force/commission in South Sudan with the presence of a more technical subgroup	
(d) Identify gradual measures and incentives targeting small local remittance	
(e) Harmonize and align some remittances supervisory rules and practices with those of the East African Community (EAC)	
(f) Maintain a corridor approach	

Challenge (a) and (b): The **remittance market is not very competitive**, and the costs of remitting to South Sudan from abroad are extremely high.

Recommendation 2	Time
Enable the development of a dynamic and competitive market environment open to more certified operators in order to: (a) foster private sector investments; (b) increase commercial competition; (c) induce reduced remittance costs; and (d) improve the access to financial services in rural areas	
(a) Support infrastructural interventions to face structural barriers (such as network coverage, access to electricity and interconnections) especially in rural and remote areas.	Medium–long-term results
(b) Encourage new formal remittance operators (mobile network operators (MNOs)/ money transfer operators (MTOs) and banks) with incentives to enter the market in South Sudan	
(c) Review the legislation on microfinance institutions (MFIs)	
(d) Support the banking system's need of reinforcement (capitalization, liquidity and internal control)	
(e) Strengthen digital and financial literacy skills, especially in rural areas and targeting women	
(f) Create the conditions to link up remittances to directly pay for the children's school fees	

Challenge (c): **Accurate data on remittance flows** is missing.

Recommendation 3		Time
Establish a data collection system directed to obtain remittance flows information from official remittance operators		Short–medium-term result
(a) Build a data collection system by directing all banks involved to submit reports on migrant remittances by involving market stakeholders and reinforcing the technical capacities and activity of the BSS		
(b) Establish data-sharing between the South Sudanese and Australian regulatory bodies		

Policy recommendations to build a diaspora engagement strategy in South Sudan

Challenge (d): **Knowledge** on the South Sudanese diaspora abroad is still limited; the **dialogue** and **trust** between the diaspora in Australia and the Government of South Sudan are very weak.

Recommendation 4		Time
Enhance the political will and institutional commitment of the Government of South Sudan to create a diaspora-friendly environment		Medium-term result
(a) Open and foster diplomatic channels: Embassies/Consulates where the diaspora lives; establish a “investment–trade–diaspora attaché”		
(b) Establish agreements with airlines companies to favour diaspora travel opportunities		
(c) Establish a diaspora institutional public event		
(d) Develop a long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation process in Australia and South Sudan		Long-term result

Recommendation 5		Time
Improve the dialogue with the diaspora in Australia by formally recognizing and involving it as development actor in South Sudan		Medium-term result
(a) Build thematic discussion tables in South Sudan involving the main stakeholders, including diaspora representatives		
(b) Create a diaspora commission within the Government in South Sudan		

Recommendation 6		Time
Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora by building a mapping scheme to reach the diaspora in Australia		Short–medium-term result
(a) Establish easy channels and consultation mechanisms to reach the South Sudanese Australians: a mapping system; communication system; a “register” of diaspora philanthropy groups and skilled/target diaspora groups		

Recommendation 7		Time
Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its development engagement by meeting and consulting the diaspora in Australia		Medium-term result
(a) Plan a consultation road tour involving different South Sudanese authorities in Australia		
(b) Establish a virtual (online) and physical diaspora desk in Juba		

Recommendation 8		Time
Consolidate knowledge on the diaspora and promote its engagement by mapping and mobilizing the expertise of skilled South Sudanese in Australia		Short–medium-term result
(a) Map skilled profiles to develop focused interventions on knowledge transfer (health and education sector)		
(b) Revitalize a project from IOM South Sudan (2013) called Strengthening South Sudan’s health system by engaging health professionals in the diaspora		

Recommendation 9		Time
Promote diaspora engagement and mobilize its expertise in relationship to gender-sensitive initiatives for women empowerment in South Sudan		
(a) Map and target the diaspora's female talented and committed individuals and groups in Australia	Medium–long-term result	
(b) Involve and reinforce existing diaspora-led initiatives addressing women empowerment and gender equity in South Sudan		
(c) Promote financial literacy particularly targeting women		

Recommendation 10		Time
Promote diaspora engagement and expertise of younger generations		
(a) A call for diaspora sustainable development ideas, projects and start-up , open to all diasporas, but particularly to young people	Medium-term result	

Challenge (e). The possibility to maximize the **productive potential of remittances** and turn them into **local investments** is weak.


Recommendation 11		Time
Promote diaspora engagement and expertise targeting diaspora investors		
(a) Design and implement tailor made investment tools and incentives targeting the diaspora	Medium–long-term result	
(b) Facilitate clearance on diaspora's land property rights to enable diaspora's investments		
(c) Facilitate the development of financial products and solutions targeting the diaspora		
(d) Improve public investments in training and education and offer training and technical assistance services (open to the diaspora and also to the local population)		

Challenge (f). Public authorities and stakeholders have not yet proficiently addressed **diaspora-related discussions**, initiatives and policies with a coordinated effort.

Recommendation 12		Time
Build and reinforce the capacities of institutions in South Sudan and their coordination to address diaspora related issues		
(a) Reinforce the competencies and capacities of South Sudan authorities to strengthen the legal frameworks with technical support and training	Short–medium-term result	
(b) Reinforce the competencies and capacities of interested institutions to address migrant-related issues (establishing a diaspora focal point/unit)		
(c) Reinforce the capacity of South Sudan authorities to build transnational partnerships with international organizations, non-State actors and authorities in Australia		
(d) Reinforce the coordination among public institutions in South Sudan to deal with remittances/diaspora issues, in particular the existing Technical Advisory Working Group (in line with the Remittance Task Force)		

ANNEX 5. DETAILED INFORMATION ON REMITTANCES TO SOUTH SUDAN AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT FROM AUSTRALIA

Figure A5.1. Remittance channels employed from Australia to South Sudan



Source: Rift Valley Institute, 2018:12.

Note: Questionnaires to 200 persons in Juba.

Table A5.1. Purpose and regularity of familial financial support

Purpose	% receiving support	Regularity of financial support			
		Weekly	Monthly	Irregularly	Don't know/unspecified
School fees or business costs	52.5%	0.4%	19.9%	30.5%	1.7%
Rent or living costs	40.3%	0.0%	19.5%	19.9%	0.8%
Marriage or funeral costs	27.5%	0.0%	1.7%	25.8%	0.0%
Cultural or regional institutions	19.9%	0.0%	5.1%	14.8%	0.0%
Legal costs	15.7%	0.0%	1.7%	14.0%	0.0%
Support to church	8.5%	0.8%	1.3%	6.4%	0.0%

Source: Rift Valley Institute, 2018:9.

Note: Survey among 200 remittance recipients in South Sudan.

Table A5.2. South Sudanese in Australia as Internet users

Dwelling Internet connection, South Sudan-born and total Victoria, 2016

Dwelling internet Connection ^(a)	South Sudan-born		Total Victoria	
	Persons	% of total	Persons	% of total
Internet accessed from dwelling	1,833	70.1	4,748,889	83.9
Internet not accessed from dwelling	539	20.6	461,723	8.2
Not stated	228	8.7	355,792	6.3
Not Applicable ^(b)	10	0.4	92,161	1.6
Total^(c)	2,614	100.0	5,658,565	100.0

Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018:26.

Notes: ^a Includes accessing the Internet through a desktop/laptop computer, mobile or smartphone, tablet, music or video player, gaming console, smart TV or any other devices. It also includes accessing through any type of connection for example ADSL, fibre, cable, wireless, satellite and mobile broadband.

^b Persons counted in non-private dwellings, migratory and offshore areas.

^c This table only counts persons who were enumerated at their usual residence on Census night.

Figure A5.2. Sociodemographic factors affecting phone ownership and financial behaviour in South Sudan

Figure A5.2a. Sociodemographic determinants of phone ownership (N = 1,648)






Figure A5.2b. Sociodemographic factors affecting financial behaviour (N = 1,648)



Source: World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019.

Figure A5.3. Barriers to bank account ownership, among those who do not have a bank account



























Source: World Bank and Altai Consulting, 2019:33.

Note: Results on a total of 1,425 persons.

ANNEX 6. DETAILED INFORMATION OF THE COSTS TO REMIT TO SOUTH SUDAN

Figure A6.1a. Cost to remit from the United Kingdom to South Sudan, Fourth quarter 2019

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (GBP)
EcoBank Rapid Transfer		Bank branch, Internet	High			Low	3.60	0.90	3.90	4.68
Small World		Internet	High			Low	5.00	1.92	6.09	7.31
Small World		Agent	High			Low	5.00	1.92	6.09	7.31
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	3.99	3.48	6.81	8.17
Dahabshii		Agent	High			Low	7.20	1.92	7.92	9.50
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	6.90	2.58	8.33	10.00
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	9.90	2.58	10.83	13.00
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	19.00	3.48	19.31	23.17
Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019		Total Average Third Quarter 2019		Total Average			7.57	2.35	8.66	10.39
8.66		9.25								

Note: Information based on simulation of sending GBP 120 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 7 February 2020).

Figure A6.1b. Cost to remit from the United Kingdom to South Sudan, First quarter 2020

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (GBP)
Small World		Agent, Internet	High			Low	5.00	2.57	6.74	8.09
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	3.99	3.97	7.29	8.75
Dahabshiil		Agent	High			Low	7.20	2.78	8.78	10.54
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	8.90	2.67	10.09	12.11
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	6.90	6.30	12.05	14.46
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	19.00	3.97	19.80	23.76
Total Average First Quarter 2020 10.79		Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019 8.66		Total Average			8.50	3.71	10.79	12.95

Note: Information based on simulation of sending GBP 120 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 17 April 2020).

Figure A6.2a. Cost to remit from the United States to South Sudan, Fourth quarter, 2019

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (USD)
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	1.99	0.00	1.00	2.00
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	4.99	0.00	2.50	5.00
Small World		Internet	High			Low	5.99	0.00	3.00	6.00
Walmart2World		Agent	High			Low	8.00	0.00	4.00	8.00
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	9.99	0.00	5.00	10.00
Dahabshiil		Agent	High			Low	12.00	0.00	6.00	12.00
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	7.00	3.04	6.54	13.08
Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019 4.01		Total Average Third Quarter 2019 3.58		Total Average			7.14	0.43	4.01	8.01

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 200 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 7 February 2020).

Figure A6.2b. Cost to remit from the United States to South Sudan, First quarter 2020

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (USD)
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	1.99	0.00	1.00	2.00
MoneyGram		Internet	High			Low	4.99	0.00	2.50	5.00
Small World		Internet	High			Low	5.99	0.00	3.00	6.00
Walmart2World		Agent	High			Low	8.00	0.00	4.00	8.00
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	7.00	1.13	4.63	9.26
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	9.99	0.00	5.00	10.00
Dahabshiil		Agent	High			Low	12.00	0.00	6.00	12.00
Total Average First Quarter 2020 3.73		Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019 4.01		Total Average			7.14	0.16	3.73	7.47

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 200 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 17 April 2020).

Figure A6.3. Costs to remit from United Arab Emirates to South Sudan, First quarter 2020

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (USD)
Western Union		Internet	High			Low	4.29	1.52	3.67	7.34
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	7.14	1.52	5.10	10.20
Dahabshiil		Agent	High			Low	4.20	4.15	6.25	12.50
Total Average First Quarter 2020 5.01		Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019 7.58		Total Average			5.21	2.40	5.01	10.01

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 200 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 17 April 2020).

Figure A6.4. Costs to remit from Saudi Arabia to South Sudan, First quarter 2020

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (USD)
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	7.00	0.75	4.25	8.50
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	21.00	0.29	10.79	21.58
Total Average First Quarter 2020 7.52		Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019 7.29		Total Average			14.00	0.52	7.52	15.04

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 200 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 17 April 2020).

Table A6.5. Costs to remit from Australia to South Sudan

Western Union – remitting AUD 300 from Australia to South Sudan									
Transfer amount	Exchange rate		Commission	Amount received	Modality to send	Date of remittance simulation	Modality to receive	Receiver information	Sender information
AUD 300.00	AUD 1.00	SSP 93.0047	AUD 9.00	SSP 27 901.40	Immediate online transaction	09/02/2020	Cash at agent location	Receiver can pick up the money at any of WU agent locations in South Sudan.	
AUD 300.00	AUD 1.00	SSP 93.0047	AUD 35.00	SSP 27 901.40	Credit card	09/02/2020	Cash at agent location	Receiver can pick up the money at any of WU agent locations in South Sudan.	In this case, a card-issuer cash advance fee and associated interest charges may apply.
AUD 300.00	AUD 1.00	SSP 93.0047	AUD 35.00	SSP 27 901.40	Debit card	09/02/2020	Cash at agent location	Receiver can pick up the money at any of WU agent locations in South Sudan.	In this case, cash advance fee and associated interest charges are not applied.

MoneyGram – remitting AUD 300 from Australia to South Sudan									
Transfer amount	Exchange rate		Commission	Amount received	Modality to send	Date of remittance simulation	Modality to receive	Receiver information	Sender information
AUD 300.00	AUD 1.00	USD 0.6472	AUD 1.99 (final fee not applied for online simulation)	USD 194.16	Credit/debit card	09/02/2020	Cash at agent location		Credit card company may charge a cash advance fee and interest charges.
AUD 300.00	AUD 1.00	USD 0.6472	AUD 1.99 (final fee not applied for online simulation)	USD 194.16	BPAY (bank account)	09/02/2020	Cash at agent location		BPAY allows to use the bank account to pay for transactions. Paying for transactions will take 2–4 business days to process, once paid.

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 100 by accessing the website of Western Union and MoneyGram (accessed 9 February 2020).

Figure A6.5. Costs to remit from Kenya to South Sudan, First quarter 2020

Firm	Payment instrument	Access point	Sending network coverage	Transfer speed	Receiving method	Disbursing network coverage	Fee	Exchange rate margin (%)	Total cost (%)	Total cost (USD)
MoneyGram		Agent	High			Low	0.33	-0.31	-0.14	-0.28
Dahabshii		Agent	High			Low	13.97	2.15	9.13	18.26
Western Union		Agent	High			Low	14.67	2.23	9.57	19.14
Spire Bank		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	18.33	1.54	10.71	21.42
GT Bank		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	18.33	1.91	11.07	22.14
ABC Bank		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	18.33	1.95	11.12	22.24
United Bank for Africa (UBA)		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	18.33	2.13	11.30	22.60
EcoBank Rapid Transfer		Bank branch, Internet	High			Low	19.44	2.23	11.96	23.92
Citibank		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	20.00	2.80	12.80	25.60
KCB Bank		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	24.44	1.74	13.96	27.92
Development Bank of Kenya		Bank branch, Call Center, Internet	High			Low	22.81	3.55	14.96	29.92
Ecobank		Bank branch	Low			Low	30.00	2.04	17.04	34.08
				Total Average			18.25	2.00	11.12	22.25
Total Average First Quarter 2020		Total Average Fourth Quarter 2019								
11.12		11.48								

Note: Information based on simulation of sending USD 200 by accessing the World Bank website, Remittance Prices Worldwide (World Bank, n.d.b) (accessed 17 April 2020).

ANNEX 7. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

**Table A7. Country of birth
(top 20 plus Australia), persons of South Sudanese ancestry, Victoria
(2016 and 2011)**

Country of birth of persons of South Sudanese ancestry	Persons identifying with South Sudanese ancestry ^(b)					
	2016		2011		Change 2011-2016	
	Total responses	% of total	Total responses	% of total	Total responses	% change
Australia	1,492	34.6	393	22.7	1,099	279.6
South Sudan	1,532	35.5	695	40.1	837	120.4
Sudan	583	13.5	331	19.1	252	76.1
Kenya	234	5.4	103	5.9	131	127.2
Egypt	133	3.1	84	4.8	49	58.3
Ethiopia	64	1.5	24	1.4	40	166.7
Uganda	59	1.4	27	1.6	32	118.5
Yemen	7	0.2	-	-	7	-
Libya	5	0.1	3	0.2	2	66.7
Saudi Arabia	4	0.1	-	-	4	-
Canada	3	0.1	-	-	3	-
United States of America	3	0.1	-	-	3	-
Other countries	17	0.4	-	-	17	-
Not stated etc. ^(a)	181	4.2	75	4.3	106	141.3
Total responses, South Sudanese ancestry	4,317	100.0	1,734	100.0	2,583	149.0

Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018.

Notes: The ranking of countries of birth in this table is based on the most total responses (first and second responses) for South Sudanese ancestry.

^a Includes "Inadequately described" and "At sea".

^b Respondents have the option of providing more than one response, but only the first two responses are coded. Total responses may exceed total persons.

ANNEX 8. NUMBER OF SOUTH SUDAN-BORN IN MAJOR SUBURBS, VICTORIA


Table A8. Number of South Sudan-born by top 20 local government areas and major suburbs, Victoria

Rank in 2016	Rank in 2011	Local Government Area	Suburbs with most South Sudan-born, ranked
1	6	Wyndham (C)	Tarneit, Wyndham Vale, Truganina, Werribee, Point Cook
2	3	Casey (C)	Cranbourne North, Hampton Park, Narre Warren South, Doveton, Cranbourne
3	4	Melton (C)	Brookfield (Vic.), Melton West, Kurunjang, Caroline Springs, Taylors Hill
4	1	Brimbank (C)	St Albans (Vic.), Kings Park (Vic.), Derrimut, Deer Park, Sunshine North
5	2	Greater Dandenong (C)	Dandenong, Noble Park, Dandenong North, Noble Park North, Keysborough
6	12	Cardinia (S)	Pakenham, Officer
7	5	Yarra (C)	Fitzroy (Vic.), Collingwood (Vic.), Richmond (Vic.), Fitzroy North
8	7	Frankston (C)	Frankston North, Frankston, Carrum Downs, Langwarrin, Seaford (Vic.)
9	10	Maribymong (C)	Footscray, Braybrook, Maidstone, West Footscray, Kingsville
10	8	Latrobe (C)	Traralgon, Morwell, Moe
11	11	Moonee Valley (C)	Ascot Vale, Flemington, Keilor East
12	14	Monash (C)	Mulgrave (Vic.), Hughesdale, Clayton, Chadstone, Ashwood
13	16	Ballarat (C)	Delacombe, Wendouree, Sebastopol (Vic.), Ballarat East, Canadian
14	19	Greater Shepparton (C)	Shepparton, Mooroopna
15	13	Greater Geelong (C)	Corio, Lovely Banks, Bell Park, North Geelong
16	29	Melbourne (C)	Melbourne, North Melbourne, Carlton (Vic.), Kensington (Vic.), Parkville (Vic.)
17	15	Whittlesea (C)	Wollert, Epping (Vic.), Lalor, South Morang, Thomastown
18	9	Maroondah (C)	Ringwood (Vic.), Bayswater North, Croydon Hills
19	22	Kingston (C)	Patterson Lakes, Cheltenham (Vic.), Oakleigh South
20	31	Colac-Otway (S)	Colac

Sources: Census 2016 and Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018.

ANNEX 9. DETAILED INFORMATION OF THE COSTS TO REMIT TO SOUTH SUDAN

Figure A9. Sudanese and South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia by country of origin, 1980–2016



Source: Carver and Ruach Guok, 2020:14.

ANNEX 10. COUNTRY OF BIRTH OF HUMANITARIAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA

Table A10.1. Top 10 countries of birth for humanitarian programme migrants in Australia, 2006

Rank	Country	Number	Proportion %
1	Sudan	18685	24.4
2	Iraq	12870	16.8
3	Afghanistan	8529	11.1
4	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	5146	6.7
5	Islamic Republic of Iran	3611	4.7
6	Croatia	2505	3.3
7	Ethiopia	2127	2.8
8	Sierra Leone	1980	2.6
9	Liberia	1839	2.4
10	Egypt	1586	2.1
	Other countries	17615	23.0
	Total – all countries^a	76719	100.0

Source: Australia Bureau of Statistics, Settlement outcomes for humanitarian program migrants – Experimental estimates from the migrants statistical study. Available at www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/3416.0Main%20Features2June%202010?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3416.0&issue=June%202010&num=&view= (accessed 5 April 2020).

Note: ^a This is the total of all humanitarian programme migrants and also includes country of birth not stated. Sources include visa subclass and country of birth (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Settlement Database extract).

Table A10.2. Humanitarian: Citizenship status by top 10 countries of birth, humanitarian stream permanent migrants,^a 2011

Top 10 countries of birth	Australian citizen	Not an Australian citizen	Not stated	Total
Iraq	13 532	9 513	840	23 885
Sudan	14 075	4 041	1 017	19 133
Afghanistan	9 113	5,782	1 061	15 956
Myanmar	1 807	7,000	494	9 300
Islamic Republic of Iran	3 688	2,825	250	6 764
Ethiopia	2 175	1 261	150	3 585
Sierra Leone	2 181	972	192	3 345
Croatia	3 135	129	40	3 305
Thailand	499	2 548	232	3 279
Sri Lanka	1 152	1 915	122	3 189
Born elsewhere	21 832	18 728	2 326	42 885
Other (b)	1 159	742	1 827	3 729
Total	74 349	55 454	8 552	138 355

Source: Victorian Community Profiles: 2011 Census South Sudan-Born.

Note: ^a Table6c, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 34170DO001_2011 Understanding Migrant Outcomes – Enhancing the Value of Census Data, Australia (2011), released at 11:30 am (Canberra time), 19 September 2013.

ANNEX 11. LANGUAGE SPOKEN

Table A11. Proficiency in spoken English by top 10 languages other than English spoken at home, permanent humanitarian stream migrants 5 years and over (2011)

	Very well	Well	Not well	Not at all	Not stated	Total
Arabic	10.277	10.535	6.514	1.682	356	29.364
Bari	2.771	3.001	2.016	698	146	8.631
Dinka	3.568	2.684	1.115	138	206	7.712
Other language (c)	14.412	16.985	10.903	2.918	772	45.988
Not stated/ Inadequately described	440	447	243	51	2.291	3.472
Total	39.310	44.456	31.929	9.001	4.239	128.936

Source: Table 10c 34170DO001_2011 Understanding Migrant Outcomes – Enhancing the Value of Census Data, Australia, 2011, Released at 11:30 am (Canberra time), 19 September 2013.

ANNEX 12. LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME BY SOUTH SUDANESE BORN – AUSTRALIA

Table A12.1. Languages spoken at home (top 20), South Sudan-born and the total Victorian population (2016 and 2011)

Language spoken at home	South Sudan-born						Total Victorian population					
	2016		2011		Change 2011-2016		2016		2011		Change 2011-2016	
	Persons	% of total	Persons	% of total	Persons	% change	Persons	% of total	Persons	% of total	Persons	% change
Dinka	1,350	49.1	535	47.9	815	152.3	4,869	0.1	3,158	0.1	1,711	54.2
Arabic	577	21.0	217	19.4	360	165.9	79,589	1.3	68,437	1.3	11,152	16.3
Nuer	389	14.1	139	12.4	250	179.9	1,601	0.0	1,190	0.0	411	34.5
Shilluk	55	2.0	44	3.9	11	25.0	200	0.0	164	0.0	36	22.0
Bari	48	1.7	22	2.0	26	118.2	169	0.0	98	0.0	71	72.4
African Languages, nec	38	1.4	37	3.3	1	2.7	571	0.0	621	0.0	-50	-8.1
African Languages, nfd	28	1.0	13	1.2	15	115.4	626	0.0	478	0.0	148	31.0
Acholi	24	0.9	21	1.9	3	14.3	111	0.0	108	0.0	3	2.8
Southern Asian langs, nfd	12	0.4	4	0.4	8	200.0	2,841	0.0	2,687	0.1	154	5.7
Swahili	9	0.3	4	0.4	5	125.0	2,447	0.0	1,398	0.0	1,049	75.0
Madi	7	0.3	5	0.4	2	40.0	42	0.0	67	0.0	-25	-37.3
Mandaeen (Mandaic)	3	0.1	-	-	3	-	32	0.0	28	0.0	4	14.3
Cantonese	3	0.1	4	0.4	-1	-25.0	78,079	1.3	72,902	1.4	5,177	7.1
Mandarin	3	0.1	-	-	3	-	191,793	3.2	103,742	1.9	88,051	84.9
Anuak	3	0.1	13	1.2	-10	-76.9	22	0.0	37	0.0	-15	-40.5
Tok Pisin (Neomelanesian)	3	0.1	-	-	3	-	315	0.0	186	0.0	129	69.4
Speaks English only	131	4.8	21	1.9	110	523.8	4,026,811	67.9	3,874,861	72.4	151,950	3.9
Other languages ^(a)	34	1.2	16	1.4	18	112.5	1,175,532	19.8	980,132	18.3	195,400	19.9
Not stated	33	1.2	23	2.1	10	43.5	360,974	6.1	243,745	4.6	117,229	48.1
Total	2,750	100.0	1,118	100.0	1,632	146.0	5,926,624	100.0	5,354,039	100.0	572,585	10.7

Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018.

Table A12.2. Proficiency in spoken English, South Sudan-born and the total Victorian population, 2016 and 2011

Proficiency in spoken English ^(a)	South Sudan-born						Total Victorian population					
	2016		2011		Change 2011-2016		2016		2011		Change 2011-2016	
	Persons	% of total	Persons	% of total	Persons	% change	Persons	% of total	Persons	% of total	Persons	% change
Speaks English only	131	4.8	21	1.9	110	523.8	4,026,811	67.9	3,874,861	72.4	151,950	3.9
Speaks other languages & speaks English:												
Very well	1,254	45.6	484	43.3	770	159.1	854,437	14.4	691,030	12.9	163,407	23.6
Well	920	33.5	394	35.2	526	133.5	419,756	7.1	332,894	6.2	86,862	26.1
Not well	347	12.6	147	13.1	200	136.1	204,807	3.5	167,831	3.1	36,976	22.0
Not at all	48	1.7	33	3.0	15	45.5	61,277	1.0	44,804	0.8	16,473	36.8
Not stated ^(b)	55	2.0	39	3.5	16	41.0	359,543	6.1	242,618	4.5	116,925	48.2
Total	2,750	100.0	1,118	100.0	1,632	146.0	5,926,624	100.0	5,354,039	100.0	572,585	10.7


Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018.

Notes: ^a This is a self-assessment.

^b Not stated includes "Language or English proficiency not stated" and "Both language and English proficiency not stated".


ANNEX 13. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTH SUDAN-BORN IN VICTORIA

Figure A13. Geographic distribution of South Sudan-born in metropolitan local government areas, Victoria. Census 2011 (left) and 2016 (right)^a



Distribution per South Sudanese ancestry in New South Wales State (2016) (Total South Sudan ancestries 1,340 – of whom 1,207 in Greater Sydney)

Distribution of Dinka spoken language in New South Wales State (2016): (Total persons speaking Dinak 2,012 – of whom 1,674 in Greater Sydney)



Sources: State of Victoria, 2013; Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018; <https://multiculturalnsw.id.com.au/multiculturalnsw/ancestry-introduction?COIID=218>; <https://multiculturalnsw.id.com.au/multiculturalnsw/language-introduction?COIID=9216>.

Notes: ^a Victorian community profiles: 2011/2016 Census South Sudan-born (State of Victoria, 2013; Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2018).

These maps are for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

ANNEX 14. DIASPORA INVESTMENT READINESS INDEX FOR SOUTH SUDAN

Diaspora investment readiness index (DIRI) framework

Pillar 1: Investment opportunity's financial profile for South Sudan (Compiled with the support of the Bank of South Sudan)

Government investment vehicles		Stock exchange		Crowd funding	Retail products		Microfinance	Investment funds		
Diaspora government bonds	Diaspora public pension schemes	Stocks	Corporate bonds		Bank savings	Loans/ mortgages		Managed funds	Managed funds	Property investment – Equity schemes
No. There is no plan to have them in the short run.	The Government of South Sudan recently developed a pension act (2012), but any diaspora pension scheme is not included. This can be developed in the long term.	No	No	A public initiative took place in 2019 to collect funds for peace agreement implementation.	There are 29 commercial banks, (private, public and government). Regulation: Banking Act 2012.	N.A.	International Monetary Fund (IMF) framework needs to be finalized; eight microfinance institutions (MFIs) pre-registered at the Ministry of Justice but did not received their licence yet).	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

DIRI framework

Pillar 2: Diaspora investment profile (ability and willingness to invest) (Compiled with the support of the Bank of South Sudan)

Level of financial education/ financial literacy	Estimated % of the diaspora with investable wealth	Estimated investable wealth (snapshot)	Diaspora bank accounts in home country (%)	Likelihood of diaspora retiring in home country	Financial obligations in home country	Likelihood of reinvesting initial investment in country of origin	Diaspora's trust in the Government
8%. The lack of financial inclusion affects particularly rural areas and all displaced people forced to move out of their normal residency areas.	No data or estimate is available. Considering the Australian context, it is reasonable to consider that the majority of South Sudanese live with low/medium salaries (for numerous families), and they unlikely are in the condition to dispose of large savings to invest. Presence of wealth can be potentially found in those smaller percentage of migrants with advanced skills, education and occupation.	N.A.	Non-South Sudanese citizens can easily open bank accounts in South Sudan. From key informants, a small percentage of bank accounts belongs to diaspora members (more likely in regional banks).	Currently, there is no legal and official scheme/programme targeting retired migrants (including regulation on hard currency repatriation). There is no evidence of retired migrants' trends or signs of interest (the population abroad is not yet at pension age).	N.A.	N.A.	Key informants mention a general lack of trust in the diaspora due to the recent armed conflicts (2013/2016); general corruption identified in public institutions and absence of accountability.

ANNEX 15. THE DIASPORA INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE

South Sudan, March 2020 (Compiled with the support of the Bank of South Sudan)

Country	Country GDP (in SSP)	Country population (thousands)	Inflation %	Bilateral remittance (millions of USD)	Ease of doing business index	World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index	2016 Bank Z Score	2015 provisions to non-performing loans (%)	Government debt to GDP (%), 2017	Country risk rating, 2018 ^a
South Sudan	182 785 242	10 975 920	83.5		185.0		8.9	90.6	0	High
Source	BSS, 2020	World Bank Data 2018 https://data.worldbank.org/	BSS, 2020		Doing Business 2019 classification, Rank over 190 countries		http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global-financial-development#	World Bank Global Financial Development 2017	https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-debt-to-gdp	https://support.lykke.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011118620-Countries-Risk-Rating

Note: ^a There is no country risk rating for South Sudan.

Domestic bonds, 2018	International bonds, 2018	Lending rate %	Interest rates %	Long-term currency volatility (1970–2013)	Dual citizenship recognized	Non-performing loans net of provisions to capital (%)	Financial Development Index 2014	Nominal exchange rate volatility % (2015–2017)	Stock market	Stock market capitalization (USD million), 2017	Stock market (# firms, 2017)
0	0	13.4%	17.82	12.1%	Yes	13.7	0.080041	564.1%	No	0	0
		BSS	BSS	Economist Intelligence Unit/Canback		BSS		BSS			

Pension funds' assets (total, million USD), 2015–2016	Depreciation of currency in last 3 years (% change)	Restricted currencies	Diaspora investment potential	Default on bonds/government over-stretched	Coupon rates on one-year bond	Coupon rates on five-year bond	Average coupon rates	Concentration of diaspora (% of diaspora in top 3 countries)	Eurobonds	Diaspora population	Bilateral remittance estimate (million USD), 2017	USD LIBOR – 1 month
0	35.40	No	N.A.	No					0	0	0	
	BSS	BSS		BSS								

ANNEX 16. SELF-ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

Pillar 1	Pillar 2	Pillar 3	Pillar 4	Pillar 5	Pillar 6
Political will of the Government of South Sudan to commit in mobilizing the diaspora	Diaspora-friendly environment	National diaspora strategy	Diaspora consultation mechanisms	Outreach mobilizing strategy	Diaspora- oriented programmes
1 Political commitment. There is a relatively moderate political commitment towards the diaspora, but a Comprehensive Migration Policy (2019) had been created addressing the diaspora engagement.	1 Level of diaspora rights. No projects or plans in relationship to diaspora's rights.	1 The Government has not yet drafted/ implemented a strategy. Policy recommendations for remittance channelling and diaspora engagement are indicated on this IOM South Sudan study (2020) with the participation of public and private stakeholders.	Formal channels (grass roots). There are no formal channels at the moment.	1 Data. No data available nor collected.	1 Diaspora programmes. With IOM South Sudan, this study on diaspora remittances and the Australian corridor has been undertaken.
2 Focal point. There was a diaspora desk at the Presidency of South Sudan. There are discussions to have a diaspora direction within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	2 Political representation. No diaspora political representation in terms of right to vote from abroad or presence of a commission on diaspora issues.	2 Effectiveness, N/A	2 Formal channels (high-level). There are no formal channels at the moment.	2 Collection capacity, Low	2 Joint programmes, No
3 Capacity (technical) of the focal point to engage the diaspora. No presence of focal point and need to reinforce capacities.	3 Incentive framework. There are fiscal incentives for investors but they do not specifically target migrants.	3 Consultation, Besides this IOM study, no formal mechanisms of consultation exist.	3 Consultation. There are no formal consultations planned.	3 Visibility. The diaspora that access social media in the country of residence has gained a certain visibility but accounted also for hate speech there.	
4 Capacity (financial) of the focal point to engage the diaspora. No presence of focal point and need to reinforce financial capacities.	5 Cooperation, No	4 Linkages, No	4 Capacity-building. There are no initiatives of capacity-building to support the diaspora, but this has been identified as a need and a recommendation.	4 Published diaspora information. In South Sudan, there are no sources to spread information on opportunities to the diaspora.	
5 Cooperation, multi-stakeholder cooperation on the diaspora engagement agenda. With IOM, there is this ongoing project and other previous initiatives had been targeting diaspora (as health-skilled diaspora). The political instability and conflicts hampered the past experiences.	5 Reintegration services. There are programmes to support internally and internationally displaced persons to possibly sustain return, as security conditions of reinsertion allow it; no diaspora return programmes exist.			5 Published investment information	
	6 Remittances. There are ways to send remittances from abroad but still the competition is too limited and costs are too high. The Government shall improve these two market aspects.			6 Cultural event support	

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